IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


1.0 


1.1 


11.25 


Uil2i  lis 

m  ^^  mi 

■^  lii   12.2 

^   Itt   12.0 

•"    I. 

y4iJ4 


6" 


^ 


^ 


/ 


V 


Photographic 

Sdences 
Corporalion 


23  WIST  MAIN  STRUT 

WnSTIR.N.Y.  14SM 

(716)  •72-4503 


V.  o 


••«i^ 
S!^^ 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHIVI/ICIVIH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historicai  IVIicroreproductions  /  Inttitut  Canadian  da  mieroraproductions  hiatoriquas 


Ttehnleal  and  Bibliographic  Notas/Notes  tachnlquea  at  bibiiographiquas 


Tha  inatituta  has  attamptad  to  obtain  tha  bast 
original  copy  availabia  for  filming.  Paaturaa  of  this 
copy  which  may  ba  bibliographleally  unlqua, 
which  may  altar  any  of  tha  Imagaa  in  tha 
raproduction.  or  which  may  algnlf  loantiy  ehanga 
tha  usual  mathod  of  filming,  ara  chaekad  balow. 


□   Colourad  oovara/ 
Couvartura  da  ooulaur 


I — I   Covars  damagad/ 


D 


D 
D 


D 


Couvartura  andommagia 

Covars  rastorad  and/or  laminatad/ 
Couvartura  raatauria  at/ou  palliculAa 


|~~|   Covar  titia  miasing/ 


La  titra  da  couvartura  manqua 

Colourad  maps/ 

Cartas  giographiquas  an  eoulaur 

Colourad  ink  li.a,  othar  than  biua  or  black)/ 
Encra  da  eoulaur  (l.a.  autra  qua  blaua  ou  noira) 


I     I  Colourad  platas  and/or  illustrations/ 


D 


Planchas  at/ou  illustrations  an  eoulaur 


Bound  with  othar  matarial/ 
Rail*  avac  d'autras  doeumants 


Tight  binding  may  eauaa  shadowa  or  distortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

La  re  liura  sarria  paut  eauaar  da  I'ombra  ou  da  la 
distortion  la  long  da  la  marge  IntAriaure 

B!ank  leaves  added  during  restoration  may 
appear  within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these 
have  been  omitted  from  filming/ 
II  so  peut  que  eertainas  pages  blanches  ajoutias 
lors  d'une  restauration  apparaissant  dans  la  taxta, 
mala,  lorsqua  cela  Atait  possible,  caa  pages  n'ont 
pas  iti  filmiaa. 

Additional  comments:/ 
Commenteires  supplAmentairas; 


L'Institut  a  microfilma  le  meilleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  lui  a  ata  possible  da  se  procurer.  Les  datails 
da  cat  exemplaire  qui  sont  peut-Atre  uniques  du 
point  da  vua  bibliographique.  qui  peuvent  modifier 
una  image  reproduite.  ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une 
modification  dans  la  mathoda  normala  de  filmage 
sont  indiquAs  ci-dessous. 


Thi 
tot 


I     I   Coloured  pages/ 


D 


Pages  de  couleur 

Pages  damaged/ 
Pages  endommagaas 

Pages  restored  and/oi 

Pages  restauraas  at/ou  pellicuiies 

Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxei 
Pages  dicoiorias.  tachetaas  ou  piqudes 

Pages  detached/ 
Pages  datachdes 

Showthrough/ 
franisparence 

Quality  of  prir 

Qujlit6  inagale  de  I'impression 

Includes  supplementary  materia 
CotTiprend  du  matariel  supplimentaire 

Only  ddition  available/ 
Sauia  Mition  disponible 


r~l  Pages  damaged/ 

I — I  Pages  restored  and/or  laminated/ 

r-~i  Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 

I      I  Pages  detached/ 

r~~n  Showthrough/ 

I     I  Quality  of  print  varies/ 

□  Includes  supplementary  material/ 
Coi 

I — I  Only  ddition  available/ 


Thf 
poa 
oft 
filn 


Ori( 
bag 
tha 
alor 
oth 
firs 
aioi 
or  I 


Tha 
aha 
TIN 
whi 

ly^ai 
diffi 
anti 
bagi 
righ 
raqi 
met 


Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc..  have  been  refilmed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Les  pages  totaiement  ou  partiellement 
obscurcias  par  un  feuiilet  d'errata.  une  pelure, 
etc.,  ont  ata  filmies  a  nouveau  de  fapon  a 
obtenir  la  meiileure  image  possible. 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  est  filmA  au  taux  da  reduction  indiqua  ci-dessous. 

10X  14X  18X  22X 


26X 


»X 


y 

12X 


16X 


20X 


24X 


28X 


32X 


ir« 

JAtails 
•s  du 
modifier 
er  une 
filmage 


les 


Th«  copy  fllmad  h«r«  has  bMn  rtproduoad  thanks 
to  tha  ganarosity  of: 

Douglas  Library 
Quaan's  Univarsity 

Tha  imagas  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  bast  quality 
posslbia  considaring  tha  condition  and  laglblllty 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  Icaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  spacifications. 


Original  copias  in  printad  papar  covars  ara  fllmad 
baginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  last  paga  with  a  printad  or  illustratad  Impras* 
sion.  or  tha  back  covar  whan  approprlata.  All 
othar  original  coplaa  ara  filmad  baginning  on  tha 
first  paga  with  a  printad  or  Illustratad  Impras* 
sion,  and  anding  on  tha  last  paga  with  a  printad 
or  illustratad  imprassion. 


Tha  last  racordad  frama  on  aaoh  microfloha 
shall  contain  the  symbol  ^^  (moaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  tha  symbol  y  (moaning  "END"), 
whichavar  appiias. 


L'axamplaira  fllmi  fut  raprodult  grica  A  la 
g4nAroaltA  da: 

Douglas  Library 
Quaan's  Univarsity 

Las  imagas  suivantaa  ont  4ti  raproduitas  avac  la 
plus  grand  soln,  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattatA  da  l'axamplaira  f llmA.  at  •n 
conformM  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  da 
fllmaga. 

Laa  axampiairas  origlnaux  dont  la  couvartura  Bn 
papiar  ast  imprimia  sont  fiimte  an  commandant 
par  la  pramiar  plat  at  an  tarminant  soit  por  la 
darnlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  ampralnta 
d'Impraaslon  ou  d'iiiustration,  soit  par  la  sacond 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  I'oui^  las  autras  axampiairas 
origlnaux  sont  fiimfo/an  commandant  par  la 
pramlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  ampralnta 
d'Impraaslon  ou  d'illustration  at  an  tarminant  par 
la  darniAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  teiia 
ampralnta. 

Un  das  symboias  suivants  apparaltra  sur  la 
darnlAra  imaga  da  chaqua  microfiche,  salon  la 
cas:  la  symbols  -^*  signlfia  "A  SUIVRE  ",  la 
symbols  ▼  signifis  "FIN". 


■Maps,  piatas.  charts,  ate.  may  ba  filmad  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  bo 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  ara  filmad 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  oornar,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diegrams  Illustrate  tha 
method: 


Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  itre 
fiimis  A  des  taux  da  reduction  diff Arents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  soul  cllchA,  il  est  fiimA  A  partir 
da  I'angle  supArisur  gauche,  do  gauche  A  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bes,  sn  prenent  le  nombre 
d'imagas  nAcessaire.  Las  diagrammes  suivants 
lllustrent  la  mAthode. 


errata 
to 


9  pelure. 
on  A 


32X 


1  2  3 


■ 

i     1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

D] 


Cibrarg 

SPECIAL  COLLECTIONS 

KINOSTON.  ONTARIO 


OF 


'«< 


■'••t~ 


Mr,  Mmmn's 


DISPASSIONATE  INQ.UIRT 


«. 


MTO  TBI 


REASONS  ALLEGED  BY  BIR.  MADISON 


IQB  OKkAUIia  Am 


OPFBNgrVB  AND  RUINOUS  WAR 
AGAINST  GREAT-BRITAIN. 

TOOSTHKB  Win 

SOME  SUGGESTIONS 

At  TO  A 

PEACEABLE  AND  CONSTITUTIONAL  MODE 
OF  JF£JtTIJV*0   THAT  DREJtDFUL  CAJbJmiTF. 


^M*m 


a-  n 


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BY  A  NEW.ENGLAND  FARMER. 

*'Poor  U  Kii  triumph,  and  ditgrao'd  hi*  name. 
Who  drawtlhe  awoni  for  empire,  wealth, .or  Tame; 
And  poorer  •till  those  itatesmen't  thajre  of  praise, 
Who  at  a  tyrant'*  nod  their  eountry's  standard  raise : 
For  them  UkOUgh  wealth  be  blown  on  every  wind,  , 

Though"  Fumoe  ''announce  them  mightiest  of  mankind, 
Though  twktten  nations  enuck  beneath  their  blade. 
Virtue  disowns  them,  and  their  glories'fade. 
For  them  no  prayers  are  poar'd,  no  pasans  sung. 
No  blessings  chaunted  from  a  nation  s  tongue. 
Blood  marcs  the  path  to  their  untimely  bier : 
The  ourte  of  orptians  and  the  widow's  tear 
Cry  to  high  HeaTcn  for  vengeance  on  their  head. 
Alive  deserted,  and  araurat  when  dead," 


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BOSTON : 

FRIKTED  BY  RUSSELL  ii  CUTLlSlt. 

1812. 


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INTRODUCTION. 


o 


PTER  the  following  pas^s  were  put  to  press,  most  interest- 
ing information  was  received  from  Europe,  which,  as  it  serves  to 
illustrate,  and  confirm  the  opinions  of  the  writer,  as  it  will  pnt  to 
the  test  the  sincerity  of  our  administration,  as  it  will  enable  us  to 
decide,  whether  the  real  object  of  the  present  war  is  to  protect 
the  commercial  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States,  or  to 
promote  the  views  of  France,  and  ih  systematic  co-operation 
with  her ;  and  as  this  intelligence  more  especially  and  distinctly 
proves,  that  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  were  not  repealed  at  the 
time  when  they  were  professed  to  be,  but  that  their  repeal,  if  it 
has  yet  taken  effect,  was  only  the  result  of  our  ''  common  measures 
adopted  against  the  common  enemy,"  as  M.  Turreau  justly  char- 
acterised them,  we  trust  we  shall  be  excused  for  devoting  a  few 
pages  to  the  examination  of  this  recent  intelligence  and  of  its  hear- 
ing upon  the  existing  situation  and  policy  of  the  United  States. 

Sometime  in  the  month  of  May  last  (1812)  Bonaparte  publish- 
ed a  decree  purporting  to  bear  date  April  38,  1811,  in  which  re- 
riting,  as  its  sole  cause,  that  *'  Congress  had  by  their  act  of 
March  2,  1811,  declared  that  British  sliips  and  merchandise 
should  be  interdicted  an  entry  into  the  ports  of  the  IJ.  States,"  and 
reciting  further,  ^'  that  the  aforesaid  law  of  Congress  is  an  act  of 
resistance  to  the  British  Orders  in  Council,''  lie  proceeds  to  decree, 
that  "  the  Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees  are  definitively  (fWtm  the 
first  of  November  last)  considered  as  no  lunger  in  farce  as  far  as 
respects  American  vessels."     The  phrasooloi^y  is  indeed  curious— > 


158671 


there  are  no  words  of  repeal  or  revocation— but  it  is  Himply  de  • 
clared,  that  the  decrees  are  considered  as  no  longer  In  force  so  far 
as  respects  American  vessels.  Notwithstanding  this  his  Majesty 
May  seiase  their  cargoes  and  condemn  them  with  a  mnch  smaller 
violation  of  his  imperial  word  than  we  have  sometimes  seen. 

Various,  numerous  and  important  are  the  thoughts  to  which 
this  singular  ex  post  facto  drcree  gives  rise,  and  if  some  of  them 
bear  hard  on  our  administration,  who  have  just  entered  into  an 
avowed  co-operation  and  concert  with  France,  they  are  indebted 
to  their  new  ally  for  these  reflections,  and  not  to  us. 

The  first  and  most  obvious  inquiry  is,  was  this  decree  really 
passed  in  ^pril,  1811,  though  not  promulgated  till  May,  1812  ? 
or  is  this  a  decree  ante-dated  to  promote  any  political  and  sinister 
views  ? 

If  bona  fide  issued  on  the  day  of  its  date,  why  wati  it  witli- 
held  from  our  minister,  Mr.  Russel,  who  was  during  the  months 
of  May  and  June,  1811,  urging  the  French  government  to  give 
some  substantial  proof  of  the  repeal  of  the  French  deorees  P  Why 
was  it  kept  back  from  the  nation  which  upon  the  face  of  it  was 
the  only  one  affected  by  it  ?  In  June,  1811,  Mr.  Russel  informed 
the  Frenoh  minister,  that  he  kept  the  John  Adams  in  waiting 
solely  that  she  might  carry  out  to  the  United  States  something  that 
might  satisfy  our  people  that  the  decrees  were  repealed.  Yet  on 
the  14th  of  July  all  he  could  obtain  was  the  release  of  two  ves- 
sels which  did  not  come  under  their  operation,  but  of  five  others 
captured  after  November,  1810,  and  coming  within  the  decrees. 
not  one  of  them  w  as  then,  or  has  been  yet  released. 

Mr.  Barlow  soon  after  arrived'  in  France,  a  man  better  suitied 
than  Mr.  Russel  to  conduct  a  negociation  in  which  the  United 
States  were  to  yield  their  independence  to  France.  He  also  in 
very  suppliant  strains  from  August,  1811,  to  February,  1812, 
urged  the  Emperor  to  furnish  some  proof  of  the  repeal  of  the  Ber- 
lin and  Milan  decrees.  Yet  his  Imperial  Majesty  did  not  reccol- 
lect,  or  did  not  see  fit  to  furnish  the  simplest  and  best  possiblt 
answer,  bis  pretended  decree  of  April,  1811. 

If  that  decree  hud  been  furnished,  Britain  probably  would  have 
long  since  repealed  hejr  orders  in  council,  and  this  disastrous  wai^ 


^# 


8  Himply  (le- 
I  force  to  far 
hit  Majesty 
nch  smaller 
en  seen, 
ts  to  which 
ome  of  them 
ered  into  ait 
ire  indebted 

lecree  really 

May,  1812? 

aud  sinister 

vols  it  widi- 
the  months 
neut  to  give 
trees  ?  Why 
:e  of  it  was 
sel  informed 
is  in  waiting 
mething  that 
led.  Yet  on 
of  two  ves. 
f  five  others 
the  decrees, 

better  suitied 
li  the  United 
He  alsd  in 
Piiary,  1813, 
loftheBer- 
td  not  reccol- 
best  possiblt 

f  would  have 
sastrous  wai^ 


Miight  have  been  avoided.  If  tliat  decree  had  been  promulgated 
the  courts  of  France,  Naples  and  Holland  would  have  restored 
(he  numerous  vessels  captured  or  seized  under  the  Berlin  aud  Mi- 
lan decrees,  and  without  that  decree  they  could  not  do  it.  For 
Ocn.  Armstrong  declared  in  one  of  his  letters,  that  the  council  of 
prizes  stated  to  him  that  they  could  take  no  other  evidence  of  the 
repeal  of  the  decrees,  than  a  solemn  imperial  edict  which  should 
annul  them.  Why  then,  tvas  this  evidence  withheld  ?  We  shall 
give  our  own  suggestions  as  to  the  retuoms  presently  We  had 
not  then  promised  to  enter  itito  the  war  !  ! 

But  we  ask  further,  why  if  the  decrees  were  repealed  so  far  as 
respects  Americans,  his  Majesty  in  person  condemned  the  Cathar- 
ine,  Ockington,  owned  by  John  Parker  Esq.  of  Boston,  and  others ' 
and  four  other  ships  and  cargoes  taken  in  the  Baltick,  under  pre- 
tence of  having  been  boarded  by  British  crui8er8,or  being  laden  with 
the  produce  of  enemies  colonies,  in  September,  ISll,  five  months 
after  the  date  of  the  pretended  decree  of  repeal  P 

Again,  if  the  decrees  were  repealed  in  April,  1811,  why,  if  not 
communicated  to  us,  who  were  specially  interested,  and  to  the  world, 
were  they  kept  in  the  Emperor's  cabinet  till  1813,  and  not  eom* 
municated  either  to  his  court  or  his  Minister  of  Marine,  when  the 
event  to  which  they  referred  happened  in  March,  1811  P  Why  did 
Feretier's  squadron  which  sailed  in  January,  1813,  nine  months 
afterwards,  sail  under  the  repealed  decrees  P  Why  were  they  order- 
ed to  capture,  sink,  bum  and  destroy  every  American  vessel  which 
had  traded  to  an  enemy's  port  ?  Why  was  the  brig  owned  by  the 
Messrs.  Curtis's  of  Boston,  destroyed'  by  that  squadron,  and  a 
dozen  others,  whose  losses  have  been  paid  by  our  underwri- 
ters? Why  did  the  Emperor  in  his  official  speech  to  his  sem  u-, 
lately  referred  to  by  Mr.  Foster ^  as  late  as  March  last,  still  lit. 
clare  them  to  be  the  fundamenta.1  laws  of  his  empire  P  How 
could  they  be  repealed,  and  yet  in  force  P  There  was  no  other 
nation  but  America,  on  whom  they  would  operate,  and  yet  he  de- 
clared them  last  March,  the  laws  df  his  empire. 

In  short,  this  measure  may  be  considered  the  climax  of  French 
injustice  and  intrigue.  While  their  decrees  which  operate  against 
MS  are  instantly  promulgated,  and  have  sometimes  a  retrospective 


^h 


tenilency,  tint  jtreittuhd  favourable  Avnvc  i»  confined  to  the  Kin- 
peror^B  breast  for  thirteen  months  )  or  rutlicr,  as  we  shall  preHcntly 
shew,  tlie  price  given  for  it  was  an  aMiiranee  of  a  declaration  of 
ntir,  and  it  was  ante-dated  to  cover  the  honour  of  one  of  the  high 
contracting  parties. 

But  this  it  the  narrowest  and  most  favourable  view  of  this 
Htrau!^  transaction.  There  arc  lights  in  which  it  ought  to  he 
considered  which  bear  as  hard  upon  our  administration  as  they  do 
upon  France. 

Bonaparte  announces  as  the  mle  ground  of  \\m  pretended  repeal 
that  our  act  of  March  2,  1811,  was  a  resistance  of  the  orders  in 
council.  But  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  sole  ostensible,  and 
the  only  plausible^  though  unjust  ground  of  our  act  of  March,  1811, 
was  the  previous  revocation  of  the  French  decrees,  on  the  ist  of 
November,  1810. 

So  then  we  have  this  extraordinary  stfttc  of  the  case. 

Congress  in  May,  1810,  passed  a  law  pretended  to  be  impar- 
tial, whieh  provided  that  the  non  interconrse  act  should  cease  as 
to  the  nation  which  ihouU  first  repeal  its  decrees,  and  that  it 
should  operate  on^the  other  which  should  fail  so  to  do. 

Mr.  Madison  declared  the  French  decrees  repealed  in  Novem- 
ber, 1810,  and  Congress  in  pursuance  of  its  pledge  to  France,  and 
supposing  the  decrees  repealed  in  November,  1810,  passed  the 
non  importation  act  of  March  2,  1811,  operating  only  against 
Great  Britain,  and  therefore  in  effect  making  war  upon  her  alone. 

France,  regardless  of  the  character  or  consistency  of  our  ad- 
ministration, now  declares  that  her  decrees  were  not  repealed  un- 
til April  28,  1811,  and  then  insultingly  tells  them  that  it  is  only 
in  consequence  of  our  act  of  March  2, 1811,  which  act  was  pass- 
ed as  is  professed  only  in  consequence  of  the  supposed  and  alUged 
previous  repeal  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees,  in  November, 
preceding.  In  any  other  view,  that  act  would  have  been  a  shame- 
ful example  of  partiality. 

Thus  it  seems  that  in  addition  to  the  bitter  pill  of  war,  we  ars 
compelled  to  swallow  this  most  nauseous  and  disgusting  dose — 
we  are  to  admit  that  our  retaliation  upon  France  was  first  with- 
drawn, before  she  would  consent  to  repeal  her  decrees,  and  Mr. 


VII 


ned  to  the  Kiii- 
e  shall  preHCiilly 
I  decluratinii  of 
one  of  the  high 

B  view  of  thi« 
it  ought  to  he 
atioii  nti  they  do 

iretendi'd  repeal 
f  the  orders  in 
!  oHtensible,  and 
of  March,  1811, 
ea,  on  the  ist  of 

cane. 

led  to  be  impar- 

should  cease  as 

's,  and  that  it 

0  do. 

led  in  Novem- 

to  France,  and 
LO,  passed  the 
;  only  against 
upon  her  alone. 
ey  of  our  ad- 
lot  repealed  un- 

that  it  is  only 

act  was  pass- 
sed  and  alleged 

in  November, 
e  been  a  shame- 

of  war,  we  ara 
gusting  dose — 
rt-as  first  with- 
erees,  and  Mr. 


Madison  declared  to  the  world  that  her  decrees  were  repealed, 
which  she  note  says  were  not  repealed  until  after  we  adopted 
what  she  directed^  that  is,  nieasurPK  of  resistance  against  her  ene- 
my's orders,  which  were  second  in  point  of  date,  and  merely  re- 
taliatory. 

If  this  is  not  a  triumph  of  France  over  our  pride,  our  honour, 
our  character,  our  justice,  our  interest,  and  our  liberties,  1  confcM* 
1  do  not  know  what  acts  could  amount  to  such  a  triumph. 

We  have  now  taken  one  view^  and  not  a  very  honourable  one 
either  to  France  or  our  own  administration,  of  this  news.  From 
this  examination  it  will  appear  to  every  man  not  wedded  to  Fraucc 
or  to  party  views— 

1st.  That  the  French  decrees  were  never  in  fact  repealed  till 
this  very  last  month  oS  May,  when  the  repeal  was  issued.  The 
well  known  execution  of  them  by  French  officers  and  by  the  em- 
peror in  person,  renders  the  pretence  of  repeal,  only  an  insult  on 
our  understandings. 

3d.  That  the  ante-doting  the  repeal  was  intended  to  screen  our 
administration ;  but  the  pride  of  France  overcame  her  desire  to 
save  Mr.  Madison.  8he  did  not  choose  to  have  it  appear  in  the 
face  of  Europe,  that  she  repealed  her  decrees  without  a  quid  pro 
quo—without  a  salvo  for  her  oivn  honour. 

She,  therefore,  alleges  on  the  face  of  this  repeal,  that  our  re- 
sistance to  Britain  was  the  sole  moving  cause ;  while  we  found 
our  resistance  of  Britain  upon  the  previous  repeal  of  her  decrees. 
How  these  anaehfonisms,  or  contradictions  of  dates,  are  to  be  re- 
conciled, we  leave  to  the  Gallo-American  chronologists  to  explain. 

But  there  is  a  more  serious  light  in  which  this  topick  must  be 
viewed,  and  if  the  declaration  of  war  aroused  our  fears  and  ex- 
cited our  jealousies,  surely  this  event  of  the  coincident,  and  late, 
and  reluctant,  and  strange  repeal  of  the  French  decrees  is  not 
calculated  to  quiet  or  allay  them.  If  France  could  have  foreseen 
that  before  her  repeal  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  could  reach 
America,  war  would  be  declared  by  Mr.  Mudison  against  Great 
Britain — Tf  a  copy  of  his  Mar  message,  and  an  assurance  of  his 
determination  to  engage  in  war,  co2dd  have  been  transmitted  by 
the  Wasp,  which  is  now  in  France ;  why,  everyman  will  perceive 


( i 


i 


riii 

(hat  DunMpnrlc  might  very  $afflif  rppral  luR  RrrliM  and  Milan  iIp* 
crpen— bf  caiiiir  thofle  deereea  only  forbade  our  trade  with  England, 
and  a  war  between  us  and  her  would  do  that  mueh  more  elTeetual- 
ly.  Now  we  do  not  nay  that  fAin  leoM  the  eaiiei  but  we  do  lay 
thut  it  would  not  be  more  extraordinary  than  Mr.  Madiiion'i  eon- 
duet  in  the  eaae  we  have  Just  considered,  in  declaring  the  French 
decrees  repeiiled  sii  months  before  our  eommou  master  now  say" 
they  were  ever  pretended  so  to  be. 

But  there  is  a  collateral  faet  which  puts  this  question,  in  my 
opinion,  at  rest.  Mr.  Barlow  did  tell  an  American  gentleman  in 
Paris,  in  May  last,  thirty  days  before  the  declaration  of  war  in 
this  country,  that  war  was,  or  would  be  declared  immediately  by 
America  agaiust  Great  Britain ;  and  advised  him  to  regulate  his 
cnneerns  accordingly  i  and  that  gentleman  did  write  to  his  fi-iends 
in  Salem  to  take  measures  for  his  exchange  in  case  he  should  be 
taken  prisoner  on  his  return.  This  looks  serious  ! !  How  did 
Mr.  Barlow,  in  France,  know  this  fact  last  May,  when  we  pri- 
vate citizens  had  no  suspicion  of  it,  in  this  country  9  The  an- 
swer will  be  found  in  our  succeeding  pages— by  the  same  means 
by  which  Armstrong^in  France,  predicted  the  embargo,  sixty  days 
before  it  was  proposed  here— by  a  secret  understanding  between 
our  administration  and  that  of  France.  There  is  an  end  then  to 
tliis  mystery.  The  decrees  which  were  to  be  fundamental  laws 
of  the  empire  expire.  Why  ?  Has  the  emperor's  purpose  chang- 
ed p  No — America  having  declared  war  at  his  order,  there  is  no 
longer  any  nation  on  whom  they  can  operate.  Who  ever  doubt- 
ed that  they  would  be  repealed  as  to  us  when  we  should  declare 
war  againHt  England  ?  and  we  see  them  so  admirably  well  timed 
as  to  reach  this  country  amidst  the  roar  of  cannon  and  in  the 
horrors  of  war. 

But  there  are  one  or  two  other  still  more  interesting  questions 
arising  out  of  the  late  intelligence.  What  will  be  the  conduct  of 
Oreat  Britain  in  consequence  of  this  queer  sort  of  ex  post  facto 
repeal  of  the  French  Decrees ;  this  declaration,  that  they  /uwe 
been  repealed  during  the  last  year,  when  they  have  been  much  more 
fffecttialbj  enforced  than  at  first  ?  Will  she  consider  this  repeal ; 
(roupled  as  it  is  with  the  declaration  every  moment  falsified  by  the 


I  Milan  ilf  • 
h  England* 
re  elTeetual- 
we  do  lay 
linon*!  eon« 
the  French 
'  now  lay" 

ion,  in  my 
tntleman  in 
of  war  in 
ediately  by 
ifl^late  hit 
hit  A-iendt 
e  should  be 

How  did 
lien  we  pri- 

The  an- 
ante  means 
,  sixty  days 
ng  between 
'■nd  then  to 
lental  laws 
ose  chang- 
there  is  no 
!Ter  doubt- 
ild  declare 
well  timed 
knd  in  the 

;  questions 
conduct  of 
post  facto 
they  /urve 
nueh  more 
lis  repeal  f 
ified  by  the 


flict,  thfttthey  have  btrn  no  repealed  for  thlrleen  months  bnek)  nill 
she  eoiiHider  such  a  nominal  repeal,  wliich  amountH  to  nothing 
more  than  the  previous  declttrutiuu  of  the  emperor  us  coming 
within  the  pledge  she  has  made  to  repeal  her  orders  ?  Can  this 
be  called  a  practical  repeal  in  iHlt,  when  the  ships  burnt  by 
Feretier  arc  Htill  nmking  f 

If  she  should  so  consider  if,  and  should  repeal  her  orders  in 
uouneil,  will  it  change  the  mejiMures  of  our  government  ?  Will  it 
give  u»  peace  9  or  will  our  administration  still  insist  (hi  other 
claims  and  resist  any  oilers  of  aeeummodation  ? 

These  are  important  questions— they  are  in  the  lips  of  every 
man,  and  it  may  uot  be  considered  impertinent  to  say  a  word  or 
two  upon  eaeh  of  them.  This  may  serve  to  shew  that  (he  ques- 
tion of  the  orders  in  council  bus  not  lust  all  its  interest,  even  if 
they  should  be  repealed.  Besides  they  may  be  revived  again  in 
vase  we  should  dare  to  make  peace  without  the  consent  of  France, 
for  France  would  in  that  case  revive  her  decrees  with  more  rigor, 
and  Great  Britain  would  probably  again  retaliate  on  her  enemy. 

In  the  6rst  place  then,  if  Great  Britain  should  repeal  her  or- 
ders  upon  this  nominal,  ex  post  fucto  declaration  of  France,  it 
would  be  a  proof  of  her  strict  attention  to  her  promises.  It  must 
be  recollected,  tluit  this  measure,  should  it  take  place,  will  only 
be  the  result  of  her  own  sense  and  justice,  and  her  regard  to  her 
engagements,  and  not  the  eflect  of  our  hostile  measures  which 
could  not  have  been  known  in  Great  Britain. 

It  will  be  a  signal  proof  of /<cr  t/estre  topresen'i'  pfoce  with  this 
Country,  and  of  her  disposition  to  restore  freedom  of  trade  to  aa 
enslaved,  and  humiliated  world — But  she  may  not  think  that  a  d«'- 
eree  of  France  of  so  extraordinary  a  nature,  so  retrospective  in  its 
operation,  and  which  assigns  on  the  face  of  it,  a  reason  so  insulting- 
to  her  and  to  us  ;  that  is,  that  America  had  resisted  her  retalia- 
ting orders,  and  for  that  proof  of  loyalty  was  entitled  to  indulgence, 
sufficient  to  warrant  the  repeal  of  the  orders  in  council.    If  she- 
thould  hesitate  upon  this  ground,  what  would  our  admiuistratiun. 
say  ?  If  the  fi-iends  of  the  Prince  Regent  now  restored  to  power, 
if  the  very  men  who  have  opposed  the  orders  in  Council,  and  whose- 
fpeeehes  have  been  republished  here  with  so  much  praise  by  the 


<  !' 


i    « 


1    \ 


friends  of  our  administration,  should  gee  through  the  thin  veil 
withwhich  this  transaction  is  covered,  if  they  should  say,  "  that 
althougii  opposed  to  the  orders  in  council  yet  when  we  see  it  avowed 
on  the/«f«  of  the  repeal  of  the  French  decrees,  that  they  are  repeal> 
ed  merely  because  America  resisted  our  orders  in  couneil,  our  hon- 
our forbids  our  acquiessing  in  such  signal  inju8tice,"what  would  our 
administration  say  ?  What  ought  all  honest  men  to  say  P  Ought 
they  not  to  say  this  is  a  shameful  intrigue  with  France  and 
does  not  in  the  smallest  degree  vary  the  merits  of  the  original  ques- 
tion, as  to  the  decrees  of  France  and  orders  of  Britain  ? 

But  suppose  a  ministry  not  pledged  to  support  the  orders  in  coun- 
cil, but  avowedly  opposed  to  them,  should,  as  it  is  possible  they  may 
overlook  the  insulting  reasons  assigned  by  France  for  the  late,  the 
very  late  repeal  of  her  decrees,  should  bona  fide  and  absolutely 
rescind  the  orders  in  council.  Would  our  cabinet  instantly  pro- 
pose or  assent  to  peace  P  It  could  not  be  said  that  war  is  now  un- 
dertaken, and  we  must  in  honour  contend  for  our  othfr  smaller 
pretensions,  because  in  the  supposed  ease,  Britain  will  have  with- 
drawn her  orders  before  she  knew  of  the  war. 

Shall  we  then  continue  at  war  to  maintain  our  doctrine  as  to 
impressments,  and  to  force  Britain  to  give  up  her  system  of  par- 
tial blockades  P  If  we  do,  then  it  will  be  manifest,  that  we  go  to 
war  for  points  which  Mr.  Madison  himself  in  his  arrangement 
with  Mr.  Erskine  did  not  include,  and  which  he  thereby  declared 
he  thought  were  not  violations  of  our  neutral  rights.  In  short, 
then  it  will  be  manifest,  that  the  war  is  undertaken  not  for  our 
ititcrests,  but  for  those  of  France. 


i  thin  veil 
say, «  Ihat 
e  it  avowed 
are  repeal - 
cil,  our  hon- 
t  would  our 
ay?  Ought 
Trance  and 
iginal  ques- 
? 

ers  in  Conn- 
ie they  may 
the  late,  the 
1  absolutely 
itantly  pro- 
r  is  noiv  un< 
Ihir  smaller 
1  have  with- 

>ctrinc  as  to 
stem  of  par- 
hat  we  go  to 
arrangement 
eby  declared 
I.  In  short, 
1  not  for  our 


Air 


INQ.UIRY,  &e. 


■•','      g^i;  ^  'j 


I  HAVE  been  in  my  early  days  honored  by  my  fellow 
citizens  with  the  office  of  a  representative  in  the  le^slature 
of  my  native  State,  a  State  dear  to  me  by  early  associations, 
by  having  been  the  place  of  my  nativity,  by  containing  the 
ashes  of  my  revered  ancestors  through  six  successive  gen- 
erations, by  possessing  within  its  bosom  all  the  fruits  of 
my  own  and  their  industry,  and  upon  the  prosperity  of 
which  State  my  children,  yet  in  their  infancy,  depend  for 
their  hopes  of  future  success.  These  solemn  considera- 
tions have  created  an  attachment  to  it,  which  neither  the 
frowns  of  men  in  power,  nor  the  temporary,  and  I  hope 
remediable  misfortunes,  into  which  our  rulers  are  about  to 
plunge  it,  can  essentially  weaken  or  impair.  The  oath 
administered  to  me  in  my  capacity  of  a  legislator,  was,  "that 
the  State  of  Massachusetts  is,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  a 
free,  sovereign,  and  independent  State" — ^and  this  solemn 
oath,  taken  before  an  assembled  people,  and  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Supreme  Being,  I  consider  a  sacred  pledge 
that  I  will  defend,  uphold,  and  maintain  the  rights  and  in- 
terests of  this  State  against  all  hostile  attempts  whatsoever. 
To  me,  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference,  whether  the  attack 
ii})r)n  these  riglits  proceeds  directly  and  openly  from  the 
great  usurper  and  eommon  enemy  of  all  civilized  States, 
or  wlicther  the  same  be  made  through  the  partiality  or  the 
mistakes  of  the  men  wliom  a  majority  of  our  citizens  have 
iiufortu'.wtely  elevated  to  ill-deserved  power. 


1/ 


It  is  my  object  in  the  following  remarks  to  shew,  that 
whether  the  influence  of  France  directly  or  indirectly  ap- 
plied,  or  whether  the  mistaken  policy  of  our  administration, 
without  such  influence,  has  occasioned  our  difiiculties,  the 
measures  lately  adopted  by  a  small  majority  of  our  national 
rulers  are  not  only  without  reasonable  justification,  and 
destructive  of  our  best  interests  and  dearest  rights,  but 
are  a  misapplicj^tion  of  the  powers  entrusted  to  them; 
and  therefore  it  belongs  to  us,  the  people,  to  decide 
whether  such  measures  deserve  our  approbation  and  sup- 
port, or  whether  they  will  justify  us  in  a  temperate  but 
firm  and  decided  opposition — ^Whether,  in  short,  the  evils, 
which  are  certain  and  inevitable  from  a  support  of  the 
present  policy,  are  not  infinitely  greater  in  extent  than  any 
which  we  could  possibly  incur  by  a  constitutional  and  res- 
solute  resistance.  Let  not  the  timid  be  alarmed  at  the  out* 
set,  by  the  idea  of  open  resistance,  of  insurrection,  of 
unjustifiable  opposition.  I  contemplate  no  such  measures. 
I  have  in  view  only  those  constitutional  principles  which 
the  usages  of  our  ancestors,  both  in  Great-Britain  and  in 
this  country,  andtheifsuccessful  example,  have  sanctioned. 
I  ask  only  for  the  application  of  the  principles  of  Mr. 
Locke,  and  for  thb  imitation  of  the  example  of  those  great 
men  who  have  gone;  before  us,  in  cases  of  smaller  pressure, 
and  of  less  importance  to  the  vital  interests  of  their  country. 

Having  made  these  general  observations,  I  shall  state 
the  particular  order  of  my  remarks  which  will  be, 

First,  a  candid  examination  of  Mr.  Madison's  manifesto 
to  Congress,  which  impelled  that  body  reluctantly  to  the 
declaration  of  an  offensivd  war  against  Great  Britain. 

Under  this  head,  I  shall  consider  the  various  allegations 
of  Mr.  Madison  against  Great  Britain,  and  I  shall  shew, 
that  the  charges  are  greatly  exaggerated,  and  that  they 
might  all  ofthem^  without  exception y  have  been  healed  and 
adjusted,  if  the  administration  of  our  country  had  been  dis- 
closed so  to  do — that  these  causes  of  complaint  have  not 
only  been  suffered  to  fester  and  spread,  but  that  they  have 
been  irritated  in  complaisance  or  at  least  in  conformity  with 
the  expectations  and  wishes  of  France. 


%    more 
I    more 

I   ^^^'  . 

,|    standi 

t   make 
nid  ( 


< 


)  shew,  that 

idirectly  ap- 

ministration, 

faculties,  the 

'our  national 

ication,   and 

rights,  but 

d  to   them; 

to  decide 

ion  and  sup- 

mperate  but 

ort,  the  evils, 

ipport  of  the 

tent  than  any 

ional  and  res- 

ed  at  the  out- 

iurrection,  of 

ich  measures. 

nciples  which 

Britain  and  in 

ve  sanctioned. 

ciples  of  Mr. 

of  those  great 

aller  pressure, 

their  country. 

;,  I  shall  state 

ill  be, 

on's  manifesto 
ictantly  to  the 
Britain. 

xis  allegations 
I  shall  shew, 
and  that  they 
:en  healed  and 
/  had  been  dis- 
laint  have  not 
that  they  have 
onformitv  witli 


\ 


5/ 

Secondly,  I  shall  consider  the  expediency  of  the  war, 
both  upon  the  supposition  of  its  being  sucucbsful  and  un- 
successful. 

Thirdly,  I  shall  contend,  that  if  the  administration  have 
contemplated  a  war  against  Great  Britain  for  several  months 
past,  (and  no  new  cause  of  irritation  exists  amunst  her 
which  has  not  existed  for  five  years)  it  was  their  solemn 
duty  to  have  made  preparations  for  it,  by  providing  an  ad- 
equate marine  force  in  order  to  protect  our  commerce  now 
exposed  without  relief  to  the  depredations  of  our  powerful 
enemy — ^by  permitting  the  return,  and  facilitating  oy  every 
means  the  restoration  to  our  countiy  of  all  the  property  of 
our  citizens  abroad — by  warning  the  merchants  or  the  in- 
tentions of  the  government,  and  thus  preventing  the  enor- 
mous sacrifices  which  will  inevitably  be  mme  in  conse- 
quence of  their  ignorance  of  such  secret  hostile  intentions 
and  purposes. 

Fourtiily,  I  shall  shew  that  in  a  war,  offensively  andun- 
justiy  undertaken,  the  subject  is  not  only  not  bound  to  en. 
gage,  but  that  it  is  his  duty  to  abstain  from  taking  a  part 
in  it. 

Lastly,  I  shall  point  out  the  legal  and  constitutional 
remedy  to  which  the  citizens  may  and  ought  to  resort  in 
tlus  cdamitous  case  of  misconduct  in  a  smait  majority  of 
their  rulers. 

"When  I  first  read  the  manifesto  of  the  Prcsidentngainst 
Great  Britain,  I  confess  that  it  was  difficult  for  me  to  de- 
cide which  feeling  was  most  predominant  in  my  mind, 
mortification  or  indignation.  Mortification,  that  our  nation 
should  be  disgraced  in  the  eyes  of  the  wliole  world  and 
of  posterity  by  such  a  tissue  of  exaggerations — and  indig- 
nation, that  artifices  of  this  sort  should  be  resorted  to  in 
order  to  deceive  and  irritate  the  people,  and  to  drive  them 
into  a  ruinous  war  of  an  offensive  nature,  and  (what  is  still 
more  to  be  feared)  into  an  alliance  with  France,  which  is 
more  dreadful  than  a  century  of  war.  I  was  astonished  ut 
Mr.  Madison's  boldness  and  his  contempt  of  the  under- 
standings and  information  of  the  people,  in  thus  daring  to 
make  a  discolored  and  extravagant  representation  of  events 
ind  circumstances   which   have  so  recently  passed  \iik1<  r 


6 

the  eyes  of  the  whole  nation.  I  was  indeed  prepared  to 
expect  almost  any  thing  from  this  author  of  the  crusade 
against  Englafid — his  proclamation,  declaring  to  the  people 
that  the  French  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  were  revoked  on 
the  1st  of  November,  1810,  when  he  knew  that  France 
had  never  even  promised  to  revoke  thetn  until  we  should 
"cause  our  rights  to  be  respected,"  that  is,  as  Mr.  Madison 
has  since  construed  it,  declare  war  against  Great- Britain^ 
had  opened  my  eyes  in  some  measure  as  to  his  character— 
I  had  lost  much  of  my  respect  for  his  political  veracity, 
and  of  my  confidence  in  his  public  assertions — His  mes- 
sage with  respect  to  the  pretended  discovery  of  Henry 
confirmed  my  suspicions. 

Instead  of  honorably  acquitting  the  citizens  of  Boston, 
as  he  ought  to  have  done,  of  any  participation  in  Henry's 
views  or  designs,  he  boldly  asserts,  that  "Henry  was  em- 
^'ployed  in  intrigues  with  disaffected  citizens  in  the  United 
"States,  having  for  their  object  a  subversion  of  our  Gov- 
"emment,  and  a  dismemberment  of  the  Union." 

Now  hewellknexti  at  the  time  he  penned  that  sentence, 
(and  he  has  since  repeated  the  same  sentence  in  the  mani- 
festo) that  Henry  expressly  declared  that  he  never  opened 
the  subject  of  his  mission  to  any  citizen  of  the  United 
States, 

A  man  capable  of  so  insidious  and  imfoundcd  an  asper- 
sion on  the  citizens  of  his  oxvn  country,  on  men  wlio  will 
not  yield  to  liim  in  patriotism  t)r  spirit,  might  well  be  ex- 
pected to  be  little  scrupulous  about  the  terms  he  might  use 
towards  a  foreign  nation,  especially  N\hcn  those  terms  of 
reproach  fall  in  with  the  passions  of  the  ignorant  part  of 
his  supporters,  whom  it  has  been  the  business  of  their 
leaders  to  inllame  and  to  deceive. 

The  partiality  displayed  in  this  manitcsto — the  black 
and  bloody  representation  whieh  is  therein  made  of  the 
conduct  of  Great  Britain,  iircciacly  adapted  to  gratify  the 
malice  of  her  deadly  cnciv.}-  and  the  cnany  of  all  free 
states — and  the  brief,  mild,  and  ;n)ologetic  style  with  re- 
spect to  the  wrongs  of  France,  bring  to  my  recollection 
many  events  in  the  history  of  Mr.  IMadison's  public  con- 
duct, which  combine  to  produce  a  strong  apprehension  iu 


I   man  th 


two  p; 
was  a 
efforts 
I  the  Fi 
^  in  171 
latioal 
tious 
:  ^tncrl 
I  indepj 
I  party[ 
I,  ison 
I  instn 
%   peace 

V    mad^ 


prepared  to 
the  crusade 
|to  the  people 
revoked  on 
that  France 
il  we  should 
r.  Madison 
reat-Britainy 
's  character— 
ical  veracity, 
s — His  mes- 
;ry  of  Henry 

iS  of  Boston, 
)n  in  Henry's 
enry  was  em- 
in  the  United 
of  our  Gov- 
)n." 

that  sentence, 
I  in  the  mani- 
:  never  opened 
of  the  United 

idcd  an  aspcr- 
incn  who  will 
It  well  be  cx- 
i  he  might  use 
hose  terms  of 
lorant  part  of 
incss  of  their 

0 — ^the  black 
made  of  the 
to  gratify  the 
iiy  of  all  free 
style  with  re- 
y  recollection 
's  public  con- 
^iprchcii>iou  iii 


my  mind  that  he  habitually  inclines  to  the  views  and  inter- 
ests of  France  more  than  becomes  the  magistrate  of  a  free 
and  independent  state.  I  shall  hereafter  shew,  that  his  last 
act  of  plunging  us  into  the  present  war,  is  altogether  for  the 
benefit  oi  France  mfact^  though  it  may  not  be  in  intention — 
that  we  can  in  no  possible  event  be  gainers  by  it,  but  that 
it  is  a  sacrifice  of  our  commerce,  our  agriculture,  our 
money,  and  our  lives,  for  no  other  good  than  to  make  a 
diversion  of  the  British  forces  favorable  to  France^  (and 
j)erhaps  some  men  look  farthcry  to  the  subjugation  of  their 
own  country)  and  in  that  light  it  ought  to  be  considered 
one  of  the  most  alarming  attempts  ever  yet  made  against 
whatever  little  there  is  left  of  liberty,  virtue,  and  religion 
in  the  world. 

If  I  succeed  in  shewing  this,  if  I  satisfy  every  reasonable 
man  that  this  war  of  Mr.  Madison  is  in  effect  a  French 
war,  and  not  an  American  one,  that  it  is  undertaken  for 
French  interests,  and  in  conformity  with  repeated  French 
orders,  and  at  the  sacrifice  of  our  cnvn  best  interests,  and 
probably  of  our  liberties,  we  shall  have  no  very  great  diffi- 
culty in  condemning  it.  I  shall  state  nothing  but  what  I 
have  learned  from  unquestionable  authority,  nothing  which 
I  cannot  support  by  indisputable  proof. 

Mr.  Madison  early  in  life  became  a  member  of  the  rev- 
olutionary Congress.  That  body  was  then  divided  into 
two  parties — the  French  party,  of  which  Mr.  Madison 
was  a  leading  man,  who  were  in  favor  of  bending  all  the 
efiforts  and  energies  of  the  country  to  promote  the  views  of 
the  French  cabuiet,  views  which  the  French  government 
in  1793  declared  to  have  been  "the  fruit  of  a  base  specu- 
latiotty  and  that  our  glory  at  that  time  offended  the  ambi- 
tious designs  of  France."  The  other  pai'ty  was  truly 
Americany  seeking  only  the  establishment  of  our  national 
independence  and  prosperity  ;  at  the  head  of  this  American 
party  were  the  members  from  New- England.  Mr.  Mad- 
ison was  one  of  the  party  who  proposed  and  carried  the 
instructions  to  our  ministers  abroad  not  to  make  any 
peace  without  the  consent  and  concurrence  of  France.  He 
Was  also  one  of  those  who  opposed  the  treaty  of  peace 
made  by  Mr.  Jay  and  Mr.  Adams,  and  who.  in  compii- 


ance  with  the  wishes  of  France,  attempted  a  censure  upon 
those  ministers  for  having  dared  to  negociate  a  most  ad- 
vantageous and  honorable  treatjr  without  the  concurrence 
or  consent  of  the  French  cabinet.  Such  were  Mr.  Madi- 
son's early  predilections ;  such  was  the  promise  which  he 
presented  of  his  future  policy.  After  the  establishment  of 
the  present  constitution,  Mr.  Madison  again  came  into 
the  councils  of  our  nation.  We  there  agam  find  him  true 
to  his  first  opinions,  and  resolutely  bent  to  promote  the 
measures  which  favored  the  views  and  interests  of  France. 
In  1794,  he  was  one  of  those  who  strenuousl)^  opposed 
Gen.  Washington's  pacific  mission  to  Great-Britam ;  he 
was  in  favor,  as  he  is  nowy  of  direct  hostility  with  that 
kingdom,  in  favor  of  the  sequestration  of  British  property, 
and  opposed  to  every  measure  which  could  heal  the  breach 
between  the  two  countries. 

'  In  the  same  year  he  brought  forward  his  famous  re- 
solutions against  Great-Brit^un,  the  whole  scope  and  ob- 
ject of  which  were  to  make  a  war&re  on  British  commerce, 
and  to  please  the  revolutionary  rulers  of  France.  They 
were  in  their  character  precisely  like  Bonaparte's  conti- 
nental system,  and  like  the  corresponding,  cooperating 
measures  of  embargo  and  non-intercourse,  so  ineffectually 
yet  so  ruinously  attemi)ted  by  Mr.  Jefferson  and  himself 
m  later  periods  of  our  history.  It  was  Mr.  Madison  who 
Avrote  the  pamphlet  against  the  author  of  "War  in  Dis- 
guise," in  which  he  arraigned  with  great  severity  the 
British  doctrine  as  to  the  cdonial  trade.  Yet  we  have  seen 
this  same  man,  within  three  years  after,  apologize  for  the 
French  decrees  as  merely  municipai  regulations,  of  which 
the  United  States,  he  says,  have  no  right  to  complain,  al- 
though these  decrees  cut  up  by  the  roots  that  very  colonial 
trade,  for  which,  while  Great  Britain  was  concerned,  he 
had  been  so  strenuous  and  warm  an  advocate.  This  gen- 
tleman, so  acrimonious  against  Great  Britain  for  modifying 
the  manner  in  which  we  should  carry  the  produce  of 
French  colonies  to  the  parent  country,  who  represented  it 
as  of  vital  importance  to  the  United  States — at  a  subsequent 
period  when  France  not  only  saw  fit  to  cut  off  all  this  car- 
rying trade  to  her  own  country,  but  to  march  her  armies  into 


HoUai 
l*ortu 
withtl 
to  acq 
condu 
ables( 

Wl 
the  su 
situate 
victor 
presse( 
demn, 
inga 
France 
of  nem 
and  sol 

Yet 
lation  t 
come  ( 
he  dare 
that  thi 


war. 

Th^ 
forms  I 
doctria 
our  ml 


il'^ 


:ensure  upon 
:  a  most  ad- 
concurrence 
;  Mr.  Madi- 
lise  which  he 
ablishment  of 
n  came   into 
ind  him  true 
promote  the 
sts  of  France. 
Hisly  opposed 
it-Britain;    he 
ility  with  that 
itish  property, 
leal  the  breach 

lis  famous  re- 
scope  and  ob- 
ish  commerce, 
France.     They 
laparte's  conti- 
g,  cooperating 
so  ineffectually 
on  and  himself 
.  Madison  who 
"War  in  Dis- 
:at  severity  the 
ct  we  have  seen 
tologize  for  the 
itions,  of  which 
to  complain,  al- 
at  very  colonial 
concerned,  he 
ate.    This  gen- 
n  for  modifying 
the  produce  of 
10  represented  it 
-at  a  subsequent 
t  off  all  this  car- 
h  her  armies  into 


Holland,  Italy,  Hambitrg,  Denmark^  Prussia,  Spain  ann} 
t^ortugal,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  our  legitimaie  trade 
vf'iitithc^v.  friend^  and  neutrai  States,  not  only  was  pleased 
to  acquiesce  in  this  injustice,  but  has  publicly  defended  the 
conduct  of  France,  as  a  le^timate  exercise,  of  unquestion- 
able sovereignty. 

What!  Shall  a  neutral  State  not  on\y  feel  indifferent  to 
the  successive  oppressions  and  Conquests  of  all  other  States 
situated  like  herself,  but  shall  she  admit  that  the  lawless 
victor  has  a  right  to  interdict  her  own  thide  with  those  op- 
pressed  and  neutral  States  ?  Shall  she  go  farther,  and  con- 
demn, as  Mr.  Madison  has  done,  Great  Britain  for  prohibit- 
ing a  trade  with  her  open  enemy^  and  yet  apolc^ize  for 
France,  who  has  by  force  of  arras  cut  us  off  from  the  trade 
of  neutral  andjriendly  States  who  wotild,  if  left  firee,  court 
and  solicit  our  commerce  with  them  ? 

Yet  such  is  the  picture  of  Mr.  Madison^s  conduct  in  re- 
lation to  the  two  belligerents,  before  he  had  the  boldness  to 
come  out  and  declare  himself  on  the  side  of  France,  before 
he  dared  to  tell  this  people  (as  by  his  measures  he  has  done) 
that  their  fortunes  must  be  hereafter  inseparably  attach- 
ed to  those  of  Bonaparte,  and  that  we  must  be  tied  to  the 
chariot  wheels  of  this  conqueror  in  his  triumphal  entry  into 
his  capital. 

I  shall  omit  Mr.  Madison's  declaration  to  Mr.  Randolphi 
that  "France  wants  money  and  must  have  itj"  and  a  thou- 
sand other  incidents  of  the  same  character  tending  to  shew, 
that  his  opinions  and  his  policy  are  too  much  connected 
with  those  of  his  new  atty,  Bonaparte. 

I  have  said  enough  ror  those  who  arc  open  to  convictiori, 
and  those  who  are  not  will  nevertheless  be  shaken  wheil 
they  come  to  the  measures  which  he  has  lately  adopted  to 
produce  a  war  with  Great  Britain. 

I  now  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  his  manifesto  of 


war. 


The  first  point-  in  Mr.  Madison's  manifesto,  and  which 

forms  the  most  prominent  part  of  it,  relates  to  the  British 

doctrine  and  practice  of  taking  their  own  seamen  out  of 

our  merclmnt  ships.     He  has  collected  under  this  hoad,  all 

2 


f^-  ,     •-' 


r<  :'     zA  .  -i~~ 


10 


(he  virulent  remarks  which  the  obscare  writers  of  his 
twrty  have  used  for  manv  years  past.  Before  I  consider 
his  assertions  on  this  pointy  it  may  be  useful  to  trace  the 
history  of  this  pretension  and  practice  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain.  All  the  nations  of  Europe  nudntain  without  any 
exception  this  doctrine,  "that  their  subjects  have  no  right 
to  expatriate  themselves,  sujid  that  the  nation  has  a  right 
to  the  services  of  all  its  citizeiis,  especially  in  time  of  war." 

Tlus  doctrine  is  not  only  maintained  and  enforced  by  all 
SK)vereign  states,  but  it  is  explicitly  laid  down  by  writers 
on  general,  law,  as  most  unquestionable* 

Grotius,  Vattel,  Puffendorf,  and  all  other  public  writers, 
concur  in  maintaining  this  right.  France  has  a  special 
code  on  the  subject,  and  every  citizen  is  enrolled  from  the 
time  he  is  capable  of  bearing  arms,  and  is  recalled  by  spe- 
cial proclamation  as  soon  as  a  war  breaks  out,  from  the 
service  of  foreign  countries. 

Denmark,  on  entering  into  the  present  war,  issued  a  sim- 
ilar proclamation.  ^  There  is  no  civilized  country  on  the 
globe  which  does  not  clum  the  right  to  the  service  of  all  its 
citizens  in  time  of  war. 

When  the  war  broke  out  between  Great  Britmn  and 
France  in  1793,  a  new  case  arose— a  case  unexampled  in 
the  history  of  nations.  America,  once  a  part  of  the  British 
empire,  speaking  the  same  langu^,  having  the  same 
habits,  occupied  in  the  same  pursuits,  remained  at  peace. 
The  profits  of  neutrality  enabled  us  to  pay  greater  wages  to 
our  seamen  than  Britain  could  posubly  afford.  The  British 
^eam^i  who  had  never  before  beeif'tempted  to  desert  the 
standard  of  their  country,  because  the  language,  habits,  and 
usages  of  the  continental  nations  were  so  diverse  and  disa- 
greeafak  to  them,  flocked  by  thousands  into  the  American 
mercantile  service,  and  produced  a  serious  and  distressing 
injury  to  Great  Britjun.  It  is  the  opinion  of  well-informed 
merchants,  that  thirty  or  forty  thousand  British  seamen 
sought  employment  in  American  ships.  Great  Britain 
found  this  evil  intolerable,  and  she  adopted  the  expedient 
of  reclaiming  her  own  seamen  found  in  our  merchant 
service,  disclaiming  however,  most  explicitly,  the  righf 
to  take  them  from  oui^public  armed  ships. 


boi 


*u 


11 


iters  of  Ins 

I  consider 

11  to  trace  the 

ipart  of  Great 

without  any 
I  have  no' right 
m  has  a  right 
(time  of  war." 
Enforced  by  all 
by  writers 

mblic  writers, 

has  a  special 

rolled  from  the 

[called  by  spe- 

|out,  firom'the 

;  issued  a  sim- 
country  on  the 
•ervice  of  all  its 

eat  Britain  and 
mexampled  in 
t  of  the  British 
ring  the  same 
lained  at  peace, 
[reater  wages  to 
.  The  British 
i  to  desert  the 
age,  habits,  and 
verse  and  disa- 
•  the  American 
and  distressing 
'  well-informed 
kitish  seamen 

Great  Britain 
I  the  expedient 

our  merchant 
itly,  the  right 


I 


This  practice  she  commenced  under  the  administntioo 
of  Washington,  and  has  continued  it  from  that  day  to  the 
present.  She  has,  however,  always  disclsumed  the  preten- 
sion of  taking  "American"  seamen,  and  if  the  case  has 
sometimes  and  unfrequcntly  occurred,  she  has  always  ex< 
pressed  her  regret,  and  has  restored  the  men  so  taken,  on 
due  apd  proper  proof  of  their  •citizen^ip. 

The  evil,  however,  has  been  of  very  limited  extent,  and 
the  bona  fide  American  citizens  have  been  the  least  depos- 
ed to  complain.  The  Northern  States  who  employ  for  the 
most  part  native  seamen  have  suffered  very  little,  and  I  have 
known  several  merchants  in  extensive  business  who  never 
had  a  seanum  impressed  from  ^eir  ships  during  a  twenty 
years  war. 

There  is  one  fact  of  great  importance  to  be  considered 
before  we  enter,  into  Mr.  Madison*s  representations  on  this 
subject,  and  that  is,  that  neither  General  Washington  nor 
Mr.  Adams  thought  this  matter  of  sufficient  importance  to 
make  it  the  subject  of  a  special  communication  to  Congress, 
much  less  did  they  think  it  reasonable  cause  of  war.  It  is 
a  well  known  fact  also  that  Great  Britain  has  been  growing 
^ore  and  more  cautious  in  the  exercise  of  her  right  of  re« 
claiming  her  seamen,  and  fewer  instances  of  impressment 
have  occurred  within  Mr.  Madison's  administration  than 
before.  Just  before  the  war  measure  was  resorted  to,  Mr* 
Foster,  the  British  ambassador,  requested  our  government 
to  furnish  him  a  list  of  impressed  seamen  calling  themselves 
Americans,  that  he  might  procure  their  immediate  release. 

Now  let  us  pause  and  consider  this  question  in  the  ab- 
stract. A  belligerent  and  neutral  nation  speak  the  same 
language,  and  have  the  same  general  character.  The  bel- 
ligerent  wants  her  citizens  for  the  defence  of  her  existence. 
The  neutral  wants  them  for  profit — ^The  neutral  offers  30 
dollars  per  month,  and  the  belligerent  oan  afford  but  15~- 
The  belligerent  loses  40,000  seamen,  which  the  neutral  har« 
bors  and  employs. 

The  belligerent  assumes  the  right  to  reclaim  her  omu 
subjects,  and  so  far  as  respects  them  she  is  right;  she  is  sup- 
ported  by  the  law  of  nations,  but  in  the  exercise  of  this 
jigUt  instances  of  misUikes  or  misconduct  will  occur,  ought 


12 


the  neutral  to  complain  unless  she  takes  effectual  measures 
to  prevent  the  entry  of  the  seamen  of  the  belligerent  into 
her  service  ?  Much  less  ought  she  to  complain,  if  she  en- 
tic^  by  high  rewards  and  countenances  by  fraudulent  pro- 
tections such  seamen  of  the  belligerent  m  deserting  the 
standard  of  their  country. 

Yet  such  is  the  fact,  well  known  to  every  man  on  the 
sea  coast— Maryland,  North  Carolina,  South  Cardina, 
Georeia  employ  three  foreign  seamen  to  one  American ! 
Yet  these  are  the  men  from  whom  our  complmnts  proceed ! 

Nor  is  this  all — our  government  give  occasion  to  the  very 
complaint  of  which  they  make  so  much  parade.  It  is  • 
fact,  acknowledged  by  our  marine  officers,  that  a  lar^  pro- 
portion of  the  seamen  in  some  of  our  national  ships  are 
native  British  seamen,  and  it  is  even  asserted  that  many  of 
the  warrant  officers  are  of  that  description. 

Can  a  government,  which  at  least  does  not  check  such 
abuses,  such  an  attack  on  the  resources  of  a  belligerent, 
such  an  important  inroad  on  his  rights,  legitimately  com- 
plain of  his  occasional  abuse  of  the  undoubted  power  of  re- 
claiming his  own  citizens? 

Much  less  can  such  men  f^rly  hold  a  moral  and  pathet-* 
ic  discourse  on  the  cmelty  of  compelling  men  to  fight 
against  their  brethren,  when  they  know  that  British  subjects 
are  first  seduced  from  their  allegiance,  and  then  compelled 
to  turn  their  arms  against  their  sovereign  and  fellow  sub- 
jects? 

Yet  such  is  the  fa^ — Vast  numbers  of  British  seamen 
will  be  now  ordered  out  by  the  President  to  slaughter  the 
subjects  of  their  own  sovereign,  and  if  captured  will  be 
liable  to  be  hung  as  traitors  to  their  king  and  country.* 

Mr.  Madison  in  his  manifesto  in  favor  of  war,  says,  that 
the  British  government  have  assumed  a  jurisdiction  on  the 
high  seas  instead  of  a  resort  to  the  responsible  sovereign^ 
wmch  he  would  have  us  believe  would  have  been  eiFectual. 
But  have  not  the  British  government  repeatedly  complain- 
ed to  ours  of  the  abuses  which  have  existed  as  to  thie  en- 
ticement and  enlistment  of  their  seamen,  and  has  the  re- 


i 


*    In  New-Yprk,  in  Englishmnn  on  board  oor  fripnte  Eskx   was  tarred  nn'l 
fpithered  bvcaute  he  Tr«(uld  not  violate  bia  oath  of  allcgiunov. 


tarred  anri 


sptmible  sovereign,  the  United  States,  ever  afforded  them  an 
adequate  remedy  ?  Have  our  laws  interdicted  the  employ- 
ment of  British  seamen,  or  have  they  tlirown  anv  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  that  system  of  seduction  of  Bntish  sulors 
which  has  been  so  injurious  to  their  marine  ?  We  know 
that  they  have  not. 

The  President,  living  in  a  slave  State,  proceeds  to  com- 
pare this  case  to  that  of  property  seized  on  the  high  seas, 
and  to  intimate  that  the  seamen  ought  to  be  carried  in  for 
adjudication  like  othfir  property ^  instead  of  being  subjected 
to  the  decision  of  military  officers ;  but  we  woula  ask, 
tvtould  this  alleviate  the  burden  ?  Would  it  be  more  profit- 
able to  our  merchants  and  convenient  to  seamen  to  be  car- 
ried  into  a  British  port  in  order  to  exhibit  the  proofs  of  their 
citizenship,  because  perhaps  there  might  be  one  or  two  Bri- 
tish seamen  on  board,  rather  than  to  have  such  seamen  taken 
out  at  sea  on  account  of  their  unquestionable^character,  or 
because  they  were  destitute  of  protections  ? 

Much  is  said  by  Mr.  Madison  of  the  severities  of  thf: 
British  discipline,  and  of  the  hardships  of  our  seamen  be- 
ing  conipelled  to  serve  in  distant  climes  and  to  be  the  me- 
lancholy instruments  of  taking  away  the  lives  of  their  fel- 
low citizens.  This  is  very  pretty  rhetorick ;  but  still  it  is 
well  known,  that  great  numbers  of  our  citizens  voluntari- 
ly enter  into  the  British  marine  service,  and  not  unfre- 
quently  augment  the  mass  of  tliose  who  compl^un  of  hav- 
ing  been  forced  into  British  employ. 

But,  says  Mr.  Madison,  against  this  "  crying  enormity 
^  the  United  States  have  exhausted  in  v^in  remcmstranccs 
**  and  expostulations,  and  they  have  offered  to  enter  into 
"  arrangements,  which  coujd  not  be  rejected  if  the  recovery 
'*  of  British  subjects  were  the  so/e  and  rra/ object — But  the 
"  communication  passed  without  effect."* 

This  sentence,  if  it  has  any  meaning,  was  intended  to 
convey  to  the  people  the  idea  that  Britain,  besides  the  re- 
claiming of  Ikt  ou'Ti  seamen,  had  an  ulterior  and  further 
object  which  can  be  no  other  than  strengthening  her  marine 
by  the  impressment  of  our  seamen. — Now  there  never  was 
a  more  uniouiided  suggestion^  and  Mr.  Madisoji  had  in  his 
posscii'.uoa  the  documents. to  satisfy  ])iin  of  it.       ..         .      . 


14 


Hi 


i^ 


The  vfhok  number  of  sailors  pretended  to  have  been 
imprcaaed  from  our  ships  for  15  years  past  was  6358,  out 
of  70,000,  and  of  whicn  all  but  1500  have  been  restored. 
Of  this  renuunder,  at  least,  one  half  are  probably  British  sea- 
men, and  of  the  residue  it  is  probable  that  at  least  another 
moiety  entered  voluntarily.  It  appears  however  from  the 
returns  that  not  more  than  1500  seamen,  including  British 
subjects  with  fraudulent  American  protections,  were  at  any 
one  moment  ki  British  employ. 

The  whole  number  of  British  seamen  in  their  marine,  or 
public  sfttpt  onfyy  is  150,000  and  in  their  merchant  ships, 
over  whom  th<y  have  a  perfect  control  240,000.  Is  it  prob- 
able, we  ask,  that  for  the  sake  of  gaining  1500  seamen,  they 
woiUd  haaard  the  peace  of  their  country  ?  It  must  then  be 
that  the  reason  why  they  inust  upon  this  right,  is,  that  they 
would  wish  to  check  the  dispoution  of  their  own  seamen  to 
enter  into  our  service,  of  whom,  it  is  admitted  on  all  hands 
we  have  at  least  from  30  to  50,000. 

But  says  Mr.  Madison,  our  proposition  to  arrange  this 
afiair  on  reasonable  terms  passed  without  notice. 

Tlus  is  a  most  unfounded  assertion — It  is  a  fact  that  both 
during  the  embassy  of  Mr.  Kmgand  of  Mr.  Monroe,  the 
BriUsh  government  manifested  a  disposition  to  arrange  this 
dispute  in  a  manner  satis&ctory  to  both  countries. 

And  Mr.  Monroe,  explicitly  states,  that  Lords  Holland 
and  Auckland  had  proposed  to  him  the  basis  of  an  ar- 
rangement  which  they  were  ready  to  make  on  that  subject, 
and  which  he  believed  would  be  satisfactory  to  the  two 
Countries. 

On  thb  pcunt  then,  Mr.  Madison's  representations  arc 
extremely  unftdr  and  unreasonable. 

Such  IS  the  true  and  well  known  picture  of  the  ques- 
ti(m  of  impressment,  which  Mr.  Madison  presents  in  the 
fore  ^und,  as  if  it  was  of  primary  importance  and  the 
principal  cause  of  the  late  declaration  of  war. 

Yet  this  evil  such  as  it  is,  is  of  seventeen  years  duration  and 
vras  much  more  extensive  in  its  actual  operation  when  the 
illustrious  Wasliington  signed  and  ratified  Mr.  Jay's  treaty, 
than  it  is  now. 


is 


We  do  not  however  mean  to  (rave  the  question 
If  the  war  U  undertaken  on  thia  PJ^und,  it  must  be  for  the 
lelief  of  the  American  jnfamen.  Three  fourths  of  them  are 
citizens  of  New-England  and  New.  York.  Ytt  we  find 
that  the  people  of  tmsc  states  are  the  most  avnse  to  the 
war,  the  least  clamorous  on  the  subject  of  these  impress- 
ments—This  ought  at  least  to  create  our  surprise,  aiul 
this  astonishment  will  be  heightened  when  wf  Vnow  that 
all  this  sensibility  proceeds  fi^  men  who  perhaps  never 
saw  a  seaman,  whose  Stat|s  fumbh  nonet  who  have  done 
eveiy  thing^  in  their  power,  by  embargo  and  non.intercourse, 
to  impoverish  those  very  seamen  for  whoa  they  profess  so 
tender  a  concern. 

Lastly,  this  prominent  cause  of  war  strikes  u^  widi  the 
greater  astonishment,  inasmuch  as  we  know  that  its  first,  its 
certain,  its  inevitable  e&cts  will  be  to  drive  out  of  the  coun- 
try three  quarters  of  all  our  native  seamen,  tq  compel  them 
to  enter  into  the  service  of  our  enemy,  and  to  fight  in  thoso 
very  ships,  and  a|;iunst  those  very  brethren,  and  to  incur 
those  same  calamities  wluch  Mr.  Madison  with  apparent 
distress  pretends  to  deplore. 

It  is  indeed  an  extraordinary  spectade  to  find  so  disinter- 
ested a  concern  for  commercial  and  nautical  men  on  the  Rpst 
I  will  not  say  in  the  hearts^  of  our  rulers,  and  at  the  same  time 
so  universal  n  detestation,  so  cordial  an  execration  of  these 
kind,  affectionate  and  sympathetic  measures  in  the  breasts 
of  those  who  alone  are  pretended  to  be  the  objects  of  thb 
kindness. 

For  my  o^vn  part,  I  consider  it  a  mockery  of  the  suffer- 
ings of  the  merchants  and  the  sailors,  for  the  known  and 
avowed  enemies  of  commerce  and  of  seafaring  meq,  to  wage 
an  unnecessary  and  destructive  war,  a  war  ruinous  to  com- 
merce and  to  navigation,  luider  the  pretence  of  supporting 
the  commercial  rights  and  of  vindicating  the  wrongs  of  the 
merchants  and  sailors.  The  merchants  and  sailors  howev  - 
cr  are  not  deceived  by  such  pretensions — ^They  know  tlic 
deep  hostility  of  the  men  who  propose  such  steps  to  all 
oommercial  prosperity,  and  tlicy  consider  these  measures  as 
resulting  rather  from  an  ill  judged  contempt  of  their  opin- 
ions :\nd  a  disreg<\rdrof  tlicir  suffcring;s  than  from  nnv  swcrn- 


•'•v. 


»*fe. 


ii-  : 


[l!'l 


disposition  to  afford  them  redress,  a  redress  which  tliey 
know  and  the  administration  well  understand  can  never  be 
obtained,  but  will  be  jMTvented  by  the  declaration  of  w:u" 
against  Great  Britain,  a  measure  fatal  to  the  eastern  and 
navigating  states. 

I  shall  pass  over  at  present  the  complaint  of  Mr.  Madi- 
son of  the  practice  of  British  ships  of  hovering  on  our  coast, 
and  the  exs^erated  picture  which  he  gives  of  the  evils 
which  have  resulted  from  that  practice — I  shall  however 
resume  that  subject  when  I  come  to  the  point  of  the  exclu- 
fflon  of  British  ships  of  war  from  our  waters,  at  the  same 
time  that  we  gave  protection  to  i'rcnch  cruizers,  and  per- 
imtted  them  to  arm  in  our  ports,  and  to  make  hostile  ex- 
cursions from  our  territory,  not  only  against  the  British  trade* 
but  against  our  own  defenceless  commerce. 

I  rather  prefer  to  discuss  the  principal  point  of  dispute 
between  the  two  nations,  the  obnoxious  and  much  decried 
orders  in  council-~the  same  course  will  be  pursued  on  this 
point  as  was  taken  ^ with  respect  to  impressments-— I  shall 
first  trace  the  history  and  ground  of  those  orders  before  I 
consider  the  distorted  picture  which  Mr.  Madison  and 
the  committee  of  Congress  give  of  them. 

First  then,  let  me  remark,  that  in  December  1807,  when 
the  orders  in  council  were  first  known  in  this  countr}',  they 
were  received  by  both  parties  witliout  surprize  or  emotion. 
The  natural  sense  of  justice  which  all  men  felt,  before  their 
passions  were  enlisted  ajyainst  them,  made  every  man  ac- 
knowledge and  in  some  degree  acquiesce  in  the  justice  and 
propriety  of  that  retaliation  which  Great  Britain  at  a  late  day 
and  with  visible  reluctance  adopted. 

Even  the  administration  themselves  in  their  early  discus-* 
sions  with  G.  Britain  on  the  subject  had  not  got  their  cue, 
had  not  learned  that  it  was  to  become  so  prolific  a  topic 
of  complaint.  The  merchants  soon  accommodated  them- 
selves to  this  new  state  of  things,  and  justly  attributed  to 
the  anti-commercial  and  t3Tannicul  principles  of  Bonaparte 
the  partial  and  comparatively  unimportant  restrictions  on 
their  trade,  and  it  may  safely  be  affirmed  and  indeed  proved 
from  official  documents,  that  if  our  administration  had  not 
entered  into  Bonaparte's  continental  system,  if  they  hnd  not 


y-f^',%. 


i  which  t^icy 

can  never  be 

'ation  of  w:ir 

eastern  and 

f  Mr.  Madi- 
on  our  coast, 

of  the  evils 
lall  however 
of  the  cxcUi- 

at  the  same 
ers,  and  per- 
t  hostile  ex- 
British  trade. 

It  of  dispute 
luch  decried 
•sued  on  this 
mts— I  shall 
iers  before  I 
ladison  and 

1807,  when 
ountry,  they 
or  emotion, 
before  their 
ery  man  ac- 
2  justice  and 
at  a  late  day 

larly  discus- 
3t  their  cue, 
li-fic  a  topic 
iated  them- 
ittributed  to 
f  Bonaparte 
itrictions  on 
Iced  proved 
ion  had  not 
;hc)'  had  not 


i 


4 


17 

cooperated  with  him  by  permanent  etnbaigoes,  nchi- 
intercourse,  and  non-importation,  our  trade  would  scarcdy 
have  felt  any  considerable  check  to  its  wonted  prosperity. 

It  may  especially  be  remarked,  that  the  federal  party 
generally,  in  the  first  instance,  acknowledged  the  justice 
and  indeed  moderation  of  Great  Britain  in  relation  to  htt 
retaliatory  orders,  not  only  in  her  delaying  to  issue  tiicm 
for  twelve  months  after  she  had  given  formal  notice  of  her 
intention  so  to  do  in  case  her  enemy  should  persevere  in 
enforcing  them,  and  we  in  submitting  to  them,  but  also  in 
refraining  from  giving  to  them  the  enormous,  unjust  and 
unparallelled  extent  which  France  liad  given  to  her  de^ 
crees. 

The  clamors  of  the  partizans  of  France,  the  dread  of 
popular  resentment  has  to  be  sure  made  some  few  federal- 
ists since  wavet*,  and  we  have  seen  with  no  small  surprize, 
that  as  in  the  case  of  the  British  treaty  so  unjustiy  con- 
demned, some  of  our  political  friends  have  been  treasuring 
up  sources  of  future  regret  and  have  been  sircngthening, 
without  intention,  the  hands  of  their  opponents* 

It  is  my  design  to  consider  tliis  subject  from  its  founda- 
tion, and  if  men  are  disposed  to  censure,  let  them  at  least 
read,  and  see  if  they  can  answer  in  their  closets  the  argu- 
ments — Let  them  divest  themselves  of  their  national  pre- 
judices and  view  this  question  as  some  future  Grotius, 
Puffendorf  or  Bynkershoek  would  examine  it. 

I  take  it  to  be  a  conceded  principle  that  belligerent  rights 
are  in  their  nature  paramount  to  those  of  neutrals,  precise- 
ly because  the  one  is  contending  for  his  existence,  the  otli- 
er  merely  for.  his  convenience,  his  accommodation  or  his 
profit.  A  man  who  is  drowning  would  be  fully  mstified 
m  seizing  hold  of  the  garment  of  another,  although  at  the 
risk  of  soiling  its  beauty  or  disturbing  its  arrangement. 

Qn  what  other  principle  is  it,  tliat  a  belligerent  has  a  right 
to  seize  the  property  of  a  neutral  going  to  a  blockaded  port? 
or  to  confiscate  articles  the  actual  property  of  a  neutral,  be- 
ing contraband  of  war,  going  to  the  relief  of  an  enemy  ? 
The  rigiit  of  the  neutral  is  here  undoubted^ — It  was  a  per- 
fect right  in  time  of  peace,  yet  by  the  universal  consent  of 
nations  tliis  right  is  surrendered  to  the  superior  claims  and 


'I     ' 


\r'<i  I  ' 


w\ 


18 

necessities  of  belligerents.  Before  the  invention  of  cannoit 
it  could  not  have  been  unlawful  to  have  carried  an  iron 
tube,  yet  since  that  has  been  converted  into  an  instrument 
of  warfare  it  has  become  a  violation  of  belligerent  rights. 

It  must  then  be  conceded,  that  if  a  state  of  things  should 
arrive  or  happen  in  which  the  trade  of  a  neutral  with  one 
belligerent  should  be  absolutely  incompatible  with  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  on  the  part  of  the  other  belligerent, 
he  would  have  as  much  right  to  interdict  it  as  to  prohibit 
relief  to  a  besieged  place,  and  if  the  case  could  be  conceiv- 
ed that  the  interdiction  of  such  neutral  trade  would  be  a 
frtdre  effectual  means  of  reducing  an  enemy  than  the  taking 
of  a  besieged  placBy  the  right  to  prohibit  such  trade  would 
be  a  still  higher  one  than  that  of  prohitnting  the  entry  into 
a  blockaded  or  besieged  fortress. 

Another  point  is  equally  clear,that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  neu- 
tral to  treat  both  belligerents  with  equal  favor,  and  even  if, 
through  weakness,  he  suffers  one  to  take  an  adrant£^  of 
him  to  the  injury  of  the  other,  however  hard  the  doctrine, 
it  is  nevertheless  true,  that  the  other  has  a  perfect  right  to 
take  the  same  liberty  if  it  be  necessary  to  his  security. 

Thus  for  example,  if  one  belligerent  should  be  suffered 
by  the  United  States  to  seize  and  fortify  Castle  William,  in 
the  harbor  of  Boston,  and  should  make  it  a  rendezvous 
from  which  to  annoy  his  enemy,  the  other  has  a  perfect 
right  to  seize  Governor's  Island,  in  order  to  counteract  the 
efforts  of  his  enemy. 

To  apply  this  doctrine  to  the  orders  in  council — When 
Bonaparte  issued  his  decree  at  Beriin,  Denmark,  Prussia, 
Hamburg  and  Holland,  were  at  least  nominally,  and  of 
right  by  treaty,  free  and  independent  States — ^we  had  a  right 
to  trade  with  them  in  British  goods — we  did  in  fact  carry 
on  a  vast  and  profitable  trade  with  them  as  wc  lawfully 
might — but  Bonaparte  marched  forces  into  these  countries 
who  were  our  friends,  and  compelled  them  by  arms  to  re- 
fuse us  this  trade.  This  was  a  wrong  done  to  us  in  two 
viexvs — First,  because  it  was  a  general  injury  done  to  all 
free  States,  and  by  the  kiw  of  nations  we  had  a  right  to 
complain  of  it.  Secondly,  because  it  deprived  us  of  a 
most  valuable  branch  of  trade,  the  very  trade  about  which 


10 

v  e  had  belbrc  been  quarrelling  with  Great  Britain — I  mean 
the  carrying  trade.  We  had  therefore  a  right  to  complain 
on  our  own  account. 

But,  thirdly,  it  was  a  serious  uniury  toGitat  Britain — so 
seriousy  that  Bonaparte  boasts  in  nib  Scnatus  Consultum, 
of  the  16th  of  March  last,  that  it  will  finally  destroy  her, 

In  fact,  it  was  both  intended  and  avowed  as  a  hostile 
measure  aimed  at  her  existence. 

Great  Britain  called  upon  us  to  resist  it— wff  had  a  fight 
so  to  do,  as  I  have  shewn,  because  it  was  an  Injury  to  us — 
she  had  a  right  to  require  us  so  to  do  becivuse  it  was  an  in. 
jury  to  her  through  our  rights. 

What  said  our  cabinet  ?  Why,  it  is  a  mere  municipal 
right — it  does  not  belong  to  us  to  resent  it.  France  may 
do  what  she  pleases  on  tlie  continent^  if  slm  lets  us  alone  on 
theocEAK. 

Is  this  true  ?  Is  this  the  law  of  nations  ?  Can  France 
march  armies  into  every  neutral  and  peaceful  State  with 
whom  we  have  commercial  connections  ?  Can  she  say  to 
Spain  and  Portugal,  you  shall  not  take  American  flour,  or 
cod-fish,  or  sugar,  or  coffee  ?  Can  she  sav  this  to  Holland 
and  Hamburg,  or  rather  could  she  have  done  it  before  the 
ANNEXATION  of  them  to France,  when  they  were  as  much 
sovereign  and  more  independent  oXhfX  tbiui  WK  ARE,  and 
shall  her  enemy  not  be  permitted  to  say,  you  shall  not  trade 
with  France  ? 

Is  it  an  offence  on  ijjie  ocean  to  use  force  to  forbid  a  neu- 
tral from  trading  with  your  enkm  v,  and  can  you  lawfully 
march  an  army  into  a  forei^-n  country  and  forbid  a  neutral 
from  trading  with  his  old  friend  who  is  not  the  enemy  of 
the  belligerent  ?  I  confess  I  cannot  see  a  stronger  case  than 
this,  of  the  right  of  Great  Britain  to  retaliate  her  enemy's 
injustice  onhimsclf.  Although  all  men  admit  the  injustice 
and  the  tyrannical  character  of  the  French  decrees  of  Berlin 
and  Milan,  yet  the  right  of  Great- Britaii\  to  retaliate  this 
injustice  upon  her  enemy,  (if  perchance  it  should  affect 
the  profits  of  ncutnil  merchants)  has  bceu  denied  on  various 
grounds,  and  as  we  are  about  to  uutUrtuke  a  war  m  support 
of  the  French  decrees,  and  in  opposition  to  the  British 
retaliation  of  them,  it  may  be  useful  to  consider  these 
several  objections  to  the  claim  of  Grcut<Britain. 


1^ 


20 

The  first  ground  is,  that  France  had  not  the  power,  did 
not  possess  uie  means  of  enforcing  her  decrees,  that  they 
were  therefore  to  be  considered  a  mere  brutum  fulmen,  an 
empty  threat,  and  could  not  for  that  reason  afford  a  reason-, 
able  excuse  to  Great-Britain  for  retaliating  them,  since  she 
on  the  other  hand  could  most  effectually  execute  her 
countervuling  orders.  o 

The  second  ground  is,  that  Britain  set  the  first  example 
by  her  order  of  May,  1806,  and  therefore  was  deprived  of 
the  plea  of  retaliation,  and  must  be  considered  as  the  first 
aggressor* 

Tile  thvd  is,  that  the  United  States  never  did  submit  to 
the  French  decrees,  though  they  did  not  resist  them — that 
they  were  not  obliged  to  resist  them,  if  incompatible  with 
Jii^er  interests,  of  which  they  were  the  exclusive  judges^ 

I  beUeve  that  I  have  fietirly  stated  all  the  objections  to 
the  British  (X'ders,  and  I  shall  proceed  to  give  the  plain 
answers  of  a  New- England  &rmer  to  all  these  objections, 
premising  however,  that  I  discuss  this  question  not  for  the 
purpose  of  defending  Great-Britain,  but  of  disseminating 
correct  nodons  of  the  dispute  between  England  and 
France,  with  the  latter  of  whom  our  government  have 
chosen  to  take  sides. 

As  to  the  first  objection  to  the  British  orders,  the  inability 
of  France  to  execute  her  decrees,  and  therefore  their  inno- 
cent character,  I  would  observe,  first,  that  this  rule  would 
be  the  most  vague,  uncertain,  and  tlitrefore  unjust  measure 
of  ri^ht.  It  would  be  to  adopt  a  principle  which  is  never 
admitted  in  any  other  case  either  of  morals  or  legislation — 
To  measure  the  criminality  of  a  deed  by  the  power  of  the 
party  to  execute  it,  would  be  most  unjust,  capricious,  and 
liaUe  to  the  greatest  uncertainty.  If  France,  from  the 
superior  force  and  vigilance  of  her  enemy,  has  been  enabled 
to  bum,  sink,  and  destroy  ov\y  fifty  of  our  ships  who  have 
committed  the  deadly  sin  of  trading  with  her  enemy,  and 
if  this  degree  of  weakness  renders  the  French  decrees 
legitimate,  or  at  least  innocent,  pray  will  any  of  the  states- 
men who  condemn  Great-Britain  on  this  ground,  give  us 
t^e  arithmetical  rule  by  wliich  we  are  to  know  when  such 


21 


ic  power,  did 
zeSf  that  they 
n  fulmen,  an 
brd  a  reason-. 
:m,  since  she 
execute  her 

Hrst  example 
5  deprived  of 
1  as  the  Jirst 

lid  submit  to 
t  them — that 
ipatible  with 
sive  judges^ 
objections  to 
^ve  the  plain 
e  objections, 
>n  not  for  the 
lisseminating 
^^ngland  and 
:nment  have 

,  the  inability 
e  their  inno- 
5  rule  would 
just  measure 
lich  is  never 
legislation — 
power  of  the 
(ricious,  and 
e,  from  the 
aeen  enabled 
ps  who  have 
enemy,  and 
nch  decrees 
)f  the  spates - 
md,  give  us 
r  when  such 


■outrageous  violations  of  national  law  become  the  fair  sub» 
ject  of  retaliation  ? 

Suppose,  instead  of  the  existing  inequality  as  to  naval 
power,  France  was  able  to  keep  a  flying  fleet  of  burning 
ships  constantly  on  the  ocean,  and  in  ^ce  of  fijii/t  sbe 
should  bum  five  hundred  ships  a  year  for  the  enormous 
transgression  of  selling  their  surplus  produce  to  the  excom- 
municated English  nation,  would  this  vary  the  question  of 
right  ?  In  the  latter  case^  it  is  obvious  that  neutrals  would 
be  deterred  from  supplying  Great^Britain,  and  she  would 
most  essentially  sufter.  But  can  her  rights  depend  upon 
so  loose  and  vague  a  criterion?  Do  any  rights  repose  upon 
so  varying  and  shifting  a  foundation  ? 

Great-Britain  reasoned,  as  all  men  of  prudence  reason : 
''This  is  a  novel  and  most  enormous  pretension — this  is 
''no  less  than  an  avowed  attempt  to  shut  me  out  of  the 
"pale  of  civilised  nations.  She  adopted  the  prudent 
"maxim,  Obsta  principiis,  oppose  the  first  inroad  on  my 
"rights."  And  1  would  ask,  where  is  the  judicious  and 
honest  statesman,  who  will  point  out  the  precise  mark  at 
which  she  ought  to  have  acted  ?  Ought  she  to  have  waited 
until  the  evil  was  brought  home  to  her  doors,  until  hex 
deserted  ports  and  ruined  commerce  would  warn  her  that 
her  case  was  without  remedy  ? 

France,  from  the  commencement  and  until  the  present 
time,  has  executed  her  decrees  to  the  utmost  extent  of  her 
power,  and  she  at  this  moment  boasts  of  their  wisdom  and 
efficacy  in  humbling  and  enfeebling  her  enemy,  and  still 
confides  in  their  sufficiency  to  destroy  him. 

But  this  is  only  one  answer,  though  I  think  a  satisfactory 
one  to  this  objection.  Bonaparte  had  two  distinct  modes 
ol  enforcing  his  decrees  ;  one  of  them  was  Umited  by  his 
naval  power,  the  other  had  its  full  operation  on  the  conti- 
nent. If  he  had  confined  his  decrees  to  his  own  territory, 
still  Great-Britain  would  have  had  a  right  to  complain  and 
to  retaliate.  Nations  have  an  undoubted  right  to  stipulate 
the  terms  upon  which  foreigners  shall  visit  their  country ; 
but  if,  under  color  of  this  right,  they  should  make  an  entire 
revolution  in  the  code  of  international  law,  if  in  place  of 
those  prudent  mnxims   of  i>;rncral  policy  which   natipus 


^ 


i:| 


-^      22 

sometimes  adopt,  they  should  substitute  a  novel  and 
monstrous  system,  injurious  to  all  free  commerce,  should 
throw  us  back  to  the  measures  of  dark  and  uncivilized 
ages,  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  destroying  their  enemy, 
not  only  that  enemy  and  all  civilized  states  have  a  right  to 
complain,  but  are  bound  to  resist. 

Bonaparte  did  this — he  declared,  not  simply  that  he  would 
not  suffer  British  goods  to  enter  his  country,  but  that  any 
neutral  ship,  which  should  in  any  former  voyage  subsequent 
to  Ws  decree  have  been  concerned  in  trading  with  Great 
Britain,  should  be  denationalized,  and  for  that  cuuse  should 
be  ccmfiscated  if  ever  she  should  enter  his  ports.  Is  this 
Si  mere  municipal  regulation  ?  Suppose  Great  Britain  had 
submitted  to  it — In  ten  years  her  trade  would  have  been 
destroyed,  or  at  least  materially  affected. 

Tlus  principle,  more  dreadful  than  the  popish  doctrine 
of  excommunication,  has  been  likened  to  the  navigation  acts 
of  Great  Britmn,  acts  which  simply  limit  the  importation 
of  British  products  to  British  bottoms;  but  you  may  search 
the  history  of  Algiers,  Morocco  and  Tunis  in  vain  for  any 
example  of  the  extended  tyranny  and  profligacy  of  the  de-  | 
crees  of  France. 

'  Put  then  their  operation  on  the  ocean  out  of  the  question, 
take  them  as  they  now  are  admitted  to  be  enforced,  even 
by  Mr.  Madison,  they  are  the  most  enormous  violation 
of  all  neutral  rights,  and  the  greatest  invasion  on  the  prin- 
ciples of  modern  civilized  nations  which  the  world  has  ever 
seen.  .%•    ,  ,  ► 

Yet  this  operation  of  the  decrees  has  been  justified  by 
Mr.  Madison,  though  it  is  tenfold  more  injurious  to  us 
than  all  their  possible  effect  on  the  ocean.  . 

'  But  Great  Britain,  as  well  as  America,  had  a  still  furthei- 
right  to  complain  of  these  decrees,  and  they  have  been 
most  dreadfully  enforced  by  the  arms  and  influence  of 
France,  in  Holland,  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal,  Prussia  and 
Denmark.  The  captures  in  Denmark  alone  are  more  than 
five  times  as  great  in  amount  as  all  the  captures  under  the 
British  orders  in  council  in  the  first  fov.i  --ears  of  their  ope- 
ration. Would  Denmark  have  issued  an  order  for  the  cap- 
ture of  American  ships  laden  with  the  produce  of  British 


:  i 

:  i 


23 

Islands,  without  the  instigation  of  France  ?  We  know  she 
would  not.  There  is  an  end  then  to  the  -argument  tliat 
France  could  not  enforce  her  decrees,  because  she  has  done 
it  in  a  most  extensive  and  calamitous  degree,  and  as  wc 
have  before  remarked,  we  cannot  sec  that  a  robbery  done 
upon  the  land  in  neutral  states,  is  in  any  respect  less  a  rob* 
bery  or  less  atrocious,  than  if  committed  upon  the  ocean, 
which  is  a  neutral  highway  for  all  nations. 

We  now  proceed  to  the  second  reason  alleged,  why 
Great  Britain  could  not  lawfully  retaliate  the  inmstice  of 
France,  and  that  is,  that  she  by  her  blockade  of  May,  1€06, 
became  tht  Jirst  aggressor ^  and  therefore  is  precluded  from 
setting  up  the  plea  of  retaliation. 

This  is  the  argument  which  assumes  such  a  rhetorical 
and  flourishing  figure  in  the  report  of  the  committee  on  our 
foreign  relations.  This  pretence  may  do  very  well  for 
weak  minds,  and  it  is  only  fitted  for  such.  Those  of  us 
who  have  memories  and  some  knowledge  of  facts  cannot 
be  deceived  by  it.  It  is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  aifrontivc 
arguments  that  was  ever  thrown  in  the  face  of  an  intelligent 
people.  -^ 

In  the  first  place,  we  would  observe,  that  the  idea  of 
the  blockade  of  May,  1806,  being  a  violation  of  our  rights 
or  an  infringement  of  the  law  of  nations,  never  made  its 
appearance  within  owr  hemisphere,  until  July,  1810,  more 
than  four  years  after  the  said  obnoxious  order  had  been  in 
full  operation.  Now  it  must  have  been  a  singular  sort  of 
invasion  of  our  rights,  which  neither  the  fault-finding  cab- 
inet of  France,  nor  the  still  more  jealous  and  irritublc 
council  at  Washington  had  for  four  years  been  able  to  dis- 
cover. Yet  such  is  the  fact.  I  have  formerly  perused  all 
the  correspondence  between  our  government  and  that  of 
Great-Britain,  and  I  do  not  recollect  that  this  blockade  ever 
formed  a  part  of  our  complaints. 

2dly,  I  distinctly  recollect  that  when  Mr.  J.  Q.  Adams 
thought  it  necessary  to  defend  the  administration  and  to 
attack  the  orders  in  council,  he  did  not  dare  trust  himself 
on  the  modern  plea  of  the  British  aggression  of  May,  1806, 
but  he  more  prudently  went  backward,  and  rested  the  de- 
fence of  France  on  the  British  adjudications  in  t/ie  war  qf 


24 


1^1) 


■i 


1756.  There  were  among  us  some,  who  thought  that  ht 
might  as  well  have  urged  the  invasion  of  France  by  Ed- 
ward the  Black  Prince. 

3dly.  But  what  ought  to  set  this  question  forever  at  rest, 
and  to  crimson  the  faces  of  our  administration  and  com- 
mittees, whene!ver  they  bring  forward  this  argument,  is  this, 
that  Mr.  Monroe,  our  minister  then  resident  at  St.  James's, 
communicated  this  order  with  great  satisfaction  to  our 
government,  and  expressed  his  conviction  that  it  was  a 
Kivorable  measure,  and  indicative  of  the  disposition  of  tlic 
British  cabinet  to  conciliate  tliis  countn*. 

In  truth  it  was  the  measure  of  Mr.  Fox^  and  was  inten- 
ded to  give  a  proof  to  America  of  his  disposition  to  recon- 
cile,  if  possible,  the  commercial  interests  of  America  with 
the  principles  absolutely  essential  to  the  British  power  and 
existence.  It  is  an  order  very  singularly  expressed,  but 
it  was  understood  and  intended  ixnd  executed  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  leave  open  all  our  trade  with  France  and  Holland, 
except  such  as  the  admitted  principles  of  the  law  of  nations 
forbade. 

Lastly,  with  due  submission  to  the  honorable  com- 
mittee of  Congress,  I  will  venture  to  assert,  from  positive 
knowledge,  that  this  blockade  was  as  vigorously  enforced, 
and  as  fully  supported  by  actual  investment,  as  the  law  uf 
nations  recognized  by  ourselves  requires. 

This,  if  it  be  true,  (and  every  captain  who  entered  the 
channel  knows  it  was  so,)  (the  President's  assertion  to  the 
contrary  notwithstanding,) />Mff  an  end  to  tlie  whole  ques- 
tion. For  Great  Britain  admits  that  if  the  blockade  was 
not  actual,  it  Nvas  illegal,  but  she  contends  it  was  actual, 
and  the  premiums  at  our  insurance  offices  against  vessels 
violating  that  blockade  will  prove  that  it  was  strictly  with- 
in the  modem  definition,  that  is  to  say,  that  the  "entry  in- 
to the  ports  so  blockaded  was  imminently  dangerous." 

I  have  one  more  remark  to  make  on  this  subject  of  the 
order  of  May,  1806,  and  then  I  shall  quit  it.  I  believe  the 
remark  is  new,  at  least  I  may  claim  the  merit  (if  there  is 
any)  of  being  its  author,  and  that  is,  that  the  idea  of  the 
blockade  of  May,  1806,  having  been  a  justifiable  cause  of 
the  Frewh  decrees  was  for  the  first  time  suggested  by  our 


r 


I 


sip 


liought  that  ht 
If  ranee  by  Ed- 

I  forever  at  rest, 
ition  aiid  com- 
pliment, is  this, 
at  St.  James's, 
faction  to  our 
L  that  it  was  a 
position  of  tlic 

and  was  inten- 
sition  to  recon- 

America  with 
tish  power  and 
expressed,  but 
in  such  a  man* 
:e  and  Holland, 

law  of  nations 

anorable  com- 
;,  from  positive 
3usly  enforced, 
t,  as  the  law  of 


ho  entered  the 

assertion  to  the 

lie  whole  ques- 

blockade  was 

it  was  actual, 

against  vessels 

s  strictly  with- 

the  "entry  in- 

ingerous." 

subject  of  the 

I  believe  the 

2rit  (if  there  is    |^ 

he  idea  of  the    '1 

[liable  cause  oi 

fgested  by  our 


^5 

fovemment  through  General  Armstrong  to  ![^ranoe.  It 
1809.  That  cunning  cabinet  instantly  seized  the  pretext, 
and  from  that  moment,  and  never  before^  have  pretended 
to  justify  their  decrees  on  the  order  of  May,  1806. 

We  shall  shew  hereafter  why  our  government  suggested 
this  excuse  to  France,  when  we  come  to  the  proof  that  iw 
all  the  proposals  of  accommodation  made  to  Great  Britain 
certain  conditions  have  been  invariably  annexed,  which  our 
cabinet  had  previously  ascertained  would  be  rejected  and 
ought  to  be  rejected  by  Great  Britain.  It  would  be  im- 
proper to  anticipate  this  part  of  the  subject  which  deserves 
a  separate  consideration. 

The  last  reason  against  the  orders  in  council  which  I 
have  heard  urged  is,  that  we  did  not  submit  to  the  Berlin 
and  Milan  decrees.  Those  decrees  interdicted  our  trade 
with  England,  yet  in  despite  of  France  we  still  traded  with 
her,  and  as  to  any  other  mode  of  resistance  we  had  not  the 
means,  or  if  we  had,  we  were  at  liberty  to  choose  our  own 
time  and  mmmer  of  doing  it. 

To  this  I  answer,  that  as  to  the  British  trade,  we  pursued 
it  only  because  it  was  profitable,  and  not  for  the  purpose 
of  proving  to  France  that  we  despised  or  opposed  her 
decrees.  So  far  were  we  from  despising  those  decrees,  it  i^t 
a  humiliating  truth  that  France  has  unremittingly  inflicted 
upon  us  the  severest  punishment  for  trading  at  all  with 
Great-Britain,  although  we  had  narrowed  that  trade  by  our 
own  laws  in  a  manner  that  cooperated  essentially  with  the 
designs  of  the  French  government.  She  did  this  by  armst 
by  the  law  of  strength — we  had  adequate  peaceable  means 
of  redress,  or  at  least  such  as  we  have  thought  powerful 
against  Great-Britain — we  neglected  to  use  them.  If 
Great-Britain,  notwithstanding  this  acquiescence,  had  no 
right  to  retaliate  on  France,  because  we  might  be  incident- 
ally though  not  intentionally  injured,  then  it  will  follow  that 
neutrals  hereafter  may  be  as  partial  as  they  please,  and  that 
the  most  unjust  belligerent  may  always  ^vound  or  possibly 
ruin  his  enemy  through  the  sides  of  the  neutral. 

I  have  now  finished  my  general  remarks  on  the  subject 
of  the  orders  in  council,  and  shall  procet»d  with  my  obsRr- 
Viitions  on  Mr.  Madison's  manifesto. 
4 


'26 


Mr.  Mudison,  not  satilsficcl  with  culling  the  orders  in 
iblNuncil  a  complicated  and  transcendent  piece  of  injustice 
anii  an  innovation^  without  taking  the  slightest  notice  of  the 
prior  Frqnch  decrees  which  occasioned  them,  proceeds  to 
declare,  "that  they  have  been  moulded  and  managed  as 
"might  best  suit  the  political  views  of  Great-Britain,  her 
"commercial  jeahustes^  or  t\\t  avidity  of  British  cruisers;" 
thus  intimating  that  her  commercial  jealousy  of  usy  and  a 
desire  to  satisfy  the  cupidity  (^  her  naval  men,  were  among 
the  prominent  modvcs  for  the  modifications  which  the  de- 
crees have  undergone. 

This  is  illiberal  and  unfounded.     The  orders  in  council 
have  undergone  no  mcKlitication  whatever  since  their  date, 
except  that  of  April,  1809.     It   was  as  well  known  to 
Mr.  Madison  when  he  wrote  this  charge,  ac  it  is  to  all  the 
commercial  worlds  that  the  modification  of  April,  1809,  so 
far  from  tending  to  restrain  our  trade,  opened  to  us  the 
Baltic,  the  German  Ocean,  the  French  and  Dutch  foreign 
possessions,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  ^t  of  Italy.      Could 
Great-Britain  have  been  actuated  byfi^mmercial  jealousy 
in  this  measure  ?  Yet  it  is  thf  %iW  chine  which  has  taken 
place  in  the  orders  in  council.    The  same  remark  may  be 
made  as  to  the  desire  to  gratify  the  avidity  of  her  cruisers. 
Was  it  the  way  to  effect  this  purpose  to  limit  and  restrain 
the  orders  in  council  to  one  quarter  part  of  their  original 
extent  ?     Hints  have  often  been  thrown  out  in  Congress, 
and  by  the  President  in  his  manifesto,  that  plunder  was  the 
main  object  of  the  British  orders,  and  it  has  even  been 
insinuated  that  Great-Britain  has  drawn  a  part  of  her  sub- 
sistence from  her  captures  of  American  property. 

This  slander  may  do  for  the  ignorant  back-woods-men 
of  Kentucky,  more  ferocious  than  their  savage  neighbors  ; 
but  mercantile  men  all  know,  that  the  orders  in  council 
were  scarcely  executed  in  a  single  instance  till  within  the 
past  year ;  and  in  an  official  return  to  Congress,  it  appeared 
that  the  amount  of  captures  by  the  British  was  not  half 
equal  to  those  either  of  France  or  Denmai'k.  But,  says 
Mr.  Madison,  and  in  this  he  is  echoed  by  the  committee 
of  foreign  relations,  successive  experiments  were  made 
to    sec    if   Great -Britain  would    repeal    her   orders 


I 


I 


council 
under 
adds,  ei 
orders  i 
unless 

Now 
upon  t 
ment 
of  this : 
we  are 
portant 
ratcly. 

We 


in 


27 


the  orders  in 
:  of  injustice 
;  notice  of  the 
I,  proceeds  to 
I  muni^d  as 
t'BHtain,  her 
ish  cruisers;" 
f  of  ust  and  a 
,  were  among 
which  thede- 

ers  in  council 
nee  their  date, 
rcU  known  to 
it  is  to  all  the 
Lpril,  1809,  so 
led  to  us  the 
Dutch  foreign 
[taly.  Could 
ercial  jealousy 
^ich  mistaken 
mark  may  be 
f  her  cruisers, 
it  and  restrain 
'  their  ori^nal 
in  Congress, 
under  was  the 
las  even  been 
rt  of  her  sub- 
erty. 

c-woods-men 
^  neighbors ; 
crs  m  council 
till  within  the 
ss,  it  appeared 
was  not  half 
:.  But,  says 
le  committee 
were  made 
:r    orders    in 


I 


J 


s 


council,  by  offering  to  place  her  adversary  exclusively 
under  the  operation  of  our  restrictive  system;  nay,  he 
adds,  encouragement  was  given  to  her  "that  a  repeal  of  the 
orders  in  council  would  be  followed  by  a  war  against  France, 
unless  she  also  should  repeal  her  decrees." 

Now  as  much  of  the  merits  of  this  question  depend 
upon  the  fairness  of  these  offers,  and  since  if  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  have  bona  fide  made  proposals 
of  this  nature  which  ought  to  have  satisfied  Great-Britain, 
we  are  wrong  in  charging  them  with  partiality,  it  is  im- 
portant that  we  consider  this  question  distinctly  and  accu- 
rately. 

We  understand  the  offers  not  only  in  a  different  but  in  a 
very  opposite  light.  In  the  summer  of  1809,  the  embargo 
was  reluctantly  withdrawn  in  consequence  of  the  formidable 
and  decided  opposition  of  the  Northern  States.  In  its 
place  was  substituted  the  non-intercourse  act,  nominally 
against  both  belligerents,  though  effectually  only  against 
Great-Britain,  in  which  it  was  provided,  that  in  case  either 
of  them  should  repeal  its  obnoxious  edicts,  the  President 
should  abolish  the  restrictions  as  to  the  one  so  repealing 
them,  and  they  should  be  in  full  operation  as  to  the  other. 
In  communicating  this  measure  to  the  two  cabinets,  the 
President  saw  fit  to  adopt  a  very  different  language  to  the 
one  from  thvit  which  he  used  to  the  other.  To  Great-Brit- 
ain he  authorized  Mr.  Pinkney  to  say,  that  in  case  Great- 
Britain  should  repeal  her  orders  in  council,  it  was  proba- 
ble the  President  would  give  effect  to  the  powers  vested 
in  him  by  that  act,  which  simply  extended  to  a  notifica- 
tion of  the  fact  of  repeal,  and  the  law  itself  declared  that 
the  act  should  remain  in  force  against  Vrance.  But  there 
was  not  the  slightest  intimation  that  in  snch  an  event  the 
United  States  would  declare  war  against  France,  There 
is  one  other  circumstance  worthy  of  ncjce  in  this  commu- 
nication to  Great-Britain  in  1808,  and  that  is,  that  no  notice 
was  taken  of  the  blockade  of  May,  1806,  which  has  since 
made  so  conspicuous  a  figure  in  the  list  of  our  wrongs. 

Yet  it  will  be  observed,  that  the  President  was  not  cm- 
yiowcrcd  to  offer  to  withdraw  the  non -intercourse  until 
Grcat-Brikuin  should  have  repealed  all  her  decrees  vwlathtf^ 


28 


>.\ 


^ur  neutral  eommerce  ;  but  as  Mr.  Jefferson  did  not  in 
1806  demand  the  repeal  of  the  blockade  of  May,  1806, 
the  inference  is  irresistible,  that  he  did  not  then  consider  it 
«  violaUon  of  our  neutral  rights.  The  same  inference  may 
be  drawn  from  Mr.  Maditon*»  arrangement  with  Erskinc, 
which  did  not  include  the  blockade  of  May,  1806,  although 
it  ought  to  have  included  it  if  it  was  a  violation  of  our 
neutral  rights.  So  that  we  have  the  construction  of  two 
successive  presidents,  Jefferson  and  Mudison,  that  the 
blockade  of  May,  1806,  was  not  a  violation  of  our  neutral 
rights. 

While  Mr.  Jefferson  only  held  out  to  Great-Britain  the 
prospect  of  a  probability  that  he  would  give  effect  to  the 
powers  vested  in  him  by  the  act  against  France,  which 
only  extended  to  the  continuance  of  the  non-intercourse,  ^ 
measure  perfectly  useless  to  Great- Britain,  since  her  fleets 
already  made  a  much  more  effectual  non-intercourse,  he 
authorized  Gen,  Armstrong  to  assure  France,  in  distinct  and 
uneouivQcal  terms,  that  if  she  should  repeal  her  decrees, 
and  jBritun  should  refuse  to  rescind  her  orders,  the  tJnitcd 
States  would  take  part  in  the  war  on  the  side  of  France. 

These  are  solemn  truths,  and  on  record  in  the  department 
Qf  state. 

But  the  second  negotiation  on  this  subject,  which  took 
place  in  1810,  was  still  more  extraordinary.  Although  the 
blockadeof  May,  1806,  had  quietly  slept  as  we  have  shewn, 
absolutely  approved  of  by  Mr.  Monroe,  and  censured  by 
no  one,  not  even  by  France  ;  although  it  did  not  make  its 
appearance  in  the  negotiation  of  1808,  nor  in  Erskine's  ar- 
rangement in  1809 ;  yet  it  was  destined  to  mak^  a  great 
and  principal jigure  hi  1%IQ.  Tliis  must  strike  every  per- 
son with  astonishment,  that  a  great  and  overwhelming 
wrong  both  to  us  and  to  France  should  ha^e  been  forgotten 
and  neglected  by  both  for  the  space  of  four  years.  Yet 
this  blockade  was  coupled  with  the  orders  in  council,  and 
with  such  other  pretensiops  in  1810,  that  no  settlement 
could  be  made  with  Great-Britain,  I  now  proceed  to  the 
proof  of  these  assertions. 

From  the  time  of  the  promulgation  of  the  French  decrees 
iof  Milan  and  ^erlln,  we  can  l\nd  no  intimation  on  the  part 


I 


1 , 


not  in 
ly,  1806, 

consider  it 

ence  may 

Erskinc, 

although 

on  of  our 

ion  of  two 
that  the 

>ur  neutral 

Britain  the 
Feet  to  the 
ce,  which 
ercourse,  ^ 
J  her  fleets 
course,  he 
listinct  and 
it  decrees, 
the  United 
■  France, 
department 

(^hich  took 
though  the 
ave  shewn, 
ensured  by 
>t  make  its 
skine's  ar- 
te a  great 
ivery  pcr- 
rwhelming 
1  forgotten 
:ars.  Yet 
uncil,  and 
settlement 
ced  to  the 

ch  decrees 
n  the  part 


> 


29 

of  France  cither  of  her  dissatisfaction  with  respect  to  the 
limited  order  of  Great -Britain,  of  May,  1806,  or  of  her 
determination  to  consider  its  repeal  an  mdispensable  con- 
dition of  the  repeal  of  her  hostile  decrees. 

T'  ie  first  notice  taken  of  it,  as  far  as  we  can  find,  is  in  a 
leltt:j-  from  Gen.  Armstrong  to  Mr.  Smith,  our  Secretary  of 
State,  of  January  28th,  1810,  in  which  he  details  a  conver- 
sation which  he  had  held  with  Count  Champagny,  the 
French  minister. 

In  that  letter  Mr.  Armstrong  refers  to  a  letter  of  Decem- 
ber 1st,  1809,  from  Mr.  Smith  to  himself,  which  ftas  never 
been  published^  in  which  he  is  directed  to  demand  oi'  France 

"  Whether,  ifGpciit-Brltfliii  rrvokcd  her  blnckailei  of  •  date  anterior  to  the 
deerce  cnmmoiily  eallcil  tlie  Oerliit  ilveroc,  his  inHJusty  the  eniiwror  would  conieiit 
to  rfvol(c  thut  decree  .'" 

To  which  the  emperor,  falling  into  the  views  of  our 
government,  and  foreseeing  the  snare  which  would  be  Itud 
for  Great -Britain,  inasmuch  as,  if  she  consented  to  repeal 
said  orders,  it  would  be  an  admission  that  she  had  been  the 
aggressor  upon  neutral  commerce,  and  further,  that  it 
would  be  an  admission  that  she  had  no  right  to  exert  her 
onlyforce^  her  maritime  pawer^  for  the  coercion  of  her 
enemy,  replied, 

"That  the  ojtit  conditi'm  rewired  for  the  revocation  of  the  decree  of  Berlin, 
will  be  a  previous  revocntion  by  C>ru>it-lii-itnin  or  her  blockades  of  France  or  parts 
of  France,  ot'a  date  antkrior  to  the  aturciiud  deurcu." 

So  far  the  plot  went  on  prosperously ;  and  if  Great- 
Britain  had  fallen  into  the  project,  it  would  have  been 
made  the  pretext  for  preventing  any  future  blockades  of 
even  single  ports  of  France  in  which  armaments  for  her 
destruction  or  the  destruction  of  her  commerce  should  be 
formed,  and  she  would  have  relinquished  to  an  enemy, 
whom  she  cannot  attJick  upon  the  continent  upon  equal 
terms,  the  only  weapons  which  God  and  her  own  valor  had 
placed  within  her  p6wer. 

Gen.  Armstrong  having  so  for  succeeded,  lost  no  time 
in  transmitting  to  Mr.  Pinkney  this  project,  the  failure  of 
which  was  not  only  certain,  but  was  probably  calculatcc\ 
upon  by  both  the  high  intriguing'  parties. 


80 

Mr.  Pinkncy  on  the  15th  of  February,  1810,  demanded 
ojf  Lord  WeWeslejr,  in  pursuance  of  the  same  project, 
\v  hether  Great  Britain  considered  any,  and  if  any,  what 
bl  ockades  of  the  French  coast  of  a  date  anterior  to  the  Berlin 
de  crec  in  force  ?  He  specified  none  in  particular,  except 
th:it  of  May,  1806.  Indeed  it  appears  by  Lord  Wellesley's 
note  that  no  others  existed. 

Lord  Wellesley  replied,  that  the  order  of  May,  1806, 
"  was  comprehended  in  the  order  of  council  of  January, 
"  1807,  which  was  yet  in  force  :"  But  did  not  intimate, 
nor  was  he  ever  asked,  whether  Great-Britain  would  repeal 
that  order. 

Mr.  Pinkney,  on  the  7th  of  March,  1810,  asked  a  fur* 

,  ther  explanation  on  the  subject,  whether  the  order  of  May, 

1806,  was  merged  or  sunk  in  that  of  January,  18C7,  and 

whether  any  other  blockades  of  France,  except  that  of 

May,  1806,  still  existed  ? 

Lord  Wellesley  replied  to  this  second  inquiry  of  Mr. 
Pinkney,  "  That  the  order  of  May,  1806,  had  never  been 
fcn-mally  withdrawn,  though  it  was  comprehended  under 
the  more  extensive  orders  of  January,  1807."  He  declar- 
ed, however,  that  no  other  blockade  of  the  ports  of  France 
existed  anterior  to  imm2t.ry,  1807. 

As  he  had  never  been  required  to  answer,  he  was  silent 
on  the  quesdon,  whether  the  order  of  May,  1806,  would  be 
withdrawn. 

Mr.  Pinkney,  though  not  perfectly  satisfied  with  Lord 
Wellesley's  answer,  still  deemed  it  sufficient  if  France  was} 
sincere,  and  accordingly  wrote  to  Gen.  Armstrong  on  the 
6th  of  April,  ♦*  That  the  inference  from  Lord  Wellesley's 
statement  is  that  the  blockade  of  May,.  1806,  is  virtually  at 
an  endf  being  merged  and  comprehended  m  an  order  of 
council  issued  after  the  date  of  the  Berlin  decree." 

Such  was  Mr  Pinkney's  construction  of  Lord  Welles, 
ley's  letter ;  but  this  did  not  suit  either  the  views  of  France, 
Gen.  Armstrong,  or  of  our  cabinet.  No  cause  of  quarrel, 
no  mode  of  renewing  the  commercial  warfare  against  Great 
Britain  resulted  from  such  a  natural  and  fair  construction 
of  Lord  Wellesley's  note.  It  was  decided  in  the  cabinet 
of  Paris  to  compql  Great  Britain  to  make  a  formal  renun* 


31 


nanded 
project, 
r,  what 
e  Berlin 
except 
llesley's 

',  1806, 
aniiary, 
iitimate, 
d  repeal 

d  a  fur- 

of  May, 

07,  and 

that  of 

r  of  Mr. 
f&[  been 
d  under 
^  declar- 
•  France 

as  silent 
irould  be 

ith  Lord 
mce  wa^ 
g  on  the 
;lleslcy's 
tunlly  at 
order  of 

Welles, 
'  France, 

quarrel, 
ist  Great 
struction 
2  cabinet 
jl  rentin* 


r 


ciatlon  of  her  rights,  and  if  she  had  consented  to  such  i^n 
humiliation,  the  emperor  reserved  to  himself,  in  the  vagi-  le 
and  inexplicit  terms  of  his  requisition,  an  ample  latitude  t  X) 
demand  still  further  humiliations.  Accordingly  Gen.  Am  i> 
strong  wrote  to  Mr.  Smith  with  respect  to  Lord  Welle  i- 
ley's  statement,  on  the  3d  of  May,  that  "he  need  scarce  ly 
observe  how  impossible  it  is  to  make  this  or  any  simil  nf 
statement  the  ground  work  of  a  new  demand  for  a  rept  !ul 
of  the  Berlin  decree."  -  | 

And  it  seems  that  in  pursuance  of  this  opinion  he  1  as 
abstained  from  that  day  to  the  present  to  inform  his  moj»  !s. 
ty  of  the  construction  put  upon  the  orders  of  May,  18(  )6, 
and  January,  1807,  by  the  British  cabinet,  which  our  ot'  her 
minister  at  London,  Mr.  Pinkney,  thought  and  had  cc  tm. 
municated  to  him  such  an  opinion  amounted  to  a  virt  .ual 
repeal  of  the  former. 

Thus  we  see  how  faithfully  our  two  ministers  conduc  ted 
this  negotiation. 

Mr.  Armstrong  informs  Mr.  Pinkney  that  if  Great  Brif  aiiii 
wiH  repeal  her  orders  anterior  to  the  Berlin  decree,  t,i\at 
France  will  repeal  her  decrees. 

Mr.  Pinkney  simply  asks  Lord  Wellesley  if  those  ai  ite- 
rior  orders  are  still  in  force.  Nor  did  he  ask  whc  tlicr 
Great  Britain  would  revoke  them  until  long  after  the  an- 
swer of  Great  Britain  to  the  first  question,  whether  they  \  »rcre 
in  force,  had  been  transmitted  to  France. 

When  the  answer  of  the  British  cabinet  is  such  ns  I 
Mr.  Pinkney  to  think  them  virtually  at  an  end,  and  v 
he  communicates  this  result  to  Gen.  Armstrong,  he  < 
not  think  it  worthy  of  attention,  nor  sufficient  to  disturb 
repose  of  his  imperial  majesty,  by  submitting  the  quci  tioii 
to  him ! 

It  is  now  perceived  we  presume  by  every  iiUelligent  n 
er,  that  the  way  was  perfectly  prepared  in  concert  for 
extraordinary  letter  of  the  Due  de  Cadorc,  in  which  a 
mal  but  illusory  promise  of  a  repeal  of  the  Berlin  and  . 
Ian  decrees  is  tendered,  provided  Great  Britain  will  rc| 
her  orders,  and  renounce,  not  the  blockade  of  May ^  lb 
which  she  had  declared  was  the  only  one  in  force,  not 
anterior  bhclcades  actually  existing',  but  something  furt! 


K'.'ls 
'hen 
Iocs 
'the 


wd- 
the 
for- 
Vli. 
K-al 
05, 
aM 


something  inwlmissible,  that  she  shall  renounce  "  her 
principles  of  blockade  which  she  wishes  to  establish," 

Terms  wWch  every  man  will  perceive  might  be  con- 
strued  to  amount  to  the  surrender  of  all  her  maritime  rights^ 

We  conceive  then  that  we  have  established  our  first  pro- 
position, that  this  demand  upon  Great  Britain  to  renounce 
her  principles  of  blockade  proceeded  from  our  cabinet — 
WMS  a  concerted  scheme,  and  was  not  pressed  as  an  ultima- 
tum until  it  was  well  asccrttdnqd  tliat  it  would  not  and  could 
noii  be  yielded. 

Our  second  proposition  rests  on  simplet-,  and  if  possible 
on  still  more  conclusive  grounds — upon  authority  which 
Mr'.  Madison  will  not  deny,  because  it  is  his  own. 

"'IVe  sav,  2ndlyy  That  Mr.  Madison  when  he  demanded 
of  Oreat  iBritain  as  a  condition  of  issuing  his  proclamation 
tha  t  she  should  annul  her  decree  of  May,  1806,  knew  that 
he '  fta&  not  authorized  to  annex  such  a  condition. 

'  That  he  did  annex  such  a  condition  is  proved  by  a  letter 
from  our  secretary  of  state,  of  July  5th,  1810,  to  Mr.  Pink- 
ney  *,  in  which  he  says,  "  You  will  accordingly  let  it  be  dis- 
tim  .tly  understood  tiiat  it  must  necessarily  include  the  anul- 
memt  of  the  blockade  of  May,  1806." 

Jllow  the  right  of  Mr.  Madison  to  include  this  demand  as 
an  indispensable  condition  could  only  arise  from  the  con- 
stnitction  put  by  him  on  the  act  of  Congress  of  May,  1810, 
which  authorized  him,  in  ci>se  "either  of  the  belligerents 
should  so  far  revoke  or  modify  its  decrees  or  edicts  as  that 
they  ceased  to  violate  the  neutral  commerce  of  the  United 
Stattes,"  to  issue  his  proclamation  stating  that  fact,  and  upon 
such  proclamation,  so  made,  the  non-intercoursewastore- 
viv(  J  against  the  other  belligerent,  if  he  should  fail  to  repeal 
*•  h  is  edicts  in  like  manner  within  tlirec  months." 

lit  is  not  denied  that  the  decrees  or  edicts  which  did  vio- 
lates our  neutral  commerce  were  undefined  by  the  act.- 
Mr-.  Madison,  by  his  agent  Mr.  Gallatin,  has  incautiously 
admitted  this  uncertainty. — It  is  not  denied  that  Mr.  Mad- 
ison, in  the  execution  of  this  power,  was  the  sole  judge  of 
th(j  decrees  to  which  it  extended.  It  is  a  little  unlucky, 
however,  when  the  statute  was  so  undefined  as  he  now 
co.fiplainSi  that  Mr.  Madison  shoukl  have  extended  it  to 


Sfi 


u 


her 


:e 
h." 

be  con- 
,e  rights^ 
irst  pro- 
enounce 
abinet — 
1  ultima- 
ind  could 

possible 
y  which 

emanded 
ilamation 
new  that 

y  a  letter 
fr.  Pink- 
it  be  dis' 
the  anul- 

emand  as 
the  con- 
ly,  1810, 
lligerents 
ts  as  that 
e  United 
and  upon 
ivas  to  re- 
to  repeal 

I  did  vio- 
the  act.- 
autiously 
Ir.  Mad- 
judge  of 
unlucky, 
he  NOW 
ded  it  to 


Ah  old  and  harmless  blockade  of  Great  Britain,  and  should 
nave  passed  over  the  Rambouillct  and  Bayonne  decrees  of 
France ! 

But  our  main  question  still  returns — did  iiifact  Mr.  Mad- 
ison believe  that  the  act  of  May,  1810,  extended  to  the 
British  blockade  of  May,  1806,  so  as  to  have  a  right  to  say 
that  the  renunciation  or  repeal  of  Great  Britain  miist  neces- 
sarily include  t/iat  blockade  ? 

We  say  that  he  did  not  believe  it,  though  he  said  it  in  a 
solemn  manner,  and  we  prove  it  thus  s— 

On  the  1st  day  of  March,  1809,  Congress  passed  an  act 
prohibiting  intercourse  both  with  Great  Britain  and  France. 
That  act  provided  however  that,  "  in  case  either  of  the 
belligerents  should  so  repeal  or  modify  its  edicts  as  that 
they  should  cease  to  violate  the  neutral  commerce  of  the 
United  States,  the  president  should  certify  that  fact  by 
proclamation,"  and  the  trade  should  be  open  with  such 
power. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  words  are  verbatim  et  literatim 
the  same  as  in  the  act  of  P.Iay,  1810,  which  Mr.  Madison 
has  declared  necessarily  included  the  blockade  of  May, 
1806.  Yet  on  the  19th  of  April,  1809,  three  years  nearly 
after  the  blockade  of  May,  1806,  Mr.  Madison  made  a 
convention  with  Mr.  Erskine,  the  British  minister,  and 
thereupon  issued  his  proclamation  of  that  date,  declaring 
(hat 

"  Whereas  Great  liritain  hail  hv  !♦<  mliiUtpr  nuimrBd  lilm  that  tlia  Orilerg  in  doiin- 
•il  of  January  ami  November,  1807,  fmif/ij  will  Imvu  Imoii  ri-pcnled.  on  the  lOili 
dav  of  June  next,  he  ccrtirivd  thiitfuct,  itii'ir  thiit  tl|y  trnilu  with  Great  Britaia  should 
after  that  day  be  free  to  the  oitiKuim  ul'  lli«  Uiiltuil  StHtu«>" 

Now  as  the  words  of  both  statutes  are  precisely  the  same, 
as  his  powers  to  make  such  a  proclamation  are  wholly  found- 
ed on  the  acts  of  Congress,  as  all  the  acts  of  Great  Britain, 
now  demanded  to  be  repealed,  existed  prior  to  his  procla- 
mation of  April,  1809,  it  follows,  that  he  did  not  believe,  at 
least  in  April,  1809,  that  the  blockade  of  Great-Britain  of 
May,  1806,  was  a  **violntion  of  our  neutral  cbm7nercet\ 
because  he  did  not  dcmapd  its  repeal. 
.5 


Iv 


34 

That  there  was  a  secret  undei'standmg  between  our 
cabinet  and  thit  of  France,  that  Great  Britain  should  be 
required  to  annul  her  blockades  of  a  date  anterior  to  the 
Berlin  decree^  and  that  this  suggestion  first  came  from  our 
cabinet,  will  appear  from  the  two  following  extracts  of  let- 
ters from  our  Secretary  Smith  to  Mr.  Pinkney,  and  one  is 
dated  July  5th,  1810,  m  which  he  says,  "  You  will  let  it 
be  distinctly  understood  that  the  repeal  must  necessarily  in* 
elude  an  annulment  of  the  blockade  of  May,  1806 — This  is 
the  explanation  which  wilt  be  given  by  our  minister  at  Paria 
to  the  French  government,  incase  it  sfmllthtvo.  be  required." 
It  seems  it  had  not  then  been  required  by  France. 

That  this  was  a  concerted  thing,  is  apparent  from  another 
clause  of  the  same  letter^  in  which  Mr.  Smith  says,  that 
"  should  Great  Britain  not  withdraw  all  her  previous  partial 
blockades,  it  is  probable  that  France  will  draw  Great  Bri- 
tain and  the  United  States  to  issue  on  the-  legality  dl  such 
blockades^  (that  is,  all  partial  blockades,)  by  acceding  to 
the  act  of  Congress  on  condition  that  the  repeal  of  the  block- 
ade shall  accompany  that  of  the  orders  in  council." 

Within  one  month  after  these  despatches  arrived  in 
France,  Bonaparte  did  bring  us  to  issue  with  Great  Britain 
on  this  very  point f  and  yet  Mr.  Madison  was  no  prophet^ 
because  it  was  he  who  first  suggested  the  thought  to  Arm- 
strong, and  Armstrong  to  the  ingenious  Cabinet  of  St. 
Cloud. 

In  support  of  this  assertion,  I  "adduce  the  following  ex- 
tract of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Armstrong  to  our  Secretary^ 
dated  long  before,  viz.  Jan.  23d,  1810.  "  In  conformity 
to  your  suggestions  in  your  letter  of  Dec.  1st,  1809,  I  de- 
manded whether  if  Great  Britain  revoked  her  decrees  of  a 
date  anterior  to  the  Berlin  decree,  his  Majesty  would  con- 
sent to  revoke  that  decree." 

It  is  much  to  be  doubted  whether  France  would  have 
ever  thought  of  such  a  condition  had  it  not  been  thus  sug- 
gested by  our  own  Cabinet. 

These  then  are  Mr.  Madison's  proofs  of  his  fair  offers  to 
Great  Britain  to  induce  her  to  repeal  her  orders  in  council. 
It  appears  that  it  was  impossible  for  Great  Britain  to  com- 


35 


^cen  oiir 
lould  be 
)r  to  the 
rom  our 
ts  of  let- 
id  one  is 
vill  let  it 
sarily  in-^ 
—This  is 
r  at  Paris 
quired." 

■ 

1  another 

lays,  that 

IS  partial 

reat  Bri- 

r  o^  such 

ceding  to 

he  block- 
>» 

rived  in 
at  Britain 
prophety 
to  Arm- 
et  of  St. 

wing  ex- 
'ecretarif^ 
jnformity 
09,  I  de. 
:rees  of  a 
)uld  con< 

3uld  have 
;hus  sug- 

•  offers  to 
I  council. 
\  to  com< 


ply  with  either  of  these  offers  without  i»acrificing  her  most 
important  rights,  and  that  our  cabinet  have  studiously 
coupled  with  the  obnoxious  decrees  such  further  demands 
as  it  was  known  Great  Britain  could  not  yield. 

Before  I  quit  the  subject  of  the  orders  in  council,  I  shall 
notice  a  popular  objection  to  them,  which  is  well  calculat- 
ed to  rouse  the  jealousy  of  commercial  men — and  that  is, 
that  Great  Britain  relaxes  them  in  favor  of  her  own  sub- 
jects, and  enjoys  that  very  trade  from  which  she  excludes 
neutrals.  One  might  say  generally  that  if  the  blockade  was 
originally  laxoful  as  a  retaliation  on  her  enemy,  ho  partial 
relaxation  va  favor  of  the  besieger,  and  which  she  thinks 
will  enable  her  longer  to  carry  on  the  war,  or  t.vi0ner  reduce 
the  enemy,  could  render  the  blockade  illegal  as  to  neutrals-— 
nor  if  the  blockade  was  at  first  unjasty  could  this  render  it 
more  so.  One  thing  also  all  men  will  concede,  that  this 
partial  relaxation  docs  not  proceed  from  a  willingness  to 
relieve  France,  but  from  a  belief  whether  mistaken  or  not, 
that  Britain  has  the  advantage  in  the  interchange. 

Thus,  she  lets  the  French  have  small  quantities  of  coffee 
and  sugar  which  she  does  not  want,  and  has  taken  in  return 
flour  >vhich  is  necessary  to  her.  Now  if  by  this  partial 
exchange  she  strengthens  herself,  and  is  enabled  more  ef- 
fectually to  cramp  the  commerce  of  her  enemy,  surely  the 
blockade  does  not  for  that  cause  cease  to  be  legal.  Let  us 
apply  general  admitted  principles  and  known  cases  to  this 
objection.  Enemies  when  they  find  it  convenient,  ex- 
change prisoners,  and  send  back  to  each  other  the  men  nee- 
essay  to  carry  on  the  war.  Can  a  neutral  complain  of  this, 
or  insist  from  this  relaxation  for  their  mutual  interests,  that 
he  has  a  right  to  supply  them  with  men  ? 

In  the  French  war  with  Russia,  under  Paul  first,  they 
clothed  and  sent  back  a  whole  Russian  army  which  they 
had  taken,  and  that  without  exchange. 

Could  America  have  complained  of  this,  and  have  in- 
sisted upon  furnishing  Russia  with  military  clothing  and 
men  ?  Yet  the  principle  is  perfectly  analogous. 

Suppose  Soult,  who  is  besieging  Cadiz  was  able  to  in- 
vest it  by  sea  as  well  as  land,  and  suppose  he  should  pro- 
pose to  the  Spaniards  t;o  supply  them  with  waier  which  the 


36 

city  \vsait9,  provided  they  would  furnish  him  with  bread 
for  the  want  of  which  his  soldiers  are  famishing,  could 
Amenta  complmn  of  this,  and  insist  upon  her  right  to  vio- 
late the  blockade  and  to  supply  Cadiz  with  flour  ?  Or  sup. 
pose  instead  of  flour,  he  should  stipulate  to  receive  back 
gold  to  pay  his  troops  with,  would  this  vary  the  question  ? 
Certainly  not — an  hundred  analogous  cases  may  be  put,  but 
the  genersd  proposition  and  argument  is  unanswerable.  If  the 
belligerent  had  an  original  right  to  attempt  to  reduce  an  ener 
my  by  seige,  or  blockade,  or  by  retaliating  upon  him  a  system 
of  commercial  distress,  any  partial  relaxation  in  the  rigour 
of  the  execution  of  such  siege  or  retaliation  to  the;  benefit 
of  such  belligerent  as  he  believes,  and  to  the  injury  or  hu- 
miliation pf  the  enemy  cannot  affect  the  question  of  right, 
If  therefore  France,  the  haughty  France,  which  threatens 
Britain  with  the  destruction  of  her  commerce,  condescendfi 
to  beg  and  to  receive  bales  of  British  broadcloth  to  clothe 
her  troops,  this  not  only  strengthens  Britain  and  enables 
her  to  persevere  in  distressing  her  enemy,  but  it  humbles 
that  enemy  in  the  sight  of  the  world.  Such  are  the  ideas 
which  this  relaxation  suggests. 

I  now  proceed  to  consider  my  second  proposition,  the 
expediency  of  the  proposed  war,  both  upon  the  supposition 
of  a  successful  and  unsuccessful  issue. 

I  need  n(A  spend  time  to  shew,  that  the  rulers  of  a  free 
State,  intrusted  with  temporary  power  for  the  public  good, 
have  no  right  to  embark  in  a  war  even  if  it  be  just,  unless 
there  should  be  at  least  a  reasonable  prospect  of  attaining 
the  object  of  the  war  by  arms — unless  the  evils  proposed 
to  be  redressed,  will  in  all  human  probability  be  remedied 
bylhe  wju*.  Individual  tyrants  can,  to  be  sure,  though  not 
lawfully,  rush  into  vvar  arid  plunge  their  subjects  into  the 
deepest  distress,  to  gratify  their  ambition,  or  to  satiate 
their  revenge.  But  the  wise  rulers  of  a  free  people  will 
never  encounter  certain  evils  for  doubtful  good,  much  less 
in  a  desperate  cause. 

Great  Britain  stands  in  a  situation  which  may  be  called 
unexampled.    Her  marine  power  is  greater  than  that  o 
any  other  nation  since  we  have  any  authentic  histories  of 
jjivU^?ed  society.     Opposed  to  her  is  the  gigantic  ^lomin, 


h  bread 

',  could 

t  to  vio- 

Or  sup- 

ve  back 

Liestion  ? 

put,  but 

e.  If  the 

e  an  ene- 

a  system 

e  rigour 

ft  benefit 

y  or  hu- 

of  right, 

hreateng 

kscendfi 

o  clothe 

enables 

humbles 

:he  ideas 

tion,  the 
}position 

of  a  free 
ic  good, 
it,  unless 
attaining 
)roposed 
emedied 
)ugh  not 
into  the 
D  satiate 
pie  will 
iich  less 

e  called 

that  o 

;ories  of 

domin, 


37 

ion  of  France,  enjoyed  and  swayed  by  one  of  the  most  am- 
bitious, daring,  successful  and  unprincipled  men  whom  the 
world  has  produced — a  man,  who  has  shewn  that  he  nei- 
ther respects  the  venerable  institutions  of  religion,  nor  the 
faith  of  treaties,  nor  the  established  laws  of  civilized  na,- 
tions — a  declared  enemy  to  the  ancient  dynasties  of  mon- 
archical states,  as  well  as  to  the  humble  citizens  of  free 
republics — He  has  spared  no  people  whom  his  arms  could 
subdue,  and  there  arc  none  whom  he  has  subdued  tliat  he 
has  not  reduced  to  the  lowest  stage  of  servitude  and  mis- 
ery. 

Against  this  monstrous  power  Great  Britain  by  means 
of  her  marine  force,  has  been  a/one  enabled  to  make  a  suc- 
cessful stand,  and  it  is  immaterial  to  us,  whether  this  op- 
position on  her  part  proceeds  from  a  general  regard  to  the 
interests  of  all  free  and  independent  states,  or  whether  she 
is  influenced  by  her  own  interests  or  by  her  ambition — 
The  effect  upon  us  is  the  same,  and  we  have  only  to  ask 
ourselves  whether  we  have  most  to  apprehend  fron\  the  ab- 
solute success  of  the  arms  of  France,  or  from  the  tnera  ca- 
pacity  of  Great  Britain  to  resist  the  tyrant  who  threatens 
her  with  destruction — If  the  chances  between  these  two 
combatants  were  equal — if  it  was  as  probable  that  Great 
Britain  would  subdue  France,  as  that  France  will  subdue 
Great  Britain,  then  we  should  only  have  to  ask  ourselves 
which  would  be  most  likely  to  abuse  their  power,  and  we 
ought  in  that  case  to  wish  success  to  that  nation  which 
had  manifested  tlie  greatest  disposition  to  justice  and  mod- 
eration. 

All  men  who  value  the  protestant  religion— ah  t,.<\\  who 
love  freedom,  and  all  impartial  men  accjuainted  with  the 
moral  character  and  political  conduct  of  the  two  govern- 
ments, must  admit,  that  it  would  be  safer  for  a  free  and 
protestant  state  to  have  the  power  in  the  hands  of  Great 
Britain  than  in  that  of  France. — Britain  is  ruled  by  her  cit- 
izens— she  is  essentially  free,  and  no  nation  abhoj-s  more 
than  she  does  the  tyrannical  principles  which  actuate  the 
ruler  of  France. 

Our  interest  then  in  the  strongest  case  which  could  be 


38 

put  would  be  iii  favor  of  the  predontinance  of  British 
power  rather  than  tliat  of  France. 

But  the  case  I  have  put  I  may  say  is  not  only  an  impro- 
bable but  hunianly  speaking  an  impossible  one — While 
Bonaparte  every  day  boasts  both  of  his  power  and  intention 
to  humble,  reduce  and  destroy  Great  Britain,  while  he  says 
that  "  she  will  one  day  become  as  insignificant  as  Sardi- 
nia" the  most  extravagant  Englishman  never  ventures  to 
hope  any  thing  more  thiin  the  reduction  of  France  to  the 
power  she  possessed  under  the  dynasty  of  the  Bourbons — 
and  this  we  may  add  is  a  more  improbable  supposition  than 
even  the  extermination  of  Great  Britain,  distant  as  we 
ought  to  hope  (notwithstanding  she  is  our  enemy)  that 
event  may  be. 

Let  us  suppose  then  that  our  arms  united  to  those  of 
France  should  be  completely  successful,  (and  it  is  to  be 
presumed  that  our  president  imdertakes  this  war  with  the 
hope  sa\d  expectation  of  success,)  suppose  Great  Britain 
humbled  and  compelled  to  yield  up  her  maritime  superior- 
ity, what  security  have  we  that  France  will  exercise  the 
advantage  which  she  shall  have  gained  by  our  united  efforts 
and  sacrifices  with  more  moderation  and  justice,  more  re- 
gard to  the  laws  and  common  interest  of  nations  than  Bri- 
tain has  done  ?  Shall  we  fmd  reasonable  grounds  for  such 
a  hope  in  her  treatment  of  all  neutral  states  to  which  her 
arms  have  extended  ?  Shall  we  find  it  in  her  code  of  colo- 
nial law,  in  the  restrictions  which  in  all  past  ages  and  at  the 
present  moment  she  imposes  on  all  commerce  with  her 
possessions  ?  Shall  we  find  it  in  the  new  practices  which 
she  has  adopted  of  converting  every  captain  of  her  fleet 
^nto  an  admiralty  judge,  and  authorizing  him  to  burn, 
sink  and  destroy  upon  a  quarter  deck  trial  and  adjudica- 
tion ? 

But  suppose  Britain  humbled,  and  the  fleets  of  France 
once  triumphant  on  the  ocean,  have  we  any  security  that 
she  will  not  enforce  her  pretentions  to  Nova  Scotia  an^ 
Canada,  and  Louisiana,  and  the  Antilles,  and  South  Amer- 
ica and  the  Floridas  ?  Many  of  them  once  the  jewels  of 
her  crown,  and  all  of  them  the  avowed  objects  of  her  ara- 
bUion? 


m 


British 

n  impro- 
— While 
intention 
e  he  says 
as  Sardi. 
itures  to 
:e  to  the 
irbons — 
ition  than 
nt  as  we 
;my)  that 

those  of 
;  is  to  be 

with  the 
i  Britain 
superior- 
ercise  the 
ted  efforts 
more  rc- 
:han  Bri- 

for  such 
ivhich  her 
e  of  colo- 
and  at  the 
with  her 
ces  which 
fher  fleet 

to  burn, 
adjudica- 

►f  France 
irity  that 
:otia  an^ 
ith  Amcr- 
jewels  of 
fher  am. 


If  tlie&e  countries  are  once  subdued  by  her,  what  rigfit 
have  we  to  expect  that  she  will  not  apply  to  them  the 
principles  which  she  has  always  maintained  of  excluding 
fort'ipjnersirom  a  participation  in  their  trade  ? 

What  right  have  we  to  expect  that  she  will  favor  of 
even  permit  our  intercourse  with  any  of  the  European 
states  under  her  control  ? 

But  above  all,  what  right  have  we  to  hope  that  she  will 
not  look  with  a  jealous  eye  on  the  only  remaining  repub- 
lic ?  That  she  will  endure  the  example  set  to  her  own 
subjects  by  the  citizens  of  this  country  who  boast  the  right 
of  governing  themselves  ? 

Why  should  we  expect  to  be  exempt  from  the  effects  of 
her  lawless  ambition  ?  We,  a  nation  hateful  to  her  on  ac- 
count of  our  origin,  our  language,  our  manners,  our  free 
institutions,  our  religion  ?  Where  is  the  bold  statesman 
who  will  affirm  that  she  will  not  undertake  the  conquest  of 
this  country,  or  who,  considering  her  military  power,  and 
talents,  and  our  own  divided  and  feeble  state  will  guarantee 
that  she  will  fail  in  her  attempts  upon  our  liberties  ? 

?I  could  press  these  considerations  much  fiirther,  but  the 
thought  of  them  is  too  dreadful,  and  the  dangtr  in  the 
event  of  the  destruction  of  Great  Britain  too  imminent  to- 
require  any  further  developement. 

But  suppose  instead  of  the  destruction  of  Great  Britain 
we  should  only  succeed  in  imposing  upon  her  a  seluctant 
assent  to  our  demands — ^Suppose  we  make  a  separate  peace, 
and  she  should  withdraw  her  orders  in  council,  and  should 
agree  to  give  up  the  right  of  reclaiming  her  own  subjects 
and  the  doctrine  of  blockade  ?  What  would  be  our  condi- 
tion ?  We  should  have  expended  perhaps  100  millions  of 
dollars — We  should  have  impoverished  our  merchants  and 
mechanics,  and  farmers — We  should  have  lost  all  the  pro- 
fits of  our  neutrality  during  the  war,  and  in  exchange  for 
this  we  should  have  gained  the  trade  to  France — a  trade, 
subject  to  the  vexations,  the  tributes  j\nd  embarrassments, 
which  a  military  sovereign  despising  commerce  will  alvvaysi 
inflict. 

But  if  the  British  maritime  power  should  still  be  unbrok- 
en, as  in  this  case  I  have  supposed,  \\hat  security  should  we 


40 


have,  that  as  soon  as  slic  had  recruited  Irotn  our  blows,  slui 
would  not  again  resort  to  the  same  measures  which  she 
deems  necessiiry  to  her  existence  ? 

So  that  we  shoul'l  have  the  satisfaction  of  having  fought 
and  ruined  ourselves  for  a  principle  which  was  not  worth 
the  contest,  and  which,  when  yielded  from  necessity  would 
be  resumed  as  soon  as  the  power  of  our  enemy  would 
permit. 

I  have  already  put  what  I  consider  the  two  most  impro- 
bable cases.  Let  us  now  view  our  situation  in  case  we 
should  fail  in  our  object — ^In  order  that  we  may  judge  of 
the  probability  of  success,  let  us  consider  the  nature  of  this 
contest.  Great  Britain  except  in  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia 
is  as  invulnerable  to  us  as  she  is  to  I*'rance.  Bonaparte  at 
his  accession  to  the  throne  of  France  declared  to  all  Europe 
his  fixed  determination  to  restore  the  marine  of  France — 
He  has  had  at  his  command  the  resources  of  sixty  millions 
of  people — He  possesses  above  100  ships  of  the  line,  200 
frigates  and  100  smaller  vessels  of  war — Yet  he  has  made 
no  sensible  advances  towards  maintaining  an  equal  contest 
with  Great  Britain — On  the  contrary  his  march  may  be  said 
to  be  retrograde,  and  yet  he  has  had  twelve  years  of  experi- 
ment in  his  project— Is  it  then  probable,  that  seven  millions 
of  people  scattered  as  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  are, 
and  a  great  proportion  of  whom  are  averse  and  hostile  to 
naval  equipments,  whose  whole  navy  consists  of  some  half 
a  score  of  small  ships,  can  bring  any  essential  aid  to  France, 
in  this  war  against  the  British  marine  ? 

It  is  said  however  that  we  can  distress  her  trade  by  our 
privateers — That  some  individual  losses  may  be  liiustainc'd 
by  her  subjects  is  not  denied  ;  but  it  will  also  not  be  denied 
that  our  losses  and  her  gains  from  us  will  be  mere  than  an 
hundred  times  as  great.  Is  this  the  way  to  red  ace  a  great 
and  powerful  nation  to  our  terms  ? 

But  it  is  said  we  shall  take  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia — 
This  perhaps  may  be  effected  with  much  bloodshed,  and 
greater  expenditure  than  the  whole  lee  simple  of  those  bar- 
ren provinces  would  produc! — Will  this  impoverish  Great 
Britain  ?  No — It  will  strengthen  her — Those  provinces 
are  an  annual  charge  upon  her  revenue — Will  they  strength* 


' 


ilovvs,  slid 
vliich  she 

ig  fought 
not  worth 
ity  would 
ny  would 

)st  impro- 
n  case  we 
judge  of 
urcofthis 
3va  Scotiu 
napartc  at 
ill  Europe 
France — 
V  millions 
line,  200 
has  made 
al  contest 
ay  be  said 
of  expcri- 
n  millions 
itates  arc, 
hostile  to 
some  half 
to  France 

le  by  our 
sustained 
DC  denied 
e  than  au 
ce  a  great 

Scotia — 
ihed,  and 
those  bar- 
ish  Great 
provinces 

strength* 


41 

en  us  ?  No — They  will  enfeeble  us — They  will  increase 
the  jarring  materials  of  which  the  United  States  are  compos- 
ed, and  which  are  already  too  discordant  for  our  peace  or 
safety — They  will  open  an  easy  entrance  to  French  power 
and  French  mtrigucs — Already  Frenchmen  are  admitted 
to  a  seat  in  our  national  councils,  and  die  addition  of  Cana- 
da would  only  ^ve  to  France  the  opportunity  of  attacking 
us  on  both  flanks  ;  for  it  ought  to  be  known  that  every 
Louisianian  and  Canadian  is  at  heart  as  well  as  by  habits  a 
Frenchman. 

But  if  we  weaken  Great  Britain  by  assaults  u}X)n  her 
provinces  and  commerce,  has  she  no  means  of  annoying  us 
m  as  great  and  vital  a  degree  ?  Ask  the  underivriters. 
Ask  the  Nantucket  owners  of  whalemen.  Ask  the  mer- 
chants who  have  ha.^arded  millions  beyond  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope.  See  the  citizens  of  Nantucket  fleeing  from 
their  Imbitations  and  sending  the  specie  of  their  banks  to 
Boston  for  safe  keeping.  Ask  the  fishermen  of  Marble- 
head  how  many  fares  they  will  get  during  the  war.  Above 
all,  ask  the  inhabitmts  of  the  province  of  Mauie  what  will 
oecome  of  their  navigation  and  their  lumber  ? 

No  country  ever  rushed  into  a  war  so  obviously  and  un- 
deniably ruinous  for  the  sake  of  maintaining  doubtful  prin- 
ciples of  small  value,  and  which  were  so  little  likely  to  be 
obtained  by  it. 

But  if  we  attack  the  provinces  of  Great  Britain,  have  we 
any  security  that  Great  Britain  will  not  annoy  or  anniliilate 
our  cities  ?  This  would  be  a  dreadful  sort  of  warfare,  (say 
some  persons)  to  which  Great  Britain  would  not  resort. 

This  is  a  strange  sort  of  reasoning — We  force  herreluc- 
tanUy  into-  a  war — We  plunder  her  commerce — We  wrest 
from  her  her  peaceful  provinces,  but  we  expect  that  slie 
will  forbear  from  doing  to  us  all  the  injury  in  her  power. 
Her  forbearance  must  then  be  much  greater  than  her  calum- 
niators in  this  country  have  declared.  t 

In  a  contest  between  two  nations,  the  question,  which 

/ill  be  the  most  likely  to  yield,  depends  upon  the  compiu'- 

ison  of  their  opulence  and  population,  their  military  lbr<'e, 

their  capacity  to  endure  sufferings,  their  respective  hal>i- 

tudes  as  to  war,  the  amount  of  the  relative  lesses  which  t<hej- 

6      ■ 


4t^ 


may  respectively  sustain,  and  the  firmness  and  btrcnrth  of 
their  political  institutions — Every  man  must  admit  tnis  to 
be  a  loir  view  of  the  case.  Now  in  each  of  these  points 
Great  Britain  will  have  the  advantage  of  us — Great  Britain 
has  twice  our  population  and  at  least  four  times  our  opu- 
lence— She  has  fifty  times  our  land  force,  and  above  one 
hundred  times  our  naval  force— ~She  has  a  much  greater 
capacity  to  endure  sufllerings  and  losses  from  the  above 
causes — She  has  been  inured  to  war  for  several  centuries, 
and  the  addition  of  the  United  States  to  the  number  of  her 
enemies  will  not  produce  so  much  effect  upon  her  as  did 
our  embargo,  which  wefoimd  by  experience  was  very  smaH 
—In  short  we  have  been  her  enemy  in^cf  and  in  intention 
ever  since  December,  1807,  when  Congress  laid  the  em- 
bargo to  distress  het  trade  and  to  please  France — As  to  the 
relative  amount  of  tosses  which  tlie  two  countries  will  sus- 
tain, we  would  ask  whether  the  British  trade,  protected  as 
it  will  be  by  strong  convoys,  can  possibly  suffer  as  much 
from  our  twenty  stnps  of  war  and  a  few  privateers,  as  we 
shall  sustain  in  our  ships  without  convoy,  and  exposed  to 
six  hundred  ships  of  war  of  Great  Britain  ? 

Lastly,  can  it  be  believed  that  a  monarchici^  and  aristO' 
cratical  Government  like  that  of  Great  Britain  will  not  be 
better  able  to  stand  the  shock  of  another  war,  than  the  fee- 
ble, divided,  changeable,  and  changing  nilcrs  of  our  nation  ? 
a  nation  which  goes  to  war  with  two  thirds  of  all  the  rep- 
resentatives and  senators  of  the  Northern  States  against  it. 
Even  a  British  mnnister  would  not  hazard  a  war  (supported 
as  he  is  by  600,000  men  in  arms)  with  a  majority  m  the 
house  of  I«ords  of  only  six  members.  What  madness  th^n 
must  it  be  deemed  in  our  government  of  opiman  onlv^  to 
haz.ird  an  offensive  and  ruinous  war  by  the  same  small  ma- 
jority? 

There  are  those  however  among  the  most  ignorant  of  the 
people  who  derive  some  consolation,  or  rather  found  their 
hopes  of  success  on  the  issue  of  our  last  contest  with  Great 
Bntain.  Such  men  make  a  wretched  figure  at  estimating 
and  co.nparing  distant  and  dissimilar  political  events. 

Great  Britain  was  then  the  assailant — She  transported 
her  troopsuSOOO  miles  to  conquer^  not  to  defend.     A  nation 


• 


rcngth  ol' 
it  tnis  to 
le  points 
It  Britain 
our  opu- 
bove  one 
1  greater 
le  above 
xnturics, 
)er  of  her 
ter  as  did 
cry  smaH 
I  intention 
i  the  em- 
■As  to  the 

will  sus- 
atected  as 

as  much 
:rs,  as  we 
i&posed  to 

nd  aristo- 
ill  not  be 
n  the  fee- 
ir  nation? 
I  the  rep- 
against  it. 
supported 
ky  m  the 
Iness  th(;n 
t  onlut  to 
small  ma- 
ant  of  the 
und  th«ir 
nth  Great 
istimating 
:nts. 

ansported 
A  nation 


• 


43 

acting  upon  the  dcfcnbivc  has  an  hundred  fold  (or  perhaps 
even  more  than  that)  the  advai^tage  over  the  nation  which 
invades  especially  from  a  grcii);  distance.  The  difficulty  of 
supply  to  itc  forces,  and  thar  consequent  limited  operations, 
retard  the  progress  of  the  invading  power. 

Our  nation  was  in  the  former  war  not  only  united  but 
enthusiastic — They  fought  pro  arts  etfucis,  for  their  lives 
and  liberties.  We  are  c^tainly  not  united  in  the  prose- 
cution  of  tfiis  war,  and  so  far  from  enthusiasm  in  any  de- 
scription of  people,  the  war  is  secretly  condemned  by  the 
TP'.ss  of  one  party,  and  openly  execrated  by  the  other,  /^tf, 
instead  of  defending  our.owji  soil,  are  noxv  inflated  with  the 
ambition  of  conquest, — we  arc  about  to  march  to  add  new 
territories  to  our  o^'ergrown  republic  at  both  extremities 
of  our  country — we  say  to  the  North,  and  to  the  South,  to 
provinces  and  to  people  who  have  never  offended  us,  and 
who  do  not  ask  our  aid,  "  Yield  yourselves  up  as  subjects 
to  the  victorious  arms  of  America." 

But  v/e  should  recoJect  that  the  war  of  the  revolution,  so 
far  as  it  affords  us  a  precedent  of  our  power  when  we  tumr 
ourselves  into  invaders,,  offers  us  no  flattering  prospect. — 
The  liivasion  of  Canada  by  Arnold  and  Montgomery,  and 
the  unfortunate  expedition  to  Bigwaduce  or  Penobscot, 
do  not  redound  to  our  honor  in  the  pages  of  our  history. 

Upon  the  ocean  how  much  less  reason  have  we  to  com- 
pare the  two  cases  together  ?  France  could  then  on  that 
element  scarcely  be  said  to  be  inferior  to  Britain.  D'Es- 
taing  often,  rode  master  of  our  coasts.  Kcppel  was  ^driven 
into  port,  and  the  British  channel  ("emphatically  so  called 
at  this  day,)  acknowledged  for  one  moment  France  as  its 
master.  The  combined  naval  forces  of  France,  Spain  and 
Holland  in  the  latter  years  of  the  war  were  decidedly  an 
overmatch  for  the  British.  Yet  even  with  this  fearjhl  dif- 
ference between  her  power  then  and  now  we  atchieved  no- 
thing against  her  commerce  after  tl>e  four  first  years  of  that 
war.  Towards  the  close  of  the  war  she  picked  .even  the 
pinfeathc;rs  from  the  plumage  of  those  who  had  rioted  on 
the  plunder  of  her  commerce,  and  scarcely  an  American  pri- 
vateer or  ship  of  war  dared  to  display  its  flag  upon  the  ocean'. 


/ 


i 


We  now  take  up  the  third  point  which  I  proposed  to 
discuss,  that  if  the  administration  had  deliberately  resolved 
upon  war,  it  was  their  soleitin  duty  to  have  made  prepara- 
tiona  to  defend  our  commerce  on  the  ocean,  to  have  en- 
couraged by  every  facility  the  restoration  or  return  of  the 
millions  of  the  property  of  our  citizens  how  in  the  British 
dominions  and  power,  and  also  to  have  warned  our  citizens 
of  their  danger,  instead  of  keeping  their  hostile  purpose  se- 
cret, and  letting  these  measures  fall  with  the  rapidity  of 
lightning  upon  our  unprotected  commerce. 

If  the  purpose  of  the  Government  had  been  long  fixed, 
and  surely  no  new  irritations  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain 
have  taken  place  within  the  last  year,  they  ought  so  to  have 
managed  their  preparations  for  war  as  not  only  to  have 
given  ample  notice  to  our  merchants,  but  to  have  satisfied 
Great  Britain,  that  they  were  resolved  to  resort  to  the  last 
extremity,  in  order  that  it  might  have  been  seen  what  would 
be  the  effect  of  such  a  resolution  on  the  councils  of  her 
Cabinet.  So  far  was  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  within 
the  past  year  firom  authorizing  our  citizens  to  expect  a  re- 
sort to  so  dreadful  a  remedy  on  the  part  of  our  Govern- 
ment,  that  it  led  them  to  hope,  that  some  expedient  would 
be  devised  by  our  Cabinet  to  avert  the  calamities  with 
which  we  were  threatened,  and  the  evils  which  we  actually 
Suffered.  The  nomination  of  a  new  minister  to  this  coun- 
try  after  the  cold  and  affrontive  dismission  of  Mr.  Jackson, 
together  with  the  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  affiiir  of  the 
Chesapeake,  gave  us  reasonable  ground  to  believe,  that  the 
Goveniment  could  not  contemplate  an  open,  undisguised, 
sudden,  and  offensive  war.  • 

For  what  step  could  have  been  more  calculated  to  lull  oiir 
commercial  friends  into  fatal  security  than  the  acceptance  of 
the  tendered  atonement  for  the  attack  on  the  Chesapeake  ? 
What  motive  could  there  be  for  adjusting  that  affair  if  our 
cabinet  then  intended  a  resort  to  arms  ? 

But  there  were  still  stronger  reasons  for  believing  that 
the  Cabinet  of  this  country  would  not  rush  into  the  embra- 
ces of  France,  and  join  her  in  her  efforts  against  Great  Brit- 
Within  tlie  past  year,  we  had  sent  a  new  ambassador 


am. 


t )  P  u-\  111      in  lieu  of  an  explicit  abandonment  of  her  de. 


45 


iposed  tcf 
resolved 
r  prepara- 
huve  en- 
irn  of  the 
he  British 
ir  citizens 
jrpose  se- 
apidity  of 

ang  fixed, 
:at  Britain 
so  to  have 
r  to  have 
e  satisfied 
to  the  last 
hat  would 
;ils  of  her 
ain  within 
:pect  a  re- 
r  Govern, 
lent  would 
lities  with 
i^e  actually 
this  coun- 
.  Jackson, 
Rliir  of  the 
e,  that  the 
disguised, 

to  lull  our 
;eptance  of 
esapeake  ? 
flair  if  our 

sving  that 
he  embra- 
ireat  Brit- 
mbassador 
of  her  de. 


crees,  in  place  of  an  immediate  restoration  of  our  property 
unjustly  surprized  by  France,  and  which  the  President  hud 
declared  must  be  an  indispensable  condition  of  our  riftum 
to  friendly  relations  with  her,  wc  had  seen  thht  France  had 
anew  promulgated  her  decrees  as  the  fundamental  kiws  of 
her  empire, — that  instead  of  restoring  our  property,  our 
minister  had  declared  that  he  had  made  no  progress  in  ob- 
taining redress  upon  that  point,  and  that  tne  prospect  oGp 
success  was  both  distant  and  doubtful. 

On  the  other  hand,  France  had  recently  given  new  and 
abundant  proofs  of  her  determination  to  annihilate  ull  free 
and  neutral  commerce  by  the  indiscriminate  plunder  and 
destruction  of  iUl  our  ships  which  she  encountered  on  the 
high  seas. 

In  this  state  of  things  it  was  impossible  for  any  honest 
and  honorable  man  to  presume,  that  we  should  suddenly 
join  France  in  her  war  against  Great  Britain.  If  however 
the  Cabinet  deemed  it  for  our  interest  to  enter  into  so  un- 
natural a  coalition,  it  was  this  their  solemn  duty  to  have  in- 
creased  our  marine  so  as  to  protect  in  some  degree  our 
trade  on  our  own  coasts. 

Let  it  not  be  said  in  answer  to  tliis,  that  the  attempt 
would  have  been  fruitless,  for  the  attempt  is  now  made» 
and  our  feeble  but  gallant  navy  ordered  out  to  guard  our 
coasts  or  become  victims  to  the  superior  force  of  tne  enemy. 

Either  then  the  defence  of  our  coast  and  waters  ought  to 
have  been  avowedly  abandoned,  or  more  effectual  measures 
should  have  been  taken  to  render  this  defence  of  some  avail. 

The  course  adopted  is  only  calculated  to  sacrifice,  after  a 
short  time,  the  truly  gallant  officers  of  our  little  navy,  and  to 
afford  a  feeble  and  illusory  protection  to  our  eommerce. 

Our  merchants  in  pursuance  of  their  national  rights 
and  interests  had  purchased  great  quantities  of  British 
goods,  and  by  the  course  of  trade,  and  from  the  superior 
convenience  and  security  arising  from  the  good  credit 
of  the  British  merchants,  had  deposited  immense  sums  in 
Great  Britain.  If  it  had  been,  which  it  now  appears  that 
it  was,  the  determination  of  the  cabinet  to  resort  to  ofl'en- 
sive  war,  they  ought  most  certainly  to  have  repealed  the  re- 
slrictjons  on  the  importation  of  British  goods,  and  to  Iwwc 


«» 


46 

permitted  our  citizens  to  bring  back  their  property  iii  order 
to  enable  them  to  pay  their  taxes,  and  to  support  the  bur- 
^en  of  the  war.  It  is  the  first  instance,  we  believe,  in  which 
a  nation  ever  commenced  a  war  by  giving  up  to  the  enemy 
such  an  hnmense  propOTtion  of  its  own  property  and  means 
of  annoyance.  Jf  we  were  diqK>sed  to  jealousy,  we  might 
«ay,  that  this  has  the  appearance  of  playing  into  the  hands 
of  our -enemy,  ^f  gratifying  the  desire  of  France  to  humble 
and  reduce  all  free  states,  and  sacrificing  the  commercial 
interests  of  this  section  of  our  country  to  the  passions  of 
the  rash  and  unthinking  representatives  of  the  south. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  motive,  the  effect  has  been 
most  dreadful.  The  people  of  New-England  generally  had 
not  the  smallest  apprehension  of  such  a  result. — They  are 
wholly  unprepared.  When  the  embargo  was  imposed,  they 
hurcied  away  their  property  as  they  lawfully  might  in  order 
to  escape  the  vengeance  of  their  own  Government,  and  they 
entrusted  it  principally  with  the  very  nation  which  the  cab- 
inet tell  us  must  be  our  enemy. 

If  war  therefore  had  really  been  intended  at  the  beginning 
of  the  session,  which  we  are  now  assiured  that  it  was,  the 
duty  of  a  watchful  and  paternal  govemmoit  was,  to  have 
continued  that  embargo,  and  to  have  abstmned  fi*om  hostiU 
ities  until  the  property  thus  sent  into  the  very  jaws  of  the 
proposed  enemy,  could  have  been  restored  to  an  impover- 
ished country,  which  will  hereaftor  need  all  its  resources. 

Fourthly,  in  a  war  offensive  and  unjust,  the  citizens  arc 
not  only  not  obliged  to  take  part, 'but  t^  the  laws  of  God, 
and  of  civil  society,  they  are  bound  to  abstain. 

This  may  appear  to  some  an  abstract  proposition,  true 
perhaps  in  itself  but  in  practice  of  no  moment,  since  the 
citizen  can  be  compelled  to  take  his  share  of  the  burdens 
of  the  war  by  the  superior  power  of  his  sovereign.  But  in 
a  free  government  like  ours,  it  is  no  answer  for  rulers  to  say 
to  the  people,  we  have  a  militaiy  force,  and  we  can  and 
will  compel  you  to  do  what  we  direct,  be  it  lawful  or  un.- 
lawful.  The  citizen  ought  to  know  what  the  ruler  can 
rightfully  do ;  as  to  his  remedy  in  case  he  should  do  wrong 
tluit  I  will  endeavour  to  shew  hereafter. 


% 


a  war 


«( 


W'*^-  -., 


^■il:-*-^.    a»',r    ;,V'-'*»^.* '• 


ty  in  order 
It  the  bur- 
r,  in  which 
the  enemy 
and  means 
we  might 
the  hands 
to  humble 
ommercial 
sassions  of 
uth. 

t  has  been 
lerally  had 
-They  are 
losed,  they 
It  in  order 
t,  and  they 
h  the  cab- 

beginnuig 
was,  the 

,  to  have 
Dm  hostil. 
iws  of  the 

impover- 
sources, 
itlzens  arc 
s  of  God, 

tion,  true 
since  the 
:  burdens 
But  in 
lers  to  say 
e  can  and 
111  or  uuf 
ruler  can 
do  wron^ 


i 


47 

The  importance  of  a  few  remarks  on  tliis  question  o{ right 
Ivill  be  perceived  from  this  consideration,  that  our  privilege 
of  (tiscussion  and  of  assembling;  to  consider  this  interesting 
topic  of  war  depends  on  the  right  of  the  citizen  to  judge 
in  the  last  resort  of  the  justice  of  tlie  proposed  war.  If  a 
government  can  lawfully  plunge  the  people  into  an  unjuj&t, 
offensive  war,  and  if  thev  are  as  much  bound  to  support  such 
a  war  as  dijust  and  dejemive  o;ie,  then  the  discussion  ok*  its 
justice  would  be  nugatory,  and  indeed  injurious,  and  the 
government  might  very  iuirly  suppress  all  examinutioPt  into 
its  merits.  *  > 

But  the  law  of  nature  and  nations  declares,  that  in  ades" 
potic  or  free  government*  the  subject  is  not  bound  t|o  obey 
the  unlawful  commands  of  his  prince  or  rulers — So  <|tvcn  at 
common  law,  a  slave  cannot  excuse  himself  by  di'js  com- 
mands of  his  master  for  committing  murder,  robbery  j  or  any 
other  crime.  If  Gen.  Dearborn  should  for  example  D}f  order 
of  the  president  seize  upon  Gov.  Strong  and  his  hoij^orable 
council,  and  attempt  to  transport  them  to  Washingto'jii,  they 
c  uld  have  a  habeas  corpus,  mid  question  the  legijility  of 
ach  an  order,  and  if  found  illegal,  Gen.  Dearborn  wjould  be 
punished  as  certainly  as  if  he  had  acted  without  any  orders — 
These  are  analogous  cases-— We  shall  now  cite  t|ie  highest 
authority  that  we  know  of  on  thcjlaw  of  nations  relnitive  to  the 
right  of  the  subject  to  judge  of  the  kwfutmss  of  i*j  war,  and 
to  refme  Ns  aid  in  its  support.  v 

Grotius,  book  II.  chap.  xxvi.  considers  this  \question 
distinctly— He  says,  that  '*  those  who  are  in  a  mor\e  servile 
"  condition,  such  as  sons  of  u  family,  servants,  siubjects, 
"and  each  particular  citizen^  compared  with  the^  whole 
"body  of  the  city  whereof  they  arc  members,  if  tliey  are 
"  admitted  toadvise,  or  left  to  their  own  choice,  whethtW  they 
"  will  take  up  arms,  or  be  quiet,  ought  to  be  guid\ed  by 
"  the  same  rules  which  arc  already  set  down  for  those 
"  who,  being  free,  have  pov/er  to  make  war  for  thems^elves 
"or  others.  But  li commanded  thereunto,  as  usually  \they 
"  are,  then  if  it  be  evident  to  them  thtvt  the  cause  be  unjust, 
**they  ought  altogether  to  forbear,  for  that  Cod  is  n.  per 
"  to  be  obeyed  than  man.  To  justify  subjects  for  refusing 
"to  execute  the  wicked  commands  of  their  princes,  Ave 


»^ 


48 

"  have  several  examples  in  sacred  story."  "We  conclude,**' 
he  says,  "  that  where  the  subject  doth  not  only  doubt  the 
*"  lawfulness  of  the  war,  but  is  by  very  probable  arguments 
•*  induced  to  believe  it  unjust,  especially  if  that  war  be  offen- 
*  *  sive  and  not  defensive,  he  is  bound  to  abstain."  Again  he 
mids,  in  book  III.  chap.  x.  "That  the  ground  of  a  war 
<'  being  unjust  (altliough  it  be  fo/e/;i;i/y  undertaken  as  to  tlic 
"  1  nanner,)  yet  are  all  those  acts  that  are  done  in  it  unjust,  so 
**  tl  lat  they  that  shall  knowingly  commit  such  acts,  or  assist 
**  in  the  doing  of  them  are  included  in  the  number  of  tliosc 
"  wl  io,  without  repentance,  cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom 
"ofl'icaven." 

W'k  now  shall  consider,  lastly,  what  are  the  peaceable  and 
const!  ftutional  remedies  in  the  hands  of  the  people  to  put  a 
stop  t  o  an  unjust,  offensive,  and  ruinous  war.  1  hcse  reme- 
dies a  re  of  various  sorts — they  are  such  as  belong  and  may 
be  us<  2d  by  each  individual  separately,  or  they  may  be  exer- 
cised by  the  people  collectively — Individually,  every  man 
has  a  1  'ight  to  express  his  disapprobation,  and  (if  he  feels  so 
stronj,  'ly)  his  execration  of  the  war,  and  of  the  causes  which 
led  to  it,  a  swell  as  his  horror  of  the  consequences  with  which 
it  is  pr>?g  nant — he  may  do  this  in  conversation  or  in  writing 
and  print ,  he  may  circulate  these  opinions  as  widely  and  as 
extensiv  'ely  as  may  be  in  his  power ;  he  may  encourage  others 
to  do  th(  ;  same,  and  may  endeavour  to  gain  as  many  prose- 
lytes to '  his  opinion  as  he  possibly  can.  He  may  point  out  to 
public  '  /censure  and  contempt  the  men  from  this  state  who 
desertc  /'d  the  interests  of  commerce  and  joined  the  standard 
of  its  e-  nemies,  without  whose  cooperation  this  deadly  measure 
woulc^ ,  never  have  been  adopted.  All  these  things  he  may 
do  wi  thout  being  amenable  to  the  laws,  in  all  these  things  he 
is  ex  <pressly  protected  by  the  constitution — there  is  but  one 
limit  auon  to  this  power — he  must  confine  himself  strictly 
to  tl  nth  in  stating  his  facts,  but  in  his  reasoning  and  infer- 
cnc  es  he  may  take  what  latitude  he  pleases.  The  individual 
har  i  two  other  rights  on  this  subject — he  may  assemble  and 
asf  ijociate  with  others  to  effect  a  peaceable  repeal  of  the 
dc  ;claration  of  war,  and  for  the  purpose  of  procuring  peace ; 
aj  id  he  may  vote  for  such  men  as  will  in  Congress  refuse 
♦'  3  aid  in  the  further  prosecution  of  this  ruinous  war. 


conclude,**' 
•  doubt  the 
arguments 
atheoffen- 
'  Again  he 
d  of  a  war 
en  as  to  tlic 
t  unjust,  so 
:s,  or  assist 
cr  of  tliose 
le  kingdom 

aceable  and 
pie  to  put  a 
"hcse  remc- 
ig  and  may 
lay  be  exer- 
every  man 
r  he  feels  so 
tuses  which 
with  which 
r  in  writing 
dely  and  as 
irage  others 
lany  prose- 
point  out  to 
s  state  who 
he  standard 
ily  measure 
ngs  he  may 
se  things  he 
e  is  but  one 
self  strictly 
and  infcr- 
individual 
isemble  and 
leal  of  the 
ring  peace ; 
^ess  refuse 
war.    --^ 


49 

I  might  add  to  this  statement  of  the  powers  and  rights  <SS 
the  individual,  that  when  called  into  service  contrary  to  the 
constitution  and  without  legal  authority,  or  when  called  td 
aid  in  executing  any  measures  which  are  a  violation  of  the 
rights  and  liberties  of  the  subject,  he  may  refuse  to  act — ^he 
has  a  constitutional  right  to  judge,  and  if  he  takes  care  that 
1  ■  is  correct  in  his  conduct  j  he  will  be  protected  in  hid  refu- 
sal by  the  tfivil  authority. 

The  individual  has  also  a  right,  and  indeed  it  is  laudable, 
to  associate  with  others  for  the  preservation  of  order  and 
quiet,  and  to  execute  or  assist  in  executing  the  laws.  A  city, 
town  or  county  is  disgraced  which  permits  a  lawless  banditti, 
as  lately  at  Baltimore,  to  triumph  over  the  prostrate  laws— It 
is  the  Wdfst  tyranny  Ivhich  can  happen — In  all  other  grie- 
vances you  have  redress  s^ainst  the  aggressors,  but  in  a  mob 
it  is  almost  impossible  tb  discover  and  detect  the  culprits. 
There  is  no  remedy  but  a  preventive  one,  and  there 
should  be  an  association  well  prepared  to  assist  the  peace 
officers  in  Suppressing  and  bringing  to  condign  punisliment 
all  disturbers  of  the  peace. 

This  is  very  important  when  the  measures  of  government 
multiply  the  number  of  idlers,  and  tend  to  ruin  the  morals 
and  habits  of  the  people.— Such  is  commonly  the  effect  of 
alt  wars — Such  will  particularly  be  the  case  in  ours,  which  is  a 
a  war  not  of  action,  but  of  suffering ;  not  of  glory,  but  of 
privation ;  not  in  our  own  cause,  but  in  that  of  France. 

The  people  collectively  have  a  right  to  meet  in  their  re- 
spective towns  as  bodies  politic,  then  and  there  to  express 
their  opinions  of  the  nature  and  tendency  of  the  present  [ 
war — to  point  out  its  destructive  effects  on  themselves  as  ' 
well  as  the  nation — to  send,  if  need  be,  delegates  to  any  ^ 
county  or  state  conventions  which  may  be  assembled  for 
the  same  peaceable,  orderly  and  constitutional  purposes — 
They  may  instruct  or  advise  their  representatives  and  sen- 
ators how  to  act  in  this  trying  emergency — especially  they 
may,  if  they  see  fit,  earnestly  recommend  to  the  senators  of  ' 
this  state  to  concur  either  in  a  general  ticket  for  the  choice 
of  electors  of  President,  or  in  a  choice  of  them  by  joint 
ballot.     They  must  recollect  that  on  the  change  of  Presi- 
dent depends  the  prospect  of  peace,  and  every  man,  let  his 


50 


N 


li'i 


politics  be  what  they  may,  who  is  attached  to  peace,  must 
wish  to  displace  the  man  w/io  ahne  is  responsible  Jbr  this 
wa/*— I  mean  Mr.  Madison. 

^  The  people  in  their  town  meetings  would  do  well  to  pro- 
vide for  the  preservation  of  order.  Frivateersmen,  recruits 
and  beggars  will  swarm  in  our  streets,  idleness  will  beget 
crimes,  and  too  early  and  too  vigorous  measures  cannot  be 
t^en  to  prevent  our  reputation  from  being  sullied,  and  our 
domestic  enjoyment  from  being  in  jeopardy. 
'  The  Legislature  of  the  State  also  may  do  much.  They 
have  already  done  a  great  deal  towards  the  restoration  of 
peace  by  the  dissemination  of  the  truth  and  of  sound  and 
correct  opinions.  It  is  their  legitimate  right  to  act  in  such 
times,  and  Mr.  Madison  himself  in  1797  pointed  them  out 
as  the  constitutional  organs  to  defend,  protect  and  guard  the 
fights  and  interests  of  the  people  in  dangerous  and  trying 
times. 

I  have  now  finished  my  proposed  plan,  and  it  only  re- 
msuns  that  I  suggest  a  few  general  thoughts  and  inferences 
which  the  subject,  the  reasoning  already  exhibited,  and  the 
awful  situation  of  our  country,  naturally  occasion. 

If  the  facts  above  stated,  and  the  arguments  before  urged, 
deserve  any  weight,  and  I  feel  a  confidence  that  the  people 
win  tlunk  that  they  do,  they  suggest  to  the  mind  very  pam- 
fUl  reflections — they  serve  to  shew  either  a  mistaken  policy, 
or  an  improper  bias,  and  undue  partiality  in  the  small  ma- 
jority of  our  rulers  who  have  plunged  us  into  this  calami- 
tous war.    There  are  some  other  detached  facts  tending  to 
impair  our  confidence  in  them,  and  to  shew  a  preconceived 
determination  to  enter  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  France, 
which  could  not  properly  have  been  introduced  in  the 
main  body  of  my  argument,  but  which  deserve  the  most 
weighty  consideration.     When  the  treaty  made  by  Mr. 
Jay  with  Great  Britain  expired  by  its  own  limitation,  (a 
treaty  ratified  by  Washington,  and  under  which  our  com- 
merce flourished  in  an  unexampled  degree,)  a  proposal  was 
made  to  Mr.  Monroe  by  Great  Britain,  to  renew  it  at  least 
during  the  existing  war  between  Great  Britain  and  France. 
This  proposal  was  submitted  to  our  Cabinet,  who  instruct- 
ed their  minister  not  to  enter  into  any  permanent  arrange- 


I 


&-'i 


51 


ice,  must 
'for  this 

illtopro- 
I,  recruits 
(rill  beget 
:annot  be 
,  and  our 

I.  They 
^ration  of 
3und  and 
ct  in  such 
them  out 
guard  the 
nd  trying 

:  only  re- 
inferences 
d,  and  the 
I. 

Dre  urged, 
the  people 
very  pam- 
:en  policy, 
small  ma- 
ils calami- 
tending  to 
iconceived 
of  France, 
ed  in  the 
I  the  most 
e  by  Mr. 
itation,  (a 
our  com- 
jposal  was 
it  at  least 
id  France, 
o  instruct- 
it  arrange- 


ment with  Great  Britain.  The  correspondence  between  tli? 
British  minister  and  Mr.  Monroe  will  shew  thisi  fact  as  well  as 
the  character  and  disposition  of  the  two  cabinets  at  tftat  peii. 
od — at  a  later  moment  our  two  envoys  extraordinary  con- 
eluded  a  formal  treaty  with  the  government  of  Great  Britain 
extremely  favorable  to  our  commerce,  and  which  Mr.  Mad- 
ison's two  friends,  Mr.  Monroe  and  Mr.  Pinkncy,  declare<), 
"to  be  satisfactory,  andtoembrace  all  the  subjects  wliichthey 
were  directed  lo  include."  This  treaty  the  t*resident  re. 
jected,  not  even  daring  to  lay  it  before  the  Senate,  lest  they 
should  advise  him  to  ratify  it.  This  measure  was  the  more 
^  extraordinary,  as  both  the  negotiators  retained  the  respect 
and  confidence  of  administration,  and  are  now  members  of 
the  same  Cabinet  which  rejected  their  own  treaty. 

Here  was  a  second  proof  of  the  disposition  of  Great  3rU 
tain  to  make  a  permanent  settlement  of  differeticcs  with 
this  country,  and  of  our  cabinet  to  avoid,  and  defeat  such 
an  arrangement.  The  third  attempt  to  settle  all  diilerenQes 
was  made  by  Mr.  Jackson,  who  assured  our  cabinet  that 
he  was  clothed  with  ample  powers  and  instruction^  to  set- 
tle every  point  of  difference  between  the  two  countries,  and 
offered  to  exchange  his  full  credentials  against  simjlar  ones 
to  be  given  by  our  cabinet  to  any  negotiator,  on  their  part-r 
As  soon  as  this  distinct  proposition  was  made,  fault  \^'as  in- 
stantly found  with  some  part  of  Mr.  Jackson's  langmige, 
but  with  what  particular  passage  no  two  men  in  Conglress, 
or  out  of  it,  are  as  yet  agreed,  and  he  was  dismissed  with 
as  little  ceremony  and  a  disposition  as  hostile  as  that  in 
which  the  declaration  of  war  was  made.  Mr.  Erskine  made 
an  offer  of  atonement  for  the  affair  of  the  Chesapeake,  which 
was  precisely  in  the  same  terms  in  which  the  satisfaction 
was  accepted  two  years  afterwards.  Yet  lest  all  dissentions 
should  be  buried  between  the  two  countries,  an  offensive 
clause  was  added  to  the  letter  of  acceptance  on  our  part, 
which  so  offended  the  British  cabinet  as  to  become  one  of 
the  prmcipal  causes  of  the  rejection  of  Erskine's  arrange- 
ment. 

Here  then  in  five  years  we  have  four  distinct  and  prom- 
inent facts  leading  all  to  the  same  point,  to  prove  a  disin- 
clination to  settle  with  Great  Britain. 


52 

Now  let  us  consider  some  facts  which  shew  a  disposU 
tion  on  the  part  of  our  cabinet  to  affront  and  injure  her,  and 
to  please  and  gratify  France.  I  shall  say  nothing  of  the 
President's  proclamation,  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations,  ex- 
cluding British  ships  of  war  from  our  waters  after  the  affair 
of  the  Chesapeake,  before  any  application  for  remedy  to  the 
sovereign,  who  instantly  disavowed  the  conduct  of  his  of- 
ficers and  promised  reparation — But  I  must  notice  the 
conduct  of  our  cabinet  after  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees. 
Great  Britain  notified  us  in  February,  1807,  that  she  should 
retaliate  those  decrees,  if,  after  due  time,  we  should  not  re- 
sist them — This  notice  on  her  part  was  certainly  frank  and 
honorable.  The  administration  contented  themselves  with 
replying  that  France  had  declared  they  did  not  extend  to 
us.  This  was  not  true — Mons.  Decres,  the  Minister  of 
Marine,  in  the  absence  of  Talleyrand,  did,  to  be  sure,  say, 
that  as  the  United  States  were  spiecially  protected  by  treaty ^ 
the  decrees  could  not  be  intended  to  operate  on  them,  but 
he  added  expressly y  that  he  had  no  authority  to  make  any 
explanation  m  the  absence  of  the  regular  minister  for  for- 
eign relations — In  fact,  the  Emperor  paid  no  regard  to  this 
explanation,  but  in  July  1807,  in  the  case  of  the  Horizon  de- 
clared **that  as  he  had  made  no  exception  in  the  terms  of 
his  decrees,  so  he  should  make  none  m  their  execution." 

In  the  same  month,  he  caused  to  be  seized  in  the  neu- 
tral states  of  Tuscimy,  Naples,  and  Hamburg,  immense 
amounts  of  American  property  under  his  Berlin  decree — 
We  took  no  measures  for  redress — we  have  taken  no  effec- 
tual ones  for  the  restoration  of  that  property  to  the  present 
day. 

To  suffer  millions  of  our  property  to  go  into  the  coffers 
pf  the  enemy  of  Great-Britain  without  a  struggle,  and 
scarcely  a  complaint,  was  a  wrong  done  to  Ver — was  as 
great  a  wrong  as  if  we  had  loaned  to  France  an  equal  sum, 
provided  we  had  the  means  of  redress,  which  we  most  cer- 
tainly had,  at  least  such  as  we  afterwards  deemed  effectual, 
to  wit,  non-intercourse  with  her.  But  in  another  light,  it 
was  a  still  greater  wrong  done  to  Great-Britain^  because 
these  goc^s  were  seized  on  account  of  their  having  been 
of  British  growth ;    thus  presenting  the  monstrpus  and 


. 


% 


a  disposi* 
re  her,  and 
ling  of  the 
ations,  ex- 
r  the  affair 
ledy  to  the 
of  his  of- 
notice  the 
in  decrees, 
she  should 
iild  not  re- 
frank  and 
ielves  with 
extend  to 
linister  of 
sure,  say, 
by  treaty  ^ 
them,  but 
make  any 
er  for  for- 
ward to  this 
lorizon  de- 
le  terms  of 
ecution." 
1  the  NEU- 
1y  immense 
I  decree — 
sn  no  effec- 
hc  present 

the  coffers 
Jggle,  and 
r — was  as 
equal  sum, 
e  most  cer- 
d  effectual, 
ler  light,  it 
n,  because 
aving  been 
istrous  and 


I 


53 

novel  doctrine,  so  injurious  to  all  neutral  states,  that  one 
neutral  shall  not  even  trade  with  another  neutral  in  tlie  pro- 
duce of  the  enemy  of  France. 

Such  was  our  boasted  resistance  to  the  French  decrees ! ! 
But  this  was  a  trifle.  Bonaparte,  not  content  with  this, 
told  us  through  Gen.  Armstrong  and  Mons.  Turreau,  in 
the  course  of  the  same  summer,  that  he  would  have  no 
neutrals.  In  the  autumn  of  1807,  Dutch  and  French 
merchants  wrote  to  their  correspondents  in  this  country 
that  there  would  be  an  embargo  m  the  United  States  in  the 
ensuing  winter.  Gen.  Armstrong,  it  is  said,  announced  to 
several  Americans  that  our  government  would  lay  an  em- 
bargo—our dispatch  ship  arrived  from  France,  and  in  three 
days  an  embargo  was  laid.  That  measure  was  in  effect 
xvar  upon  Great  Britain — ^it  was  avowed  as  such  in  Con« 
gress — it  was  justified  as  such  by  the  friends  of  adminis- 
tration— it  was  said,  that  it  would  bring  her  to  our  feet  in 
Jour  months :  yet  the  British  orders  were  not  known  in 
this  country  when  the  embargo  was  adopted — Mr.  Picker- 
ing, well  known  (and  deservedly  respected  wherever  he  is 
known)  .the  faithful,  steady,  able,  resolute  friend  of  your 
rights  and  interests,  has  declared  in  sundry  public  pieces, 
to  which  he  has  given  his  name,  and  has  never  been  con- 
tradicted, that  the  British  orders  were  not  known  in  the 
Senate  when  the  embargo  passed — in  fact,  they  were  some 
time  afterwards  communicated  by  Mr.  Jefferson  "as  a 
further  proof''  of  the  wisdom  and  prudence  of  the  embargo. 

We  have  only  to  inquire  then,  for  whose  benefit  was  the 
embargo  imposed  ?  and  against  xvhom  was  it  aimed  ?  We 
have  shewn  that  the  thought  of  it  ori^nated  in  France— 
we  say,  moreover,  that  Bonaparte,  in  three  public  state  pa- 
pers, approved  of  it,  and  praised  us  for  laying  it — we  say 
tliat  by  liis  decree  of  Bayonne  he  undertook  to  enforce  it— 
we  add,  that  as  soon  as  wc  dared  to  repeal  it,  he  issued  a 
decree  confiscuting  all  our  ships  and  cargoes  in  France. 

On  the  other  hand,  no  man  can  have  forgotten  the  keen 
letter  of  Mr.  Canning,  in  which  he  declared,  that  the  cabinet 
of  Great- Britain  perfectly  understood  that  measure  as  in- 
tended  exclusively  against  Great-Britain,  and  to  further  the 
views  and  projects  of  France.     In  short,  no  man  who  had 


54 

either  ears  or  eyes,  and  who  eitlier  heard  the  language,  or 
read  the  speeches  of  our  members  of  Congress,  could  doubt 
that  the  embargo  was  turned  cxchisively  against  Great. 
Britain — and  yet  it  was  imposed,  I  beg  the  puolic  to  recol- 
lect, it  was  imposed  before  the  British  orders  in  council 
were  known  in  this  country,  those  orders  which  now  figure 
in  the  fore  ground  of  our  picture  of  British  wrongs. 

Can  any  man  read  this  statement,  which  is  solemnly 
tme,  and  not  perceive  that  we  have  really  been  in  league 
with  France,  and  virtually  at  war  with  Britain  for  five  years 
past  ?  The  only  reason  it  was  not  before  declared  was  be- 
cause the  people  had  not  been  wrought  up  to  the  proper 
degree  of  irritation.  The  war  will  be  carried  on  upon  the 
same  principles  as  the  commercial  restriction  system  has 
been,  not  to  procure  a  redress  of  our  grievances,  but  to 
uphold  the  continental  system  of  the  emperor.  For  this 
purpose,  the  restriction  on  British  goods  will  be  kept  on  ; 
and  a  bill  is  proposed  in  Congress  to  prohibit  the  exporta- 
tion of  our  own  produce  except  in  American  bottoms,  or 
in  vessels  of  nations  actually  at  war  with  Great- Britain, 
Why  this  provision  ?  American  vessels  cannot  go  without 
immensejtisk — why  prohibit  our  exportation  in  any  neutral 
vessels  ?  or  in  any  vessels  of  nations  not  at  war  with  us  ? 
Pressed  to  the  earth  by  our  losses  and  our  war-taxes,  every 
vent  for  our  productions  TiUst  be  very  important.  But  it 
must  not  be — it  is  against  the  interest  of  France  that  you 
should  supply  Spain  and  Portugal  whom  she  wishes  to 
subdue — perish  American  commerce,  so  that  French  arms 
and  Frencn  policy  flourish  and  succeed.  Well  might  Mr. 
Felix  Grundy  say,  "France  has  somehow  twisted  a  knot 
about  our  necks — we  cannot  untie  it— we  must  cut  it  by 
the  sword."  But  in  lieu  of  cutting  the  knot,  Mr.  Gruijdy 
and  his  associates  have  very  sagaciously  cut  off  the  neck 
itself!  ! ! 

I  beseech  all  sober,  serious,  and  patriotic  men  to  ponder 
on  these  facts,  this  train  of  coincident  circumstances,  all  of 
which  are  of  public  notoriety,  and  then  say  to  what  a  dread- 
ful concliision  they  lead.  Can  they,  after  that,  be  surprised 
at  the  present  war  ?  There  are  men  however,  who  say,  that 
we  ought  not  to  analyze  and  weigh,  and  measure  our  CQm- 


juage,  01 
lid  doubt 
St  Great, 
to  recol- 
1  council 
>w  figure 

solemnly 
in  league 
ive  years 
,  was  be- 
le  proper 
upon  the 
'Stem  has 
r,  but  to 

For  this 
kept  on ; 

exporta- 
ttoms,  or 
i- Britain, 
a  without 
ty  neutral 

with  us  ? 
Kes,  every 
.     But  it 

that  you 
/Irishes  to 
:nch  arms 
light  Mr. 
ed  a  knot 
cut  it  by 
'.  Gruijdy 
'  tlie  neck 

to  ponder 
ces,  all  of 
t  a  dr^ad- 
surprised 
0  say,  that 
our  CQm- 


55 

parative  wrongs^-^hat  Britain  has  done  us  great  tnjury<*~ 
that  the  government  are  the  exclusive  judges,  when  the 
wrongs  which  we  suffer  demand  repai-ation  by  the  sword, 
and  against  whom  the  sword  ought  to  be  drawn,  and  they 
liaving  decided  this  question,  all  good  citizens  ought  not 
only  to  submit,  but  to  support  them  with  all  their  talents 
'and  fortunes.  It  is  a  war  they  say  iov principle^  and  for 
our  honor t  and  we  must  not  stop  to  calculate  consequences. 
Even  if  we  knew  that  we  should  fail,  we  ought  to  fight  and 
fall  valiantly.  If  one  could  perceive  in  the  conduct  of  our 
government  a  real  sensibility  to  the  wrongs  done  to  our 
country-'if  their  sense  of  honor  had  appeared  to  be  a  con- 
stant, impartial  and  regular  principle  of  action,  there  might 
be  some  weight  in  this  remark—- But  if  upon  a  short  com- 
parison of  their  conduct  towards  the  two  belligerents  it 
shall  appear,  that  they  are  feelingly  alive  to  every  appear- 
ance  of  injury  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  and  are  per- 
fectly insensible  to  the  multiplied  wrongs  and  insults,  the 
kicks  and  cufis,  the  robberies  and  plunders  of  France,  we 
cannot  bring  ourselves  to  believe  that  they  enter  into  this 
war  to  vindicate  tlie  honor  of  the  United  States. 

The  injuries  of  Great  Britain  we  have  already  enumera- 
ted and  considered.  They  are,  the  occasional  impress- 
ment of  our  seamen,  the  blockade  of  French  ports,  and  the 
orders  in  council,  which  in  fact  include  the  second.  We 
have,  however,  no  charge  agiunst  Great  Britain  of  breach 
of  treaty — the  only  one  she  has  made  with  us  since  the 
treaty  of  peace,  she  most  honorably  executed.  Her  ships 
of  war  have  covered  every  sea  for  twenty  years  past,  and 
had  she  been  actuated  by  the  same  dire  and  dreadfiil  hos- 
tility to  all  free  states  ab  France  has  been,  we  should  not 
at  this  moment  have  had  such  an  immense  commerce  to 
be  delivered  up  by  our  government  as  a  defenceless  prey 
to  her  numerous  cruizcrs.  The  past  unexampled  prosper- 
ity of  the  United  States,  which  has  been  the  boast  of  both 
parties,  of  Mr.  Jeflerson  and  Mr.  Madison,  as  well  as  oth- 
ers, is  the  strongest  proof  which  can  be  adduced  of  tlie 


general  spirit  of  justice  and 
councils. 


moderation  in  the  British 


i'      A 


h 


m 


1 1 


56 

Another  idea  is  very  important — so  honorable  and  so 

t'ust  has  been  the  conduct  of  her  merchants,  so  upright 
las  been  the  deportment  of  her  government  towards  our 
citizens  who  have  traded  to  her  ports,  that  many  millions 
of  dollars  of  American  proi^rty  are  at  this  monient  depos- 
ited with  her  for  safe  kcieping,  and  during  a  twenty  years* 
^ar  not  one  case  has  occjurred  of  a  violation  of  the  laws  of 
hospitality,  of  seizure  oft  our  property  confided  to  her,  or 
of  unnecessary  detention  or  embargo. 

Now  let  us  reverse  the  picture.  How  many  violations 
of  the  laws  of  civilized  nations  has  France  committed  dur- 
ing the  same  period  ?  I  shall  not  go  back  to  the  infamous 
conduct  of  her  cabinet  prior  to  Mr.  Ellsworth's  treaty — I 
limit  myself  in  considermg  the  amount  of  her  wrongs  to 
the  last  ten  years  only.  That  treaty  of  Mr.  Ellsworth's 
stipulated  that  we  should  have  a  right  to  trade  freely  with 
her  enemy,  and  from  one  enemy's  port  to  another,  and 
from  her  enemy's  ports  to  those  of  France.  Yet  long  prior 
to  the  Berlin  decree,  she  forbade  our  entering  her  ports 
after  having  touched  in  Great  Britain  merely  for  orders  nnd 
mformation.  The  Berlin  decree  annulled  this  article  of 
the  treaty,  or  rather  violated  it  in  a  shameless  manner — j'et 
our  government  never  complained  of  this  breach  of  treaty. 
France  has  professed  to  respect  the  doctrine  of  free  ships 
making  free  goods — ^yet  she  has  uniformly  confiscated 
British  property  taken  in  our  vessels,  nnd  has  made  it  the 
sweeping  pretext  for  condemning  millions  of  bona  fide 
American  property.  France  has  professed  to  favor  free  and 
neutral  commerce,  yet  by  her  ordinances  requiring  certifi- 
cates of  origin,  she  virtually  forbade  the  neutral  trade  in 
the  productions  of  her  enemy,  and  thus  aimed  a  fatal  blow 
at  our  carrying  trade. 

France  was  the  first  nation  on  the  civilized  globe  (at  least 
since  the  introduction  of  admiralty  courts)  which  author- 
ized its  cruisers,  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  nations,  to  bum, 
sink  and  destroy  neutral  ships  and  cargoes  on  the  high  seas 
without  any  manner  of  trial.  This  injury  has  not  been 
casual,  but  sytematic  and  repeated.  Mr.  Jejfferson  com- 
plained  of  it  as  the  "most  distressing  mode  in  which  belli- 
gerents exercise  might   contrary  to  right."     Yet  every 


• 


If  ranCe  i 
^st  possibl 
our  nation; 
t>agny  told 
^,  and  Ic! 
ison  instru 
years  since 

How  th 
tional  intet 
that  neithe 
the  questic 

If  It  be 
hot  fight  b 
honor  and 
if  fight  we 

Our  hot 
insult — be 
no  one  wrc 
Britain  has 
and  has  act 
tion  for  th 

Our  in^ 
ing  be  ind 
we  lose  th< 
— in  givin 
— France 
has  always 
merce,  cai 
cannot  rei 

But  it  1 
Britain  ref 

To  tho! 
tend  for  tl 

Ifneith 
his  courts 
in  the  Dai 
will  conv 
even  if  on 


si     ■ 

iFranCe  also  has  treated  us  diplomatically  with  the  greats 
t&i  possible  indignity.  Turreau  declared  war  for  us — but 
our  national  pride  never  rises  at  French  insults.  Cham- 
t)agny  told  us  that  "we  were  without  honor,  without  ener- 
^,  and  less  free  than  the  colony  of  Jamaica.*'  Mr.  Mad- 
ison instructed  Mr.  Armstrong  to  notice  this  insult  two 
years  since,  and  that  is  the  very  last  that  we  hear  of  it. 

How  then  can  it  be  believed  that  our  honor  or  our  na- 
tional  interest  are  the  motives  to  this  war,  when  we  find 
that  neither  of  them  are  regarded  when  France  is  a  party  to 
the  question  ? 

If  It  be  sjud  that  we  miist  chuse  our  enem)-,  that  wc  can- 
hot  fight  both  England  and  France,  then  I  itply,  that  rur 
honor  and  ihterest  required  that  we  should  tight  France, 
if  fight  we  must. 

Our  honor,  because  she  has  heaped  upon  us  insult  uponr 
insult — because  she  was  the  Jirst  aggressor — because  for 
no  one  wrong  or  insult  has  she  tendered  reparation ;  whereas 
Britain  has  made  us  proposals  respecting  all  her  ivjrr'es) 
and  has  actually  made  a  magnanimous  apology  and  «atis  Ac- 
tion for  the  greatest. 

Our  interest  required  that  we  should  fight  France,  if  fight- 
ing be  indispensable,  because  in  losing  the  trade  of  France 
we  lose  the  sale  of  only  three  millions  of  dollars  per  annum 
— in  giving  up  that  of  Great  Britain  wc  lose  thirty  millions 
— France  could  not  possibly  hurt  us  mor-i  in  war  than  she 
has  always  done  in  peace — Great  Britain  can  ruin  our  com- 
merce, can  inflict  an  injury  which  fifty  years  of  wise  policy 
cannot  repair. 

But  it  IS  said  that  France  has  repealed  her  decrees,  and 
Britain  refuses  to  perform  her  promise  *  ">  repeal  her  orders. 

To  those  who  with  a  knowledge  of  Cr .  facts  can  con- 
tend for  this  proposition,  all  argument  would  be  vain. 

If  neither  the  reiterated  declarations  of  the  emperor,  of 
his  courts,  of  his  marine  officers,  oar  his  personal  decisions 
in  the  Dantzick  cases,  nor  tb';  ?liiily  destruction  of  our  ships 
will   convince  men,    "neither  would  they  be  convinced 


even  if  one  should  ri-iie  from  the  dead."    [^See  Note  2.] 


ey 


,y 


( 


58 


But  one  remark  ought  not  here  to  be  otnitted,  and  that 
is,  tliat  Britain  has  lately  actually  repealed  her  orders  in 
council,  to  take  effect  when  the  trench  shall  have  repealed 
even  in  words  her  decrees — and  she  has  declared  that  all 
ships  taken  after  such  a  nominal  repeal  of  the  French  de- 
crees shall  be  instantly  restored  in  admiralty,  without  any 
new  order  to  that  eifect — It  is  at  such  a  moment  as  this, 
tliat  we  undertake  to  fight  Great  Britain  for  maintaimng  her 
orders  in  council  and  to  join  France  in  supporting  and  en- 
forcing her  decrees ! !  I  shall  now  quit  this  topic  and  take  my 
leave  of  my  fellow-citizens,  not  because  it  is  exhausted, 
for  I  scarcely  know  how  to  repress  the  many  thoughts 
which  occur  on  this  fertile  subject,  but  I  aim.at  utility  alone, 
and  I  have  said  as  much  as  most  readers  will  be  disposed 
to  read. 

If  any  man  can  conscientiously  say,  after  the  perusal  of 
this  candid,  well  authenticated,  well  supported  statement  of 
facts,  that  he  thinks  we  have  good  cause  of  war  against 
Great  Britain,  and  that  it  is  both  politic  and  just  to  single 
her  out  in  preference  to  France,  why  then  let  him  buckle 
on  his  armour,  and  fight  manfully,  though  fruitlessly,  in 
the  cause  of  France ;  but  those  of  my  fellow  farmers,  who 
with  me  think  that  the  war  is  neither  just  nor  expedient, 
and  who  know  it  will  be  ruinous,  will  leave  no  constitution- 
al measure  untried  to  put  an  end  to  so  fatal  a  measure. 

But  it  may  be  said,  and  it  is  often  said,  it  is  now  too  late 
to  discuss  the  merits  of  the  declaration  of  war.  The  Ru- 
bicon is  passed.  It  is  your  duty  to  submit  and  aid  as 
much  as  possible  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  It  is  not 
patriotic  to  vindicate  the  conduct  of  a  nation  whom  your 
jgovemment  lias  declared  your  enemy.  Let  us  before  we 
part,  my  fellow  citizens,  consider  this  subject.  Every 
war  is  supposed  to  liavc  some  definite  object.  That  object 
ought  to  be  a  legitimate  and  honest  one,  otherwise  the  war 
is  unjust.  It  ought  also  to  be  a  practicable  and  attainable 
one,  othenvise  the  war  is  inexpedient.  It  ought  not  to 
expose  us  to  greater  evils  and  dangers  than  those  which  we 
would  wish  to  remedy,  otherwise  it  is  rash  and  destructive. 
Ill  order  then  to  know  for  -ivfiat  we  are  to  fight,  and  hov.' 


59 


and  that 
orders  in 
e  repealed 
d  that  all 
rench  de- 
ithout  any 
nt  as  this, 
taining  her 
ng  and  en- 
nd  take  my 
exhausted, 
y  thoughts 
itility  alone, 
36  disposed 

c  perusal  of 
•tatement  of 
war  against 
ist  to  single 
him  buckle 
uitlessly,  in 
armers,  who 
r  expedient, 
jonstitution- 
ieasure. 
low  too  late 
The  Ru- 
and  aid  as 
'.    It  is  not 
whom  your 
i  before  wc 
:t.     Every 
That  object 
i^ise  the  war 
d  attainable 
ught  not  to 
;e  which  we 
lestructive. 
t,  and  how 


long  we  ought  to  fight,  and  what  we  are  to  insist  upon  as 
an  ultimatum  from  our  enemy,  it  is  necessary  to  discuss 
before  the  people,  (who  have  as  yet  heard  only  one  side  qf 
tJie  question  from  the  inflamed  speeches  of  members  ^ 
Congress)  the  whole  merits  of  this  war. 

If  we  are  bound  yore- v^r  to  approve  of  this  war,  because 
a  majority  of  six  senators  only,  (no  wiser  nor  better  than 
ourselves)  saw  fit  to  declare  it  in  complaisance  to  th(i  pres- 
ident, why  we  may  as  well  give  up  the  right  of  suffrage  at 
once  to  this  obligarchy,  and  let  them  save  us  the  trouble 
of  future  elections.  But  if  we  have  a  right  to  change  our 
rulers  and  to  put  in  better  men,  men  who  love  peace,  rather 
tlian  a  hopeless  war  ;  it  is  necessary  that  we  should  also 
have  the  right  and  power  to  shew,  that  the  present  men  have 
abused  their  trust  by  plun^ng  us  into  an  unjust  war  which 
might  and  ought  to  have  been  avoided.  What  limit  will 
our  friends  of  freedom  set  to  the  right  of  discussing  the 
merits  or  propriety  of  continuing  tlie  war  ? 

Suppose  after  ten  or  twenty  yejffs  of  war,  our  posterity 
shall  find  the  country  impoverished,  our  commerce  destroy- 
ed,  our  young  men  sacrificed  in  fruitless  expeditions,  the 
nation  ground  to  powder  by  taxes  and  paper  money— and 
suppose  our  enemy  still  triumphant  on  the  ocean,  and  thiit 
all  the  prophecies  about  her  downfoll,  shall  prove  illusory, 
would  not  some  future  patriot  in  1832,  be  authorized  to  ad- 
dress the  people,  and  assure  them  that  the  war  was  ruinous, 
that  the  points  for  which  we  were  contending  were  not  woi'th 
the  contest,  and  that  Britain  it  was  evident  could  not  bo 
compelled  to  yield  them,  and  that  for  these  reasons,  they 
ought  to  turn  out  those  who  were  for  continuing  the  war, 
and  put  in  those  who  would  restore  peace  ? 

Would  not  such  a  man  be  a  true  patriot  ? 

Well  then,  where  will  you  draw  the  line  as  to  the  time 
when  the  war  may  be  opposed  ?  Shall  it  be  fixed  at  six 
months,  a  year,  ten  years,  or  twenty  ? 

I  should  say,  that  from  the  moment  war  is  declared,  those 
who  conscientiousl If  opposed  its  declaration  have  a  right,  i.nd 
to  preserve  consistency,  are  bound,  to  endeavour  to  brin;if 
about  a  peace  by  shewing  the  folly,  the  wickedness  ai\dth? 
c^•ils  of  the  war. 


/ 


<vi 


t^Vfr'^.-.y.^  .')-•  ■»-''^^^.. 


V  (i^*^ 


If*.''" 


60 

Nay,  I  go  farther — ^the  sooner  you  do  this,  and  the  more 
strenuously,  and  vigorously,  and  undauntedly  you  urge  it, 
the  more  true  patriotism  you  discover.  For  by  these  means 
you  may  put  an  end  to  the  war  before  its  evils  are  fully 
realised,  and  while  the  country  still  possesses  some  com-^ 
merce  worth  saving ;  but  there  will  be  little  or  no  merit 
in  opposing  the  war  some  twenty  years  hence,  when  an 
oppressed,  and  impoverished,  and  desperate  people  rise  as 
they  will  eventually  do,  and  look  around  in  despair  for  the 
autnors  of  their  calamities  who  will  then  seek  refuge  in  caves 
and  mountains^  and  call  upon  the  rocks  and  hills  to  cover 
them. 

What  i$  this  doctrine  th^t  an  insulted  people  l;iear?  Why, 
that  a  measure  bi{^  with  the  fate  of  seven  millions  of  people 
passed  in  secret  conclave,^  (and  as  the  case  might  be,  and 
almost  waSf  by  a  single  vote,  and  that  for  aught  they  could 
know,  a  corrupt  one^  is  not  only  to  be  bindmg  upon  them 
as  a  law,  (that  they  know  and  will  submit  to)  but  its  jus- 
tice, its  wisdom,  its  expediency  must  not  be  questioned ! ! 

You  may  qhange  your  rulers  next  November  they  tellyou ; 
but  you  must  not  shew*;  that  Seaver,  and  Cutts,  and  Rich- 
ardson, andAVidgery,  and  Green,  have  sacrificed  your  inter- 
ests,— ^have  abandoned  you,  helpless  and  forlorn,  to  the  curses 
of  French  alliance  and  the  sweeping  andresisdcss  force  of  the 
British  marine.  These  are  not  my  maxims.  I  say,  meet, 
comprehend,  weigh,  consider,  discuss  the  causes,  secret  and 
^vowed,  the  progress  and  the  consequpnces  of  this  dreadful 
imd  needless  war.  Inquire  who  are  its  authors,  and  who  are 
opposed  to  it.  Compare  then;  together— at  the  head  of 
the  friends  of  peace  you  will  find  Jay,  and  King,  and  Pink- 
ney,  and  Stroilg,  and  Pickering,  and  Gilman,  and  Gore, 
and  Smith,  and  Otis,  and  Griswold,  and  Hillhouse,  and 
Qeneral  Brooks,  and  all  the  other  firienids  of  Washington, 
and  in  favor  of  it  you  will  find  Madison,  and  Dearborn, 
and  Cutts,  and  Widgery,  and  Seaver,  and  Austin,  and 
If  omans,  and  perhaps  some  of  the  colonels  and  lieutenant 
colonels,  contractors,  army  agents  and  custom  house  spies. 

Take  away  in  this  state  the  men  who  hold  places  under 
^e  government,  and  there  is  scarcely  a  man  of  any  distinc- 


tion 
catic 
bcM 
youi 
patr 
and 
turn 
cert 
revc 
JSTei 

THI 


V 


'I't'-V^ 


61 


^' 


1  the  more 
Quurge  it, 
liese  means 
iS  are  fully 
lOme  com* 
ir  no  merit 
%  when  an 
>ple  rise  as 
pair  for  the 
ge  in  caves 
lis  to  cover 

ar?  Why, 
s  of  people 
'ht  be,  and 
they  could 
upon  them 
)ut  its  jus- 
lestioned ! ! 
ey  telly  ou; 
,  and  Kich- 
your  inter- 

0  the  curses 
force  of  the 
'.  say,  meet, 
,  secret  and 
lis  dreadful 
md  who  are 
he  head  of 
;,  and  Pink- 

and  Gore, 
house,  and 
/"ashington. 

Dearborn, 
Lustin,  and 

1  lieutenant 
ouse  spies, 
laces  under 
tny  distinQ- 


{ 


tion  who  is  not  a  friend  to  peace*  Let  then  your  suppli- 
cations, remonstranc<'s,  n  solutions,  groans  and  complamts 
be  wafted  on  every  bree^ee  to  the  President's  throne.  Turn 
your  eyes  instantly  towards  such  firm,  upright,  undeviating 
patriots  as  will  save  the  commonwealth  in  this  perilous  time, 
and  suffer  those  who  have  abused  your  confidence  "/o  re- 
turn to  private  life;^^  but  above  all,  preserve  union  and  con- 
cert in  all  your  measures.  Recollect  the  old  maxim  of  our 
revolution,  which  is  still  more  important  to  be  applied  to 
New  England  an4  the  commercial  states  Kow  than  it  was 
THEN,  United  we  stand,  divided  we  fall. 

A  NEW-ENOLAND  FARMER. 


^ 


*■ 


NOTES. 


JVY)TE  1. 


>■> 


'^  Mr 


It  may  lit  tsked,  why  u>  nneh  time  is  derMed  to  the  •rgUment  upon  the  orders 
iu  Counoil  ? 

We  answer.  Because  the  otd  enmplaints  of  impressment,  and  of  hovering  on 
.our  eoasts,  and  the  general  principles  of  blockade  adopted  hj  Great  Britain,  are 
only  the  light  and  shade,  the  mere  colouring  of  the  principal  ostensible  cause  of  the 
war.  Any  man  who  will  review  the  course  of  negotiation  between  us  and  Great 
Britain  will  perceive,  tliat  since  the  settlement  of  the  affair  of  the  Cliesapeake.  the 
orders  In  Council  of  April,  1809,  are  the  only  ostensible  causes  of  hostility  which 
'  have  been  urged  wainst  Great  Britain.  Mr  Erskinc'a  arrangement  extended  only 
to  the  satisfaction  for  the  attack  on  the  Chesapeake  and  to  the  repeal  of  the  orders 
in  Council.  All  the  minor  points  in  dispute  were  left  untouched,  and  yet  Mr. 
Madison  undertook,  on  the  unautltorizcd  promise  of  Mr.  Erskine  to  restore  Great 
Britain  to  the  situation  <tf  the  most  favored  nation,  upon  the  settlement  of  the 
Chesapeake  affair,  and  the  repeal  of  the  orders  iu  Council  only,  leaving  the  other 
pretended  eauses  of  war  wholly  unadjusted. 

We  are  now  however  at  war,  and  in  order  to  know  for  what  we  engage  in  this 
dreadful  calamity,  we  ars  to  seek  the  answer  in  the  terms  of  Erskine  s  arrange- 
ment, Mr.  Madison  having  restored  Great  Britain  to  her  trade  with  us  by  that  ne- 
gotiation, and  he  'vas  not  authorized  to  do  this  until  Great  Britain  ceased  to  violate 
our  neutral  rights, 

We  have  a  risFht  then  to  say,  on  this  authority  of  Mr.  Madison,  that  the  orders 
in  Council  are  the  sole  eausc  of  the  war,  and  those  viho  wish  for  peace  must  citlier 
believe  that  those  orders  are  not  juttijiable  causes  of  war,  or  must  contend,  that 
their  repeal  must  hO  made  a  sine  qua  non,  an  indispensable  condition  of  any  .treaty 
of  peace. 

Now,  believing  as  I  do,  that  their  repeal  will  not  be  granted  by  Great  Britain  un- 
til  the  united  arms  of  France  and  America  reduce  her  to  the  lowest  degree  of  hu< 
iniliation  and  weakness,  or  until  the  Berlin  mnd  Milan  decrees  arc  repealed  ;  and 
believing,  that  it  is  neither  just,  nor  for  our  interest,  to  compel  her  to  rescind  them 
while  those  of  her  enejny  anterior  in  point  of  time  are  in  full  force,  1  have  thought 
it  expedient  to  endeavour  to  satisfy  the  citizens  of  our  country,  that  the  repeal  of 
the  orders  in  Council  ought  not  to  be  an  ultimatum  in  our  demands  in  a  negotiation 
for  peace.  If  we  are  not  persuaded  of  this,  it  is  vain  and  hopeless  to  clamour  for 
peace.  Peace  we  probably  never  shall  have,  if  we  conteml  for  the  repeal  of  the 
orders  in  Council,  unless  i  ranee  should  revoke  bona  fide  her  decrees. 

It  will  become  now  a  point  of  honor  with  our  enemy  to  maintain  them.  Yet  if,  as 
Mr.  Madison  luid  his  friends  contend,  the  orders  in  Council  are  a  signal  act  of  injus- 
tice, Avholly  unprovoked  and  unwarranteil  by  the  laws  and  usages  of  nations,  no 
fionerable  man  could  ash  tiie  government  to  makepeace  while  those  orders  remain 
in  force. 

It  is  bectuse  I  believe,  that  those  orders  were  so  far  as  respected  France,  the 
aggvessov,  justifiable.  It  is  because  I  believe  that  a  moderate  share  of  e)>irit  and 
honorable  impartiality  on  our  part  would  have  pi-ocurcd  the  repeal  of  the  French 
decrees,  or  at  least  have  induced  Great  Britain  to  rescind  her  orders  in  Council,  that 
I  have  entered  so  much  at  large  into  this  argument. 

I  now  advance  an  opinion,  which  I  fully  believe  will  appear  hereafter  to  be  cor- 
rect,  that  until  we  can  bring  ourselves  to  view  this  question  candidlif  as  between 
two  powerful  belligerents,  the  one  lighting  for  existence  and  the  other  for  eonqucst, 
until  we  can  perceive  that  Great  Britain  wus  constraineil  by  the  paramount  law  of 
self  preservation  to  retaliate  on  her  enemy  her  own  unexampled  mjustice,  we  must 
content  ourselves  with  a  perpetual  war,  (unless  France  should  rec.'-.de  from  her  sys- 
tem) or  else  hail  as  a  blessing,  the  greatest  possible  of  all  calamities  to  us,  the  sub- 
jngatinn  of  Great  Britain  by  the  common  enemy  of  the  human  race.  Those  who 
e»n  derive  consolation  from  such  a  prospect,  may  not  heed  our  arguments,  or  give 
vtrdit  to  our  motives,  but  sober  men  will  reflect  and  weigh  the  dreadful  conse- 
quences before  they  decide  to  contend  for  so  qucstiouablu  and  so  uniir.portaut  a 
poiot, 


#' 


/ 


1 


ncc 


^ 


M.- 


63 


le  orders 


I 


" 


JVo,    2. 

Bonap»r(e  has  inch  •  thorough  eonteropt  fqr  hU  new  allf,  Mr.  Madiioti,  that  he 
takes  no  pains  to  snare  his  fcehngs  or  sQpport  his  characUr.  Now  a  short,  simple, 
nominal  repeal  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  would  have  helped  Mr.  Madison 
much,  and  not  hav«  injured  the  emperor's  system  in  the  least ;  for  he  might  still  have 
•ondemned  under  special  decrees,  as  he  has  lately  done— he  roiffht  still  hare  burnt 
every  American  ship  on  the  ocean,  and  never  have  had  bis  imperial  repose  disturbed 
by  the  unquiet  complaints  of  his  new  ally.  But  as  if  purposely  to  proclaim  to  the 
world  his  utter  contempt  of  our  KOvernraent,and  his  aosolute  control  over  it,  he  has 
declared  on  not  let*  than  ten  public  occasions  that  his  decrees  were  not  repealed. 
And  why  should  he  net,  since  he  found  us  marching  on  as  straitly  as  he  'jould  wish 
to  Ailfll  his  orders  of  fighting  Great-Britain  ?  The  last  arrival  from  Europe  contains 
another  repetition  of  this  insult  and  contradiction  of  Mr.  Madison. 

The  Moniteur  (Bonaparte's  official  paper}  declares  "that  the  French  decrees  were 
not  repealed  with  respect  to  Americans  till  April  28, 1811,"  that  is  to  say,  six  months 
after  our  president's  proclamation  declaring  them  repealed  in  November,  ISIO,  and 
after  the  arrival  in  France  of  news  of  our  non-intcrcoui-se  act  of  March,  1811, 
which  was  construed  to  be  a  causing  our  rights  to  be  respected ;  so  it  now  appears 
that  the  condition  annexed  to  the  Due  de  Cadore's  letter  of  August  5,  1810,  was  a 
condition  precedent.  But  the  French  decrees,  according  to  the  Moniteur,  -were 
not  repealed  in  May  last,  for  it  concludes  witli'this  sentence — "Let  England  revoke 
her  new  legislation  of  blockade  and  her  orders  in  council,  and  the  Berlin  and  Milan 
decrees  tmm  be  annulled,  and  all  neutrals  treated  in  France  as  they  were  previous 
to  the  present  war."  This  was  at  the  very  moment  when  Madison  was  writing  a 
inanisesto  declaring  the  decrees  repealed. 

Now  what  neutrals,  we  would  ask,  are  there  in  the  present  war  ?  Upon  whom 
are  these  repeals  and  promises  of  Bonaparte  to  operate  ?  At  L.ie  time  when  the 
article  in  the  Moniteur  was  written,  America  was  a  sort  of  neutral — a  neutral  in 
etery  thin^  but  impartiality  in  its  dealings  ;  now,  alas  !  Europe  and  America  do  not 
contain  a  single  neutral  state.  Britain  stands  aloae  against  tlie  world,  defending  her 
right  to  retaliate  her  enemy's  injustice  on  himself,  and  ive  have  just  joined  France 
for  tlie  avowed  object,  as  the  Moniteur  tells  us,  of  compelling  England  to  withdraw 
her  retaliatortj  orders,  after  wliich,  it  Informs  us,  France  will  revoke  her  prior 
decrees,  (that  is  to  say,  if  s)ie  pleases,  and  can  do  no  better.)  But  when  England 
is  .  .'duced  to  that  state  of  liumiliation|  I  think  his  majesty's  promises  would,  like 
nian^  former  ones,  \>o  forgotten. 


JVote  3. 


The  people  are  to  be  deluded  into  the  belief  that  this  war  is  to  be  prosecuted 
without  the  imposition  of  new  taxes;  Congress  have  therefore  postponed  the  tax> 
bills— but  they  ar;  only  postponed.  After  the  election,  when  Mr.  Madison's  place 
will  be  secure,  they  will  be  passed,  or  if  not,  an  immense  debt  (if  they  can  procure 
loans)  will  accumulate,  and  then  the  only  boon  wc  shall  have  will  be  that  our  children 
will  be  taxed  instead  ol'  ourselves.  Now  the  liability  to  taxation  at  a  future  d.tr, 
and  the  certainty  that  that  day  must  arrive,  actually  reduces  the  present  value  of  oi'u* 
kouses,  our  farms,  and  the  price  of  labor  nearly  in  as  great  a  degree  as  immediate 
impositions  or  taxes.  The  future  taxes  indeed  will  be  enhanced  in  proportion 
to  the  accumulation  of  debt,  and  will  be  more  severely  felt  than  if  gradually  imposed. 
Public  credit  will  in  the  mean  time  suffer,  and  the  price  of  every  tiling  which  the- 
government  may  require  for  the  support  of  the  war  will  be  greatly  and  iiccillcssly 
enhanced. 

The  people,  particularly  of  the  Northern  St.ites,  are  now  in  fact  taxed  for  the 
war,  Uiid  will  soon  feel  its  pressure  by  the  diminished  viiliic  of  llieir  real  estates,  by 
the  reduced  price  of  labor,  and  the  difficulty  of  fimliii!;  emplovmcMit,  and  by  the 
dreadful  increase  of  the  price  of  ifll  foreign  conimoilitiii'i,  vvlii«U  have  become  almost. 
necessaries  of  life. 


